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This thesis responds to calls for more advanced portrayals of institutional effects 
on cross-country opportunity entrepreneurial activity (EA). In particular, it 
examines the effect of formal institutional development on EA depending on 
differences in informal constraints and economic development (ED). Though 
acknowledged in part within extant theory, little empirical research has 
documented the simultaneous interaction of all of the three variables in formal 
and informal institutions and ED. This research offers one perspective on the 
interdependencies and directionality between these variables. 
I suggest that a country's entrepreneurs respond differently to formal institutional 
incentives depending on societal culture and the nature of opportunities that arise 
from the predominant economic structure whether agriculturally, manufacturing or 
services based. I also develop an operational framework to translate institutions 
to conditions for EA. This framework suggests that formal institutions are 
associated with entrepreneurial opportunities and incentives, financial capital and 
an explicit form of human capital such as formal education. In addition, informal 
institutions are associated with social capital and a tacit form of human capital 
such as practical experience.  
I construct a panel dataset based on the GEM and World Bank Group 
Entrepreneurship Surveys and the IMF database for up to 45 countries over the 
2000–2007 periods. I test the hypotheses with a random effects generalised least 
squares model in a hierarchical multiple regression procedure. This procedure 
tests the significance in the variance of cross country EA due to the addition of 
two-way and three-way interaction terms. A contingency approach examines for 
two-way interactions while a configurational approach examines for three-way 
interactions. The regressors include not only explanatory variables themselves 
but also multiples of explanatory variables. I multiply the explanatory variables 
that represent conditional effects to test for moderating or interaction effects. 
The empirical results confirm that higher levels of formal institutions do indeed 
result in higher levels of EA. However, the results support the three-way but not 











institutions on EA that is not simply contingent on informal institutions alone. For 
institutions to provide a universal explanation of EA, their concomitant interaction 
with ED becomes important. In particular, the results show that higher levels of 
informal institutions - a culture of individualism and risk taking - tends to enhance 
the effect of formal institutions on EA more sharply among less developed than 
developed countries.  
The thesis confirms a non-linear but still increasing trend in opportunity EA as ED 
increases. An introduction of conditions of informal institutions and ED result in 
much greater confidence in a theory predicting the effect of higher levels of 
formal institutions on EA. It is advisable that policymakers design for differences 
in their cultural and economic contexts when they adopt formal institutions that 
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Efforts at market reforms to stimulate entrepreneurial activity (EA) have increased 
particularly after the fall of the Berlin wall. While former socialist countries have 
reformed their markets, other less developed countries in Africa, Latin America 
and Asia also started to do so (Rodrik, 2006). Different country contexts, 
however, have led to differential impacts of these market reforms on EA. In 
particular, two key conditions, which alter the effect of these reforms, are the 
existing local cultural context (Klyver et al., 2008) and the predominant economic 
structure (Acs et al, 2008).  
1.1 Problem background 
This thesis seeks an understanding of the varying rates in cross-country EA 
based on market reforms, local culture and economic structure. It explains the 
effects of market reforms and local culture on EA through institutional economic 
(IE) theory (North, 1990). IE theory relates market reforms and the local culture to 
an individual’s incentives to start businesses. However, individuals also require 
opportunities. Arguments that focus on either individual incentives or 
opportunities alone, without regard to the other, lead to an incomplete analysis 
(Shane and Venkataraman 2000). The thesis relies on economic development 
(ED) theory to explain the changes in the quantity and nature of opportunities.  
North (1990, p.3) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” 
Though he takes an economic perspective of institutions, he also includes an 
informal institutional dimension, which allows for secondary incentives such as 
social conformity. Formal institutions are codified. They include constitutions, 
laws, and regulations. In contrast, informal institutions lack formal codification and 
include conventions, norms, and traditions. While the force of law backs formal 
institutions, social custom enforces informal institutions. In addition, formal 
institutions are visible. For instance, countries can alter their constitutional law 
comparatively quickly to adapt to changing economic circumstances. In contrast, 
informal institutions are the invisible norms, values and acceptable behaviours 











This thesis argues that ED is an explanatory variable of EA since it explains how 
opportunities vary across countries. ED involves a process of structural 
transformation (Brinkman, 1995). It occurs with sustained growth from a simple, 
low-income economy to a modern, high-income economy (Myint and Krueger, 
2009). Its activities should be geared to creating an economic base (North, 1955). 
This includes economic activity where a surplus remains after the local 
consumption of the product, service, or activity has been satisfied. Such a surplus 
can then contribute to trade with parts of the country or the world. The money 
from trading activities results in an economic gain, in turn giving rise to ED.  
Kirzner (1973) suggests that the initial conditions of ED starts off the relationship 
between ED and EA. Specifically, Banerjee and Newman (1993) observe that the 
initial distribution of wealth from ED determines the pattern of occupation choice 
of potential entrepreneurs. The structure of occupational choice in turn 
determines how much people save and what risks they bear. These factors then 
give rise to a new distribution of wealth.  
Opportunities arise from the changes in economic structure. These opportunities 
increase when economic activity advances from primarily agricultural activity to 
primarily manufacturing activity and eventually to a high level of service activity 
(Porter et al, 2002). “In developed economies, consumer goods industries make 
superior use of highly specialised capital goods, particularly in machinery, and 
enjoy access to a wide variety of producer services, such as equipment repair 
and maintenance, transportation and communication services, engineering and 
legal supports, accounting, advertising, and financial services and so on” 
(Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996, p33). Herein are numerous opportunities for 
potential entrepreneurs to exploit. 
I theorise around individual-level EA since country-level EA aggregates individual 
level EA. Three broad streams of entrepreneurship literature have sought to 
understand why some individuals and not others choose to pursue 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Levie and Autio, 2010). These three streams have 
looked to theories from the fields of psychology, sociology and economics. 
Explanations based on psychology rely on answers in individuals’ traits and 











This tradition has emphasised the risks and uncertainty associated with the 
entrepreneurial occupational choice and suggested that only individuals with 
unusually strong achievement motivation and a tolerance of risk and uncertainty 
will tend to choose to start businesses. The psychological stream argues that 
predominantly intrinsic motivations drive entrepreneurs (Levie and Autio, 2010). It 
considers the context of the individual as less important. 
The sociological stream of entrepreneurship research has sought to explain the 
entrepreneurial occupational choice as the individual’s response to institutional 
pressures to conform (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Thornton, 1999). This stream allows for variance in EA rates across social 
groups. Non-economic factors induce this variance. Rational calculations of 
economic utility are only of secondary importance for the entrepreneurial choice, 
as individuals tend toward the socially desirable and normatively appropriate 
option (Levie and Autio, 2010). 
The economic literature tends to emphasise differences with respect to 
individual’s endowments of human, social and financial capital, and it considers 
individuals as rational beings who seek to maximise their economic and non-
pecuniary utility associated with an occupational choice (Blanchflower et al, 2001; 
1989; Lazear, 2005). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that those 
with the greatest capacity to be entrepreneurs will become entrepreneurs 
(Jovanovic, 1994). Because individuals tend to maximise utility, their decisions 
will be influenced by institutional factors that regulate the distribution of profits 
between different stakeholders, and thus, the accumulation and profitability of 
returns to their entrepreneurial efforts (Autio and Acs, 2010). Thus, depending on 
how institutional conditions influence the distribution of profits between, e.g., 
entrepreneurs and employees, individuals might decide to be either 
entrepreneurs or employees.  
The occupational choice literature provides a useful theoretical underpinning for 
the study of cross-country EA (Levie and Autio, 2010). The assumptions of 
rationality and utility maximisation associated with investments of human, social 
and financial capital permit the consideration of the entrepreneurial occupational 











traits, behavioural compulsions or social conformity pressures. Therefore, this 
thesis assumes an economic incentive for individuals to start businesses. In 
acknowledgement of the influence of the local society on entrepreneurship and 
wealth creation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Thornton, 1999), the thesis 
considers the cultural norms and values of society as a secondary incentive.  
The research of Acs and Szerb (2009) gives us some idea of the ED and 
institutional perspectives of the variance in EA rates across countries. This 
research shows an S-shaped relationship (see Figure 1) between ED and an 
index of entrepreneurship that includes measures of entrepreneurial attitudes, 
activity and aspirations from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
research (Bosma et al., 2009). An S-shaped relationship results because 
countries within primarily agricultural economic activity have low EA , which then 
increases among countries with manufacturing and innovation activity eventually 
levelling off as countries become fully developed (Acs and Szerb, 2009).1 
Which institutional factors most significantly affect EA also depends on an 
economy’s stages of ED. For example, state-of-the-art accounting disclosure 
rules are of little use in an economy where illiteracy and corruption prevail (Fogel 
et al, 2006). At this stage, the state should rather promote EA by offering 
entrepreneurs secure ownership of their businesses and legal enforcement of 
business contracts they enter. 
                                            
1 Acs and Szerb (2009) restricted their work to a study of opportunity EA. These two types of EA differ 
depending on the motivation of entrepreneurs to start their business. While opportunity entrepreneurs pursue 
a perceived opportunity, necessity entrepreneurs start businesses because all other employment options are 
either absent or unsatisfactory (Reynolds et al., 2005.). Opportunity entrepreneurs start businesses 
voluntarily. They are also likely to have invested more in the skills necessary to succeed as a business 
owner (Reynolds et al., 2005.). Empirical evidence based on GEM data shows that opportunity-driven EA 
has a stronger association than necessity EA to ED (Acs, 2006). As a result, an examination of the variances 
in opportunity-driven EA is expected to increase the validity of any inferences in the relationship between ED 












Figure 1: The S-shaped ED-EA relationship 
Source: (Acs and Szerb, 2009) 
1.2 Research problem 
There is yet more to understand about the underlying causes of cross-country 
differences in EA (Levie and Autio, 2011). If one examines the interplay between 
institutions and ED then one can explain the changes in the rate of cross-country 
EA. However, the way that the incentives underlying institutions and the 
opportunities underlying ED interact to give rise to an individual’s decision to start 
a business has not gone uncontested. The interdependency between incentives 
and opportunities complicates efforts at explaining differences in country-level 
EA. Theorists take different perspectives (Alverez and Barney, 2007). Some 
theorise that opportunities exist independently in the environment, waiting to be 
discovered (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Others suggest that opportunities 
are “enacted” based on the entrepreneur’s perception, interpretation, and 
understanding of environmental forces rather than simply discovered (Dutta and 
Crossan, 2005; Gartner 1985). Accordingly, opportunities are not waiting to be 











fact, as opportunities increase with ED, societal appreciation of entrepreneurship 
also increases (Minniti and Bygrave, 1999). Accordingly, the opportunities 
themselves also result in incentives.  
Extant research (Aidis et al, 2012; De Clercq et al, 2011b; Levie and Autio, 2010; 
Lim et al, 2010; Kreiser et al, 2010; Acs and Szerb, 2009) has not adequately 
explained the underlying interdependencies between opportunities and incentives 
that lead to cross-country variations in EA rates. A further complication arises 
because of interdependencies within incentives themselves, i.e. between formal 
and informal incentives. For instance, the positive effect of formal market reforms 
on EA might decrease if the local society has yet to regard entrepreneurship as a 
legitimate occupational choice. Though Acs and Szerb (2009) have attempted to 
model these interdependencies, their work is primarily empirical. They do not give 
a theoretical explanation of cross-country EA based on the interdependencies 
between opportunities and incentives... 
Based on my earlier argument for a primarily economic incentive underlying the 
occupational choice decision, I focus on the formal institutions-EA relationship. 
Formal institutions regulate the distribution of profits between different 
stakeholders and therefore, the profitability of entrepreneurial efforts (Levie and 
Autio, 2010; Autio and Acs, 2010). When formal institutions can influence a 
profitable outcome for entrepreneurs, then they serve as a powerful incentive for 
entrepreneurial efforts.   
Though researchers acknowledge that the impact of market reforms on EA is not 
universal (North, 1990; Boettke et al, 2008b), little research explains the 
variations in EA rates due to formal institutions across an entire spectrum of 
contexts. For example, one ought to consider both those contexts where 
societies perceive entrepreneurial choice as legitimate and those that do not. For 
instance, the strengthening of formal institutions such as a reduction in company 
tax might serve as a greater incentive when the local society views 
entrepreneurship and wealth creation as a legitimate occupational choice. This 
legitimacy eases their effort to identify and source available resources. In turn, 
this enables them to go on to find new and better ways to combine these 











A lack of attention to the deeper cultural-cognitive elements expressed in policies 
and regulations can lead to a superficial understanding of institutional processes 
(Roland, 2004). In fact, formal institutions are only effective when embedded in 
informal incentives (Williamson, 2009; Boettke et al, 2008b). We thus need 
research that includes both formal and informal institutions as explanatory 
variables of cross-country EA (Bruton et al, 2010).  
Much of current research has tended to describe informal behaviour in terms of 
social ties and networks rather than culture. These findings suggest that 
enterprising individuals use social relations to compensate for the lack of formal 
market mechanisms like property rights, contracting, and information exchange 
(Aidis, 2005; Smallbone et al., 2006; Aidis et al., 2009; Estrin and Prevezer, 
2010; Naudé, 2011; DeClercq et al 2011a). For instance, entrepreneurs in less-
developed countries might join various associations to establish the social ties 
that they go on to use to substitute for the inadequate regulatory environment (De 
Clercq et al, 2010). Such a substitution effect is absent among developed 
economies (Danis et al, 2010).  
Access to information on the existence of the opportunity (Kirzner, 1973) is an 
important antecedent of cross-country EA. Social ties and networks play a key 
role in accessing information (Singh et al., 1999). An individual with a high level 
of social status finds it easier to convince others that the opportunity they have 
identified is valuable, despite the uncertainty and information asymmetry present 
with such opportunities (Dolton and Makepeace, 1990). Social ties increase the 
likelihood that people will exploit entrepreneurial opportunities because social 
contacts provide information useful to the exploitation process (Cromie and 
Birley, 1992).  
However, research should go beyond the representation of informal institutions 
as mere social ties. As a result, Danis et al (2010) suggest that the work on the 
institutions-EA relationship include not only the social relationships that arise from 
associational activity, but also related cultural norms and values (Coleman, 1990; 











Moreover, even when such societal incentives are adequate, the surrounding 
economic structure might limit the type of opportunities available to aspiring 
entrepreneurs (Pinillos and Reyes, 2011). While I have motivated for informal 
institutions as a primary moderator of the formal institutions-EA relationship, the 
introduction of ED as a secondary moderator of cultural factors might result in an 
even more complete explanation of the changes in cross-country EA rates. Acs 
and Szerb (2009) show that increasing levels of ED have an overall positive 
effect on opportunity EA. Liao and Welsch (2003) found a strong association 
between cultural norms and technology-based entrepreneurs and an equally 
strong association between social ties and non-technology-based entrepreneurs. 
Technological change has also been strongly associated with ED (Porter, 1998b; 
Porter et al., 2002; Acs et al., 2008a, Rostow, 1960). 
Research thus far does not examine the contingent effects of both societal 
incentives and economic structure on the formal institutions-EA relationship. This 
requires a test of the simultaneous effect of formal and informal institutions and 
ED. In particular, approaches should examine for variations in EA due to a three-
way interaction. This calls for a configurational approach. While a contingency 
approach examines for two-way interactions, a configurational approach can 
examine for a three-way interaction (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005). 
Lastly, in research with such closely related variables such as EA, institutions and 
ED, one needs to deal with endogeneity concerns. This applies in particular to 
models acknowledging bi-directional causality between EA and ED (Reynolds et 
al., 1994; Naude, 2010a) and in the link between institutions and ED (Chang, 
2010). Longitudinal research designs are useful to enable the control for 
endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). Danis et al (2010) also suggest that a 
longitudinal research design will better establish the causal mechanisms 
underlying EA.  
1.3 Research purpose and objectives 
This thesis uses both IE and ED perspectives to explain variations in the rate of 
cross-country EA. Moreover, it explains the variations in EA due not just to the 











and ED. As suggested earlier, the institutional economics perspective delineates 
institutions into formal and informal incentives (North, 1990). Though this 
perspective has been referred to as an economic one, through a consideration of 
informal institutions one can also include the underlying cultural dynamics of 
society. This thesis’s explanatory variables thus include formal institutions, 
informal institutions, and ED. A configurational approach or three-way interaction 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) has the potential to assess the simultaneous interplay 
between these three explanatory variables. This type of approach ought to bring 
out the nuances in the effects of institutions and ED on EA. 
In order to commence a multiple regression analysis that includes a three-way 
interaction, the researcher has to choose a theoretically meaningful focal or 
primary explanatory variable (Jaccard et al, 2003). Unlike a two-way interaction 
analysis with only one contingent or moderating variable, a three-way interaction 
analysis contains two moderating variables. Thus, the researcher should also 
decide on a primary and secondary moderator. As argued earlier, this thesis 
assumes that economic incentives motivate entrepreneurs before societal ones. 
Accordingly, this thesis locates formal institutional incentives as the focal 
explanatory variable. This might include the incentives underlying the market 
reforms among countries in transition as well as developing countries.  
I argue that formal institutional reforms like the introduction of strong property 
rights do not have the same effect on EA across different countries. Formal 
institutions that are effective in increasing EA in one country cannot easily apply 
to another country with a different context. In particular, the effect of formal 
institutions will depend on the local cultural norms and values as well as the 
dominant economic structure. As Porter et al (2002) note, some countries are at 
a factor-driven stage with primarily agricultural activity while others are efficiency-
driven with primarily manufacturing activity. Yet others are at an innovation-driven 
stage with a high level of service activity. Overall, the responses of entrepreneurs 
in different countries will differ because of differences in incentives that arise out 
of its institutional context as well as the nature of opportunities due to differences 
in the predominant economic structure. Accordingly, this research uses the 











country EA when contingent on both the level of informal institutions and ED. In 
particular, I ask, “How and why is the formal institutions-EA relationship 
moderated by informal institutions and ED?” 
Brambor et al (2006) suggest an examination of the three-way interaction term for 
this type of analysis. I show the basic operational model below with the emphasis 
on the form of the last term with a coefficient b7. 
EA = b0 + b1(ED) + b2 (Formal) + b3 (Informal) + b4(ED) (Informal) + b5(ED) (Formal) + b6 (Formal) 
(Informal) + b7(ED) (Formal) (Informal)  
Where: 
EA = cross-country entrepreneurial activity 
ED = economic development 
Formal = formal institution 
Informal = informal institution 
b0 = estimated constant (later I will explain how heterogeneous country effects are included under 
this term) 
b1...b7 = estimated coefficients. 
Figure 2 depicts the broad operational framework, the detail of which I will 
discuss in later sections. Earlier, I noted that formal institutions include the laws 
and regulations designed by the state. Similarly, one regards the formal 
education system as a formal institution. This formal education system influences 
EA through its influence on an entrepreneurial resource like explicit human 
capital (HC). Similarly, the formal finance system influences EA through its 
influence on an entrepreneurial resource like financial capital (FC). The 
regulatory system of taxes and other related economic type entrepreneurial 
incentives are referred to as opportunity and incentives (O&Is). Earlier, I noted 
that informal institutions included customs, norms, and cultures and they manifest 
in societal behaviour. I associate these with an entrepreneurial resource like 
social capital (SC). I also suggest that these be associated with a tacit form of HC 











Adequate conditions for HC and SC are required to perceive O&Is, access FC 
and identify the actual opportunities available because of the prevailing economic 
structure. Entrepreneurship literature confirms that conditions for HC, SC, FC and 
O&Is influence EA (Reynolds and White, 1997; Davidsson and Honig, 2003a). I 
argue that institutions ought to nurture these conditions for EA. 
 
 
Figure 2: Preliminary framework of the nexus between EA, ED and institutions 
O&I conditions might usefully be measured by World Bank Governance 
Indicators and Doing Business projects (World Bank, 2007). Also useful are GEM 
entrepreneurial framework conditions (EFC) (Reynolds et al., 2005) like 
government policies and regulations, research and development transfer, the 
openness and dynamism of local markets. A possible indicator of FC conditions 
includes the GEM Finance EFC, which probes mainly external sources of finance 
regulated by law and accompanied by formal contracts. The GEM EFC on 
business content in education and training indicates explicit HC conditions. This 











The GEM EFC on general entrepreneurship capacity might usefully indicate tacit 
HC conditions. Possible indicators of SC conditions include GEM EFCs like 
entrepreneurial culture, the societal image of the entrepreneur, and the support 
and relations derived from business services and government programmes. 
Another useful indicator of includes the GEM individual measure viz. ’knowing 
another entrepreneur within the last two years. 
1.4 Contribution 
Country-level EA differs depending on the institutional context and level of ED 
within an economy. Therefore, one must examine this broad nexus between EA, 
institutions and ED (Acs et al, 2008a). By asking how and why informal 
institutions and ED moderate the effect of formal institutions on EA, this research 
will contribute to an understanding of EA across a wider range of contexts.  
1.4.1 Theoretical contribution 
This study contributes to on-going research on cross-country EA (Aidis et al, 
2012; De Clercq et al, 2011b; Levie and Autio, 2010; Lim et al, 2010; Kreiser et 
al, 2010). Unlike prior studies, it also considers ED explicitly as an explanatory 
variable of EA. By using a configurational approach, this thesis can examine the 
combined effects of formal and informal institutions as well as the further effect of 
ED. Thus, I am able to go beyond simply including these explanations in an 
additive manner to include how they interact.  
By considering the simultaneous interaction of formal and informal institutions 
and ED, this thesis can examine the underlying theoretical interdependency 
between incentives and opportunities as well as the interdependency within 
incentives themselves. Extant research has not adequately explained the 
underlying interdependencies between incentives and opportunities that lead to 
cross-country variations in EA rates. A further complication arises because of 
interdependencies within incentives themselves, i.e. between government and 
societal incentives (Dikova et al, 2010; Kreiser et al, 2010). By examining the 
formal institution-EA relationship under conditions of both informal institutions and 
ED, this study goes beyond explanations based on formal economic incentives to 











There is a need to understand the conditions in which formal institutional reforms 
operate to influence EA. Conditions include informal institutions and economic 
structure. Existing research has tended to focus on social ties and their 
moderating effect on particularly weak formal institutions. It has paid limited 
attention to issues of culture and trust as moderators of the formal institutions-EA 
relationship. Moreover, the differences in economic structure also influence both 
the level and rate of change in EA (Acs and Szerb, 2009). Thus far, research has 
not addressed the moderating effects of both informal institutions and ED on the 
incentives provided by formal institutions to entrepreneurs in the proposed 
direction i.e. the effect of formal institutions moderated by informal institutions 
and in turn moderated by ED. Moreover, this research extends the understanding 
of the proposed S-shaped ED-EA relationship by providing an institutional 
economic explanation of its non-linear trend.  
The thesis responds to several other calls for extending current research. De 
Clercq et al (2010) suggested increasing the external validity of the effects of 
institutions on EA using a wider range of economies while Danis et al (2010) 
suggest using longitudinal data to establish causal mechanisms. Danis et al’s 
(2010) also called for broader conceptualisations of SC than the oft-used social 
network explanations. The thesis also responds to a call to acknowledge 
opportunity-driven instead of necessity-driven EA as a useful measure to 
continue the conversation of the significance of EA in the light of ED (Acs and 
Szerb, 2009). While acknowledging the non-linearity in the ED-EA relationship 
being proposed by Acs and Szerb (2009), it examines this in the light of the 
institutional interplay. The configurational approach, applied to a combined 
sample of less-developed and developed countries will model non-linear effects 
as well as the interplay between ED and institutions, answering to the concerns 
of Chang (2010) among others that the development economics debate does not 
often account for such interplays.  
Finally, the research provides a framework to bridge the work done by 
institutional and entrepreneurship theorists. This bridge links formal and informal 
institutions to entrepreneurship conditions such as HC, SC, FC and O&Is. Since I 











Autio’s (2008) call to test the GEM EFC model in an investigation of the contexts 
of entrepreneurship. While they were among the first to test the impact of EFCs 
on entrepreneurship, this research will extend their efforts by locating the EFCs 
within institutional theory and ED. In addition, whilst the GEM EFCs (Bosma and 
Levie, 2010) provide a means to translate individual-level antecedents of EA to 
country-level conditions, this research aims to develop a more parsimonious 
framework by consolidating these into formal and informal institutions. 
1.4.2 Practical contribution 
This study’s findings could extend an understanding of appropriate policy 
frameworks for EA. Policymakers need to examine ways to factor in informal 
social constraints when designing policies and regulations to promote EA. For 
instance, they should reduce not just the red tape arising from arduous formal 
institutions but also stimulate individual risk-taking (Bruton et al, 2010; Boettke et 
al, 2008b). The effects of such cultural predispositions depend on the 
surrounding economic structure (Pinillos and Reyes, 2011). 
An integrated framework that includes both formal and informal institutions will 
assist policymakers to visualize the links between their disparate policies across 
several government departments. For example, government efforts into HC 
development may turn out to be inadequate in increasing EA levels since poor 
incentives like personal income tax and business tax may result in an individual 
with high levels of HC rather seeking high-paying employment (Naude, 2010b). 
A singular government department cannot influence EA in an isolated manner. 
Government departments need to align themselves in light of a national goal 
towards economic growth. Lundström and Stevenson (2002) assert that the 
greater the commitment to entrepreneurial development, the more effort there is 
in designing an interconnected government structure. This constitutes one of the 
greatest challenges in the implementation of a systemic and comprehensive 
entrepreneurial development strategy (Kantis et al., 2005). By contributing toward 
an understanding of the mechanisms that underlie EA, this research will enable 











Moreover, it will assist policymakers in developing strategies to influence such 
mechanisms to achieve their stated policy goals. 
1.5 Definitions, scope and limitations 
This research focuses on opportunity-driven EA since empirical evidence based 
on GEM data finds that only opportunity-driven EA is associated with economic 
growth (Acs, 2006). As a result, it does not look at other manifestations of 
entrepreneurship such as necessity EA and even corporate entrepreneurship or 
intrapreneurship (Bosma et al., 2010). 
The data for EA was extracted from the World Bank database on new business 
registrations across the world, limiting the application of this research to the 
formal economy (Klapper and Delgado, 2007; Acs et al., 2008b). I particularly use 
the data on ‘Entry Rate’, which is the number of newly registered corporations 
divided by the number of total registered corporations. Entrepreneurs who are 
motivated by an opportunity to grow their business also tend to register their 
enterprises (Levie and Autio, 2011). The use of new business registration data 
limits the definition of EA to the creation of a new enterprise (Gartner, 1985). 
While GEM data measures the potential for EA, the World Bank data measures 
actual EA albeit at a formal level (Acs et al., 2008b).  
This study limits its interpretation of ED to modernisation and technological 
advance (Solow, 1957; Rostow, 1960). During ED, a country's population 
increases its living standards, with sustained growth from a simple, low-income 
economy to a modern, high-income economy (Myint and Krueger, 2009). 
Accordingly, researchers tend to measure ED by GDP per capita.  
Measuring ED through GDP per capita has its limitations. Calculations of GDP 
per capita capture the transactions of formally registered enterprises within a 
formal economy and thus neglects activities within an informal economy 
(Schneider and Enste, 2000). Focusing on GDP per capita may therefore 
underestimate ED, e.g., transition economies like Poland are economically 











This thesis treats ED as an explanatory variable. However, theorists (Wennekers 
and Thurik, 1999) commonly acknowledged that variations in EA also explain ED. 
In the Methodology section later, I will look at ways to control for the endogeneity 
of ED. Endogeneity accounts for the fact that the explanatory variable depends 
on unobserved factors or even the feedback from the dependent variable as is 
the case in the ED-EA relationship. Not accounting for endogeneity will result in 
possible estimation errors of the regression coefficients.   
In fact, one doubts that the strict assumptions required for a recursive model are 
appropriate. In all likelihood, there are more non-recursive relationships among 
institutions, ED and EA that a fully specified path model might do justice do. For 
example, there is increasing evidence that entrepreneurs influence institutional 
change. For example, the institutional and regulatory framework in a democratic 
society results partly from a political process that is responsive, among other 
things, to the personal agency beliefs of individuals and organised interest groups 
whose political support is sought (Harper, 2003; Battilana et al, 2009). The 
prevalent personal agency beliefs of potential coalitions, in combination with their 
motivations, interests and ideologies, comprise the aggregate background of 
wants, which shape demands for public policy. Demands refer to those wants 
that the members of organised interest groups would wish to see implemented 
through public policy outputs of some sort (e.g. tax reform, tariffs and trade 
restrictions, and wealth transfers). As a result, we tend to run into problems of 
identification in explaining the supply of entrepreneurship and the determinants of 
entrepreneurial alertness. Such problems might include the difficulties in sorting 
out the potential simultaneous and lagged relationships, which often characterise 
economic phenomena (Harper, 2003). We also know that formal institutions arise 
out of longstanding informal institutions like culture (Boettke and Coyne, 2003). 
There are cases too of formal policies put in place to transform a local culture 
(Lundström and Stevenson, 2005). 
This seems to indicate that one must not use recursive models. Instead, one 
must use more realistic non-recursive models. If we employ a recursive model 
that violates the required assumptions and if we use OLS regression to estimate 











inconsistent. Thus, we will give an inaccurate assessment of the nature and the 
magnitude of the causal effects. This does not mean that we should specify 
models in which there are reciprocal influences between every variable i.e. a fully 
non-recursive model. To be useful in empirical research, a model cannot be fully 
non-recursive. Typically, some of the parameters of a non-recursive model must 
be assumed zero (Berry, 1984).  
A necessary condition for identification is that the number of exogenous variables 
must be greater than the number of endogenous variables. Otherwise, the 
models become under-identified. A unique solution is not possible. There are an 
infinite number of possible solutions when there are more unknowns than there 
are equations. 
In order to overcome this, I assume that EA can only affect institutions over the 
long term, longer than the period of 8 years for this panel data set. Similarly, 
informal and formal institutions affect one another only over the long term. 
Accordingly, I am able to relax the requirements of a fully non-recursive model. 
As a starting point for analysing the complex social and economic issues 
associated with entrepreneurship, the mostly unidirectional account of causation 
adopted is not unreasonable. As a methodological matter, a piecemeal approach 
that provisionally treats some variables as relatively constant and free from the 
effects of feedback disturbances is an appropriate way to promote the growth of 
our knowledge about this area. Marshall (1938) argued that such simplifications 
have enabled science to make progress in dealing with complex and dynamic 
matter. That is, the approach tentatively takes some institutions as given for the 
purpose of current analysis, while at the same time acknowledging that, at 
another level of analysis, or over a longer period, those assumed absolutes might 
well undergo endogenous changes. Over the longer term, the system is fully 
interconnected (Williamson, 2000). 
Reciprocal causation does not imply that the different causal elements must 
occur simultaneously. Indeed, with time lags, some causal factors take a while to 
kick in and to trigger reciprocal forces so that we do not have to consider every 











1.6 Thesis outline 
I organised the thesis as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the theory of 
entrepreneurship. Chapter 3 goes on to review the theory linking institutions to 
entrepreneurship. Chapter 3 also develops a framework that links institutions to 
conditions for EA. Then Chapter 4 reviews the theory of ED in light of the 
institutions-EA relationship. Chapter 5 reviews configurational theory and 
develops a conceptual framework consisting of five hypotheses. Chapter 6 
discusses the research methodology and related methods to lend empirical 
support to the conceptual framework. Chapter 7 puts forward the results. The 
thesis ends with a discussion on the findings, implications, limitations, future 












2. Entrepreneurship  
This study analyses EA at a macro-level. In order to explain the effects of formal 
institutions on entrepreneurship and the conditions that influence this relationship, 
I first attempt to seek out theories of entrepreneurship useful for a macro-level 
analysis. Though I include a discussion of the individual level antecedents of EA, 
in the following Chapters I will link these to the macro level conditions related to 
ED and institutions. 
I find that theories depicting entrepreneurship as an occupational choice (Lucas, 
1978) useful since country level EA can be viewed as a consolidation of a series 
of individual occupational choices. In addition, I find it useful to define 
entrepreneurship as involving the sources of opportunity; the processes of 
discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities; and the set of individuals 
who discover, evaluate and exploit them (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). The 
sources of opportunity fit in with my argument that the structural changes from an 
agricultural to a manufacturing to a services economy introduce numerous 
opportunities for potential entrepreneurs. In addition, the added description of 
entrepreneurship as discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities 
enable me to fit in the role of institutional incentives in the entrepreneurial 
process. The constraints placed by both state and society on such individual 
behavior either hinder or support EA. Lastly, in order to operationalize the 
occupational choice or opportunity exploitation decision, the thesis considers the 
creation of new enterprise (Gartner, 1985) as an entrepreneurial event.  
2.1 Theories of entrepreneurship 
Currently there exists a diversity of definitions of entrepreneurship (see Table 1) 
and a multitude of empirical studies without a common basis - a weakness in the 
field of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship literature emphasises the role of the 
individual as the main decision-maker (Levie and Autio, 2011). However, this 
individual centric approach has not achieved notable success in identifying 
potential entrepreneurs or explaining variance in self-employment decisions 











Table 1: Summary of entrepreneurship definitions  
Contributor Period Definition 
Richard Cantillon 1710 Buying and selling at certain prices, thus undertaking a 
risk in exchange for profit 
John-Baptiste Say 1801/1810 Using management talent to co-ordinate production 
Carl Menger 1871 Entrepreneurship involves obtaining information, 
calculation, an act of will and supervision 
Joseph Schumpeter 1910 Entrepreneurship is in its essence the finding and 
promoting of new combination of productive factors 
Frank Knight 1921 Directing and controlling whilst bearing uncertainty 
Harvey Leibenstein 1970 Entrepreneurship is the reduction of organisational 
inefficiency and the reversal of organisational entropy 
Israel Kirzner 1975 The identification of market arbitrage opportunities 
William Gartner 1985 The creation of a new business 
Howard H Stevenson 1988 Entrepreneurship is the pursuit of opportunity beyond 
the resources currently under your control 
Scott Shane and Sankaran 
Venkataraman 
2000 It involves the sources of opportunity; the processes of 
discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities; 
and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate and 
exploit them 
Zoltan Acs and Lazlo Szerb 2009 Entrepreneurship is the dynamic interaction of 
entrepreneurial attitudes, entrepreneurial activity, and 
entrepreneurial aspiration that vary across stages of 
economic development 
Source: adapted from Kao et al (2011) 
A definition gaining prominence over the last decade is Shane and 
Venkataraman’s (2000, p218) explanation of entrepreneurship as the, “sources of 
opportunity; the processes of discovery, evaluation and exploitation of 
opportunities; and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate and exploit them.” 
They shifted the earlier individual-oriented approach to entrepreneurship to a 











Table 1, we note that this definition has its origins in the work of Kirzner (1975) 
and later Stevenson (1988). Another helpful definition locates EA as the “dynamic 
interaction of entrepreneurial attitudes, entrepreneurial activity, and 
entrepreneurial aspiration that vary across stages of economic development” Acs 
and Szerb (2009, p7). However, I find the definition of entrepreneurship that 
delineates EA as sources of opportunity, discovery, evaluation and exploitation 
more useful to build arguments on how my primary constructs of institutions and 
Ed influence cross-country variations in EA. The sources of opportunity fit in with 
my argument that the structural changes from an agricultural to a manufacturing 
to a services economy introduce numerous opportunities for potential 
entrepreneurs. In addition, the added description of entrepreneurship as 
discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities enable me to fit in the role 
of institutional incentives in the entrepreneurial process. The constraints placed 
by both state and society on such individual behavior either hinder or support EA. 
Gartner’s (1985) definition of EA as the creation of a new business forms the 
basis of many empirical studies. As a result, in the Methodology section, I look to 
Gartner’s (1985) definition to locate measures of EA.  
I acknowledge that a consideration of entrepreneurship as start-up activity or new 
business creation has its limitations in fully accounting for EA. It does not 
consider the initiatives by employees in existing firms to undertake new business 
activities. Such initiatives, termed intrapreneurship, substitute for the decrease in 
EA in some highly developed countries (Bosma et al., 2010). Although 
intrapreneurship relates to corporate entrepreneurship, these concepts differ in 
the following sense. Corporate entrepreneurship occurs at the level of 
organizations and refers to a top-down process, i.e. a strategy that management 
can utilize to foster more initiatives and to achieve improvement from their 
workforce and organization. Intrapreneurship occurs at an individual level and 
refers to bottom-up, proactive work-related initiatives of individual employees 
(Bosma et al., 2010).  
As noted earlier in Section 1.1, the S-shaped ED-EA relationship shows that the 
rate of increase in EA ultimately declines among advanced economies. Perhaps 











within existing companies and they enjoy high remunerations as a result. In such 
contexts, they might increasingly choose high-wage employment. In effect, an 
increase in intrapreneurship substitutes for start-up activity within such contexts. 
Start-up type of EA therefore declines. In the next Section, I look at the related 
occupational choice decision that faces entrepreneurial individuals.  
2.2 Opportunity exploitation as occupational choice 
The decision to exploit an opportunity by starting a new enterprise arises from the 
occupational choice of individuals at the start of or during their active working life 
(Kanniainen and Vesala, 2005). The economic literature (Lucas, 1978; Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997), in 
particular, has favoured an explanation of opportunity exploitation based on the 
occupational choice decision. This perspective of EA emphasises the differences 
in a potential entrepreneur’s endowments of education, social support and 
finance, and it considers them as rational beings who seek to maximise their 
economic and non-pecuniary utility (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that those with the greatest 
capacity to be entrepreneurs will become them. Depending on how institutional 
conditions influence the distribution of profits between entrepreneurs and 
employees, potential entrepreneurs might decide to be either entrepreneurs or 
employees (Jovanovic and Gilbert, 1993).  
Evident then is the need to explore the effect of institutional conditions on EA. 
North (1990) suggests that institutions affect the distribution of incentives. 
Moreover, the incentive or disincentive to make the occupational choice lies in 
the gap between the expected utility of opportunity exploitation and the 
opportunity cost of utilising one’s time. Entrepreneurial ability plays a significant 
role in this gap.  
Lucas (1978) introduced the notion of entrepreneurial ability differences to 
explain enterprise size distribution and growth. The gap increases when 
individuals have information and skills that enable them to exploit opportunities 
better because these will increase their returns to opportunity exploitation. 











pursuit of an entrepreneurial opportunity. Skills are required to sell, bargain, lead, 
plan, make decisions, solve problems, organise a firm and communicate. 
Education also improves entrepreneurial judgement (Casson, 1995). Therefore, 
educated individuals are more likely to exploit opportunities than less educated 
individuals are (Reynolds, 1997).  
Career experience also improves entrepreneurial ability. General business 
experience (Schoonhaven and Romanelli, 2001), industry experience (Aldrich, 
1999), functional experience in marketing, product development or management 
(Roberts, 1991), and previous start-up experience (Holmes and Schmitz, 1993) 
all provide some of the information and skills that enhance entrepreneurial 
performance, thereby increasing the likelihood of opportunity exploitation. 
In addition, the entrepreneurial ability of parents plays a role. Parental 
entrepreneurial experience increases the likelihood that a person will exploit an 
entrepreneurial opportunity because one can learn through observation of others, 
some of the information and skills useful for exploitation of an entrepreneurial 
opportunity (Delmar and Davidsson, 2000). 
Entrepreneurial ability operates to influence the cognitive characteristics and self-
efficacy of a country’s potential entrepreneurs. Three cognitive characteristics 
influence the exploitation of opportunity. These are overconfidence, 
representativeness and intuition. Confident individuals are more likely to exploit 
opportunities because overconfidence leads individuals to take action in 
situations in which they do not have enough information to assess the likelihood 
of their success, but where further investigation would reveal the poor odds, short 
opportunity half-life, or low opportunity value facing them. Moreover, 
overconfidence leads people to follow their own information instead of heeding 
that provided for by others, to disregard disconfirming information and to 
misperceive the riskiness of actions (Arabsheibani et al., 2000). 
Representativeness increases the likelihood of opportunity exploitation because it 
makes individuals likely to generalise in situations where little historical 











where greater effort to analyse information will not resolve uncertainty, where 
individuals are not experts, and where one needs quick action. 
Intuitive decision-making increases the likelihood of opportunity exploitation 
because one can make the decision to exploit an opportunity under time 
pressure, uncertainty and limited information, all of which hinder analytical 
decision-making (Allinson et al., 2000).     
Country-specific structural or cultural determinants may not be less important as 
a determinant of cross-country EA (Klyver et al., 2008). Access to information 
about the existence of the opportunity (Kirzner, 1973) is an important antecedent 
of cross-country EA. Social ties and networks play a key role in accessing 
information (Singh et al., 1999). Social status makes it easier for a person to 
convince others that they have identified a valuable opportunity, despite the 
uncertainty and information asymmetry present with such an opportunity (Dolton 
and Makepeace, 1990). Social ties increase the likelihood that people will exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities because social contacts provide information useful 
to the exploitation process (Cromie and Birley, 1992). Cultural aspects might also 
play a role in non-pecuniary incentives in starting enterprises. Previous studies 
have also established that the profit motive may not fully capture the reasons why 
some people become entrepreneurs (Hamilton, 2000).  
While ability and culture play a role in the individual decision to start an 
enterprise, an important antecedent of EA is the opportunity itself. Ability and 
culture matter little when opportunities are scarce. 
2.3 Major sources of opportunity 
Three major sources of opportunity include (i) technological changes, (ii) political 
and regulatory changes and (iii) social and demographic changes (Shane, 2003). 
Technological changes are important sources of opportunity because the 
introduction of new solutions to problems makes it possible for individuals to 
allocate resources in different and more productive ways (Blau, 1987). Political 
and regulatory changes are important sources of opportunity because they make 
it possible for individuals to re-allocate resources to new uses in ways that either 











(Carrol and Hannan, 2000; Sine et al., 2001). Social and demographic changes 
are also important sources of opportunity because they facilitate the creation and 
transmission of information about opportunities, increase demand, and make 
possible opportunities that were otherwise not possible (Bygrave and Minniti, 
2000). Some sources of socio-demographic type opportunities include 
urbanisation, population dynamics, and educational infrastructure (Shane, 2003). 
Later in Chapter 3, I note that technological development underlies the very 
process of ED (Solow, 1957). Thus, if technology changes (Blau, 1987; Acs and 
Armington, 2004) give rise to opportunities then ED might affect the demand for 
entrepreneurs through an increase in such opportunities.  
2.4 The context for opportunity exploitation 
The fact that opportunities exist, does not necessarily mean that those with the 
greatest capacity to be entrepreneurs will become entrepreneurs (Jovanovic and 
Gilbert, 1993). Context plays a major role. This context includes the antecedents 
of EA such as work experience, education, social ties and networks and finance 
occur. The context for the exploitation of opportunity delineates into an industry 
and institutional context. These are explained next. 
2.4.1  Industry context 
Industry significantly influences the characteristics of opportunities. Eckhard 
(2003) found that some industries had a consistently higher percentage of start-
up companies on the Inc. 500 and experienced more initial public offerings than 
other industries. The industry context also influences potential entrepreneurs 
(Georgellis and Wall, 1999). Shane (2003) observed that two individuals with the 
same characteristics, both psychological and otherwise, would make very 
different decisions about starting an enterprise if the first one experiences an 
industry that favours opportunity exploitation while the other experiences an 
industry context that hinders it. 
There are five theoretical perspectives on industry level differences in the 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities through the creation of new 











industry life cycles, (iv) appropriability conditions and, (v) industry structure 
(Shane, 2003). 
First, knowledge conditions (Winter, 1984) influence the level of entrepreneurial 
opportunity present in an industry, and include such factors as the research and 
development intensity of the industry, the reliance of innovation by small 
enterprises, the degree to which an industry depends on public sector institutions 
to innovate, and the level of uncertainty in the industry. Empirical evidence shows 
that EA occurs more commonly in industries that are more research and 
development intensive (Dean et al., 1998), where individuals tend to source 
innovative ideas outside of the value chain. For example, universities (Shane, 
2001) have a greater level of small, micro and medium enterprise (SMME) start-
ups (Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Audretsch and Acs, 1994).  
Second, demand conditions (Kirzner, 1997) influence the level of EA in an 
industry, and include such factors as market size, market growth and market 
segmentation. Empirical evidence shows that EA occurs more commonly in 
industries that are larger, faster growing and more segmented (Dean et al., 
1998). 
Third, industry life cycles examine opportunity exploitation as a function of 
industry age, dominant design and the dynamic density of enterprises. Empirical 
evidence shows that EA occurs more commonly in industries that are younger 
(Barnett, 1997) and not yet converged on a dominant design (Baum et al., 1995). 
In addition, EA initially increases with the number of enterprises already in the 
industry and then declines when the number reaches a high level (Barnett, 1997). 
Fourth, appropriability conditions examine the ability of entrepreneurs to capture 
the returns to opportunity exploitation as a function of patents, complementary 
assets and other methods of appropriating the returns to innovation. The 
empirical evidence shows that EA occurs more commonly in industries where 
patents are more important, and complementary assets in manufacturing, 
marketing, and distribution are less important in appropriating the returns to 











Fifth, industry structure considers opportunity exploitation as a function of 
industry profitability, input costs, capital intensity, advertising intensity, industry 
concentration, and average enterprise size. Empirical evidence shows that EA 
occurs more commonly in profitable industries (Acs and Audretsch, 1989), have 
lower input costs (Carrol and Huo, 1986; Fonseca et al., 2001), are less capital 
and advertising intensive (Mata and Portugal, 1994), are less concentrated, and 
have lower average enterprise size (Dean et al., 1998).  
2.4.2 Institutional context 
The effect of the institutional infrastructure (Baumol, 1990) on productive EA 
divides into three categories of factors. These are (i) the economic environment, 
(ii) the political environment and (WestIii and Meyer) the cultural environment. All 
three sets of factors influence the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
First, within the economic environment four aspects influence the exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. These are (i) wealth, (ii) economic stability, (WestIii 
and Meyer) capital availability, and (iv) taxation. Evidence shows that societal 
wealth (Reynolds, 1994), economic stability (McMillan and Woodruff, 2002), 
capital availability (Pennings, 1982; Audretsch and Acs, 1994; Amit et al., 1998) 
all enhance opportunity exploitation. In addition, higher tax rates reduce 
opportunity exploitation (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000). 
Second, within the political environment, through perceived risks and returns, 
three aspects influence the level of opportunity exploitation in a society. These 
are (i) political freedom, (ii) the system of property rights and (WestIii and Meyer) 
the centralisation of power. Strong political freedom, property rights and 
decentralisation of power enhances opportunity exploitation (Harper, 1997). 
Third, the social and cultural environment influences the amount of opportunity 
exploitation that takes place in a society in three ways. By (i) influencing the 
degree to which community members consider EA desirable (Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994; Blanchflower et al., 2001), (ii) affecting the number of entrepreneurial role 
models (Smith, 1992; Walstad and Kourilsky, 1998), and (WestIii and Meyer) 













I find that the definition of entrepreneurship that best brings in the macro-level ED 
and institutional perspective is that defining it as involving the sources of 
opportunity; the processes of discovery, evaluation and exploitation of 
opportunities; and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate and exploit them 
(Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). This perspective of entrepreneurship enables 
one to consider both opportunities and incentives. The fact that opportunities 
exist, does not necessarily mean that those with the greatest capacity to be 
entrepreneurs will become entrepreneurs (Jovanovic and Gilbert, 1993). The 
incentives matter. Broadly, the context for the exploitation of opportunity 
delineates into an industry and institutional context.  
The industry and ED context are synonymous. For instance, sources of 
opportunity might arise from the technology changes experience by local industry 
(Blau, 1987; Acs and Armington, 2004). These changes underlie the process of 
ED. For instance, some industries have a consistently higher percentage of start-
ups on the Inc. 500 and experience more initial public offerings than other 
industries (Eckhard, 2003). Two individuals with the same characteristics, both 
psychological and otherwise, would make very different decisions about starting 
an enterprise if the first one experiences an industry that favours opportunity 
exploitation while the other experiences an industry context that hinders it 
(Shane, 2003). Thus, one can argue that ED might affect the demand for 
entrepreneurs through an increase in such opportunities 
I find the decision to exploit an opportunity synonymous with occupational choice 
(Lucas, 1978). Country level EA aggregates a series of individual occupational 
choices. This perspective emphasises the differences in a potential 
entrepreneur’s endowments of education, social support and finance, and it 
considers them as rational beings who seek to maximise their economic and non-
pecuniary utility (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). All of these traits are, in part at 
least, skills that individuals must develop. A country’s economic structure and its 
institutional environment can either encourage or discourage this, and so 
determines, in part at least, its level of EA. For instance, the occupational 











incentives provided by the state and the local society. In this way, one can 
incorporate the institutional perspective into a study of cross-country differences 
in EA.  
Depending on how institutional conditions influence the distribution of profits 
between entrepreneurs and employees, potential entrepreneurs might decide to 
be either entrepreneurs or employees (Jovanovic and Gilbert, 1993). The effect 
of the institutional infrastructure (Baumol, 1990) on productive EA divides into 
three categories of factors. These are (i) the economic environment, (ii) the 
political environment and (WestIii and Meyer) the cultural environment. All three 
sets of factors influence the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. Later, in 
Chapter 4, I note that the political and economic environment align with formal 
institutions while the cultural environment aligns with informal institutions (North, 
1990). 
With formal institutional reforms having taken place among post-communist 
nations and increasingly implemented among African and Latin American 
countries, it will be useful to examine the effectiveness of these reforms. As 
suggested earlier, the conditions among which these reforms take place include 
the local cultural context as well as the economic structure. Implicit here then is 
an interaction between formal and informal institutions. In addition, this interaction 
might vary depending on surrounding conditions of economic structure. In other 
words, the effectiveness of the incentives put in place by governments relies on 
the local societal incentives. However, even when local societal incentives are 
adequate, EA might increase little if the surrounding economic structure provides 
few opportunities. 
Lastly, in order to operationalize the occupational choice or opportunity 
exploitation decision, the thesis considers the creation of new enterprise 












3. Entrepreneurship and institutions 
Considering this research examines the formal institutions-EA relationship, I now 
review the theory of institutions and develop a framework to link institutions to 
conditions for EA. I argue that the formal institutions-EA relationship relies on the 
level of informal institutions such as the local culture. There are two schools of 
thought on institutional theory—an economic angle starting from North (1990) 
and a sociological one stemming from Scott (1995). In this thesis, I follow the 
economic angle. 
3.1 Institutional theory 
Institutions are important in determining the level of EA. Rules, regulations, 
property rights, and their enforcement matter because they affect transactional 
trust. Transaction trust includes the degree of trust the parties to a business 
transaction place in each other. Therefore, government matters because it 
establishes and enforces rules, regulations, and property rights. Good 
government raises transactional trust and so facilitates entrepreneurship. Culture 
also matters. For instance, authoritarian and hierarchical societies fail to honour 
self-made success, and social status forms part of the payoff to entrepreneurs. 
Other basic institutions like universal basic education also matter in that it lets 
latent entrepreneurs realize that opportunities exist. Openness to the outside 
world lets in foreign ideas and opportunities along with foreign goods and capital. 
Diversity also matters because it opens minds to new ideas. These factors all 
affect entrepreneurship because they stimulate information exchange. New ideas 
are a necessary condition for successful entrepreneurship (Fogel et al, 2006). 
Before going any further, I will first clarify the term, institutions. Still, there exists 
no agreed-upon framework on how to organise the various institutions (Hirsch 
and Lounsbury, 1997). Whilst North (1990) delineates institutions into formal and 
informal rules, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) delineate them into three isomorphic 
processes viz. coercive, mimetic, and normative. Yet further, Scott (1995) 
delineates them into regulatory, cognitive and normative institutions. Table 2 















Formal Comprise of statutes, constitutions, common law, and other 
governmental regulations. They determine the governance 
structure, individual and property rights, contracts, and the 
enforcement system. They are enacted, changed, and 
enforced by legislators, judges, bureaucrats, and other rule-
makers. 
North (1990) 
Informal Customs, moral values, religious beliefs, and other norms of 
behaviour that have stood the test of time 
North (1990) 
Regulatory Formally codified, enacted, and enforced structure of laws in 
a community, society, or country. Based on experience. 
Scott (1995) 
Cognitive Beliefs about the expected standards of behaviour that is 
specific to a culture. Based on shared understandings or 
taken-for-grantedness. 
Scott (1995) 
Normative Manifest in standards and commercial conventions such as 
those established by professional and trade associations, 
and business groups. Based on social obligation. 
Scott (1995) 
 
Coercive process Results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organizations by other powerful organisations and by 
cultural expectations in the society within which 
organisations function. Such pressures may be felt as force, 
as persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion. In some 
circumstances, organisational change is a direct response 
to government mandate. 
DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) 
Mimetic process When organizational technologies are poorly understood, 
when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment 
creates symbolic uncertainty, organisations may model 





Stems primarily from professionalization viewed as the 
collective struggle of members of an occupation to define 
the conditions and methods of their work, to control 
production and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation 
for their occupational autonomy. 
DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) 
North (1990, p.3) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” A 
government sets up and enforces formal institutions. It is an institution. 











influence EA, like laws and regulations. Government also influences features like 
law enforcement and judicial efficiency. However, features like culture and 
religion lie outside the control of government except perhaps in the very long run 
(Fogel, 2006). 
For example, government designed institutional features constrain EA. They 
impede information flow, raise information costs, and erode the gains from 
information. These can include lax accounting standards and disclosure 
requirements, weak property rights protection, an inefficient judiciary, and 
ambient corruption. Besides their direct negative impact on the information 
seeking aspect of EA, these institutional deficiencies also retard capital market 
development, which further dampens EA. They render markets less competitive, 
diversified, and developed, and this reduces economic pressures on established 
firms to explore new opportunities, like innovatively entering vertically related 
lines of business (Fogel, 2006). While institutions might lessen the uncertainty 
faced by the entrepreneur, they also make the actions of others such as resource 
providers and competitors predictable (Boettke and Coyne, 2003).   
According to Peng et al (2009), the scheme of formal and informal institutions 
complements Scott’s (1995) idea of three supportive pillars: regulative, 
normative, and cognitive. Formal institutions correspond to the regulative pillar 
while informal institutions cor espond to both normative and cognitive pillars. 
While the cognitive pillar corresponds specifically to the cultural aspect of 
informal institutions, the normative pillar corresponds particularly to the norms 
within informal institutions.  
Though both normative and cognitive institutional pillars draw on culture, there 
are differences between them (Bruton, 2010). The normative pillar represents 
actions that businesses and individuals ought to take. They include the standards 
of behaviour and commercial conventions of different professions, occupations, 
and organizational fields. A normative evaluation of legitimacy will show whether 
the business’s activities are proper and consistent with influential groups and 
societal norms. The cognitive institutional pillar includes the scripts, schemas, 
and taken-for-granted elements that influence individuals in a particular socio-











between a business and its cultural environment (Peng et al, 2009). For the 
purposes of this research, both normative and cognitive pillars are informal in 
nature. 
This thesis uses North’s (1990) delineation of institutions because of its 
parsimony, as well as its economic arguments associated with the use of 
economic structure as an explanatory variable of EA. Formal institutions are 
codified. They include constitutions, laws, and regulations. In contrast, informal 
institutions lack formal codification and include conventions, norms, and 
traditions. While the force of law backs formal institutions, social custom enforces 
informal institutions. In addition, formal institutions are visible. For instance, 
countries can alter constitutional law comparatively quickly to adapt to changing 
economic circumstances. In contrast, informal institutions are the invisible norms, 
values and acceptable behaviours (Coyne and Sobel, 2010; Sobel and Coyne, 
2011). One can change formal institutions more easily than informal institutions 
(Williamson, 2000).  
Informal institutions embody society’s perceptions about the world, the 
accumulated wisdom of the past and current set of values. Informal institutions 
are thus part of a society’s culture (North, 1990). Culture is the ‘software of the 
mind’ and formal institutions are themselves ‘products of the dominant cultural 
value systems’ (Hofstede, 2001, p255). They are sustained through generations 
by various transmission mechanisms such as imitation, oral tradition, and 
teaching. The enforcement of informal rules occurs by means of sanctions such 
as expulsion from the community, ostracism by friends and neighbours, or loss of 
reputation (Pejovich, 1998).  
Formal institutions can emerge in response to changes in economic conditions, 
such as new markets, knowledge and supply sources. Such changes result in 
new opportunities for human interactions. Potential entrepreneurs will seek new 
contractual arrangements to exploit these opportunities. Market friendly 
contractual arrangements have the potential to become institutions when they 
result in sustained and lower transaction costs. For these new formal institutions 












3.2 A framework for linking institutions to conditions for EA 
In order to explore extant theories and to facilitate the gathering of empirical 
evidence later in this thesis, I look for manifestations of institutions within extant 
entrepreneurship theory. As a result, I come up with a framework linking formal 
and informal institutions to conditions for EA. The literature on entrepreneurship 
has thus far not explicitly linked formal and informal institutions to EA. Conditions 
for EA might include human capital (HC), social capital (SC), financial capital 
(FC) and opportunities and incentives (O&Is). These conditions of HC, SC, O&Is 
and FC are related to antecedents of EA such as work experience, education, 
social ties and networks, finance and the opportunities themselves. Figure 3 
below, shows the links between institutions and conditions for EA.  
 
Figure 3: Links between institutions and conditions for entrepreneurship 
The opportunity exploitation process relies on entrepreneurial antecedents such 
as work experience, education, social ties and networks as well as access to 
financial resources by potential entrepreneurs. Broad support for these as 











occupational choice (Malecki, 1993; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Verheul et 
al., 2001; Lundström and Stevenson, 2005; Reynolds et al., 2005; Hoffmann and 
Gabr, 2006). In the sub-sections to follow, I explain further these conditions and 
their links to the respective institutions. Figure 8, above shows that tacit HC and 
SC conditions link to informal institutions and FC, O&I and explicit HC conditions 
link to formal institutions. For example, while high levels of formal institutions 
result in opportunities for EA, informal institutions influence the perceptions of 
these opportunities (Welter and Smallbone, 2003). 
3.2.1 Social capital conditions 
Informal institutions comprise of customs, moral values, religious beliefs, and 
other norms of behaviour that have stood the test of time (North, 1990). SC 
associates with informal institutions (Knowles, 2006), since it includes 
relationships as well as associated norms and values (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 
1994). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) define SC as the sum of the actual and 
potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the 
network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit.   
According to Coleman (1988), SC c mprises of three forms. One form includes 
the ability of information to flow through a community and provide a basis for 
action. Another more relational form includes the obligations and expectations 
that depend on the trustworthiness of the environment. Lastly, it includes the 
existence of norms and related sanctions. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) framed 
SC as consisting of three dimensions: (1) the relational dimension (trust, 
identification and obligation); (2) the cognitive dimension (shared ambition, vision 
and values); and, (3) the structural dimension (strength and number of ties 
between actors). 
Structural SC concerns the properties of the social system and the network of 
relations as a whole (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Thus far, researchers have 
examined SC by means of network characteristics, information and knowledge 
sharing, and the strength of social interactions (Carey et al, 2011) 
Relational SC refers to the trust, obligation, and identification present in personal 











willingness of parties to engage in cooperative activity through which further trust 
can be generated (Fukuyama, 1996). Trust precedes resource acquisition and 
knowledge combination and exchange. Therefore, those who develop a high 
degree of trust can more likely appropriate the knowledge, information, and other 
resources available in their social network. One thus expects, relational SC to 
enhance EA. 
Cognitive SC refers to those resources providing shared representation, 
interpretations, and systems of meaning among parties (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). They represent culturally supported habits. They gain legitimacy through 
subconsciously accepted rules and customs as well as taken-for-granted cultural 
account of EA. Although carried by individuals, cognitive programs are elements 
of the social environment (Berger and Luckman, 1991). Thomas and Mueller 
(2000) associate risk tolerance and independence to culture. Thus I suggest that 
these are associated with cognitive SC. Hofstede (2001) describes individualism 
as the relationship between the individual and society or group, while uncertainty 
avoidance relates to norms, values and beliefs regarding a tolerance for 
ambiguity and risk. 
The forms of SC are not mutually exclusive. Relational SC associates with the 
common belief system in cognitive SC, and the associated ability of actors to 
make sense of common experiences (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Adherence 
to the associated norms of behaviour breeds trust as the parties identify and 
conform to the shared ideologies underpinning the relationship. Relational SC will 
unlikely accrue if one party does not understand another (Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
Structural and relational SC operates to facilitate the access to information about 
the existence of the opportunity (Singh et al, 1999; Kirzner, 1973), an important 
antecedent of EA. An individual’s social status in particular makes it easier f to 
convince others that they have identified a valuable opportunity, despite the 
surrounding uncertainty and information asymmetry (Dolton and Makepeace, 
1990). Social ties increase the likelihood of opportunity exploitation because 
social contacts provide information useful to the exploitation process (Cromie and 











Cognitive SC influences EA through the different value systems that influence 
views of occupational choice (Thomas and Mueller, 2000). The degree to which 
members of the community consider EA desirable also influences the amount of 
opportunity exploitation (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Blanchflower et al., 2001). The 
number of individuals considered as entrepreneurial role models also influence 
EA (Smith, 1992; Walstad and Kourilsky, 1998). 
Part of the economic differences in countries arises from their different 
orientations in cognitive SC (Earley and Gibson, 1998; Dennis Jr., 2011). For 
instance while some countries contain an individualistic society, others might 
contain a collectivist society. Individualistic societies contain social ties that are 
loose. Within collectivist societies, potential entrepreneurs integrate into strong, 
cohesive in-groups from childhood onwards (Hofstede, 1991). This cohesiveness 
builds from a common set of goals, norms and values (Etzioni, 1968). For 
instance, values of individualism and power distance are often associated with 
cross-country differences in rates of inventiveness (Shane, 1991). In societies 
with high individualism, bankers might favour entrepreneurs with risk taking and 
independent thinking behaviour. 
The relational SC or trust referred to in this thesis includes generalised trust or 
trust in strangers. This helps ndividual self-determination. While at face value 
one expects increasing trust to be in harmony with collectivist societies, their 
hierarchical nature (Tabellini, 2010) and restricted within-group associations 
actually limits trust (Olson, 1982).  
Particularly in large and mobile societies, where personal knowledge and 
reputation effects are limited, a sizable proportion of potentially mutually 
beneficial transactions will involve parties with no prior personal ties. In societies 
in which strangers can trust one another to act in the collective interest, they can 
contract with a wide range of parties without drafting lengthy written agreements 
and operate enterprises without devoting too much time in monitoring employees, 
partners, and suppliers. Such individuals might also be more likely to support 
efficient economic policies than those within low-trust societies might, whether or 











Whereas Putnam (1994) views the market as undermining civil society, 
McCloskey (2006) contends that markets and exchange nourish and cultivate 
individual character, virtues, and ethics for the better. On the contrary, the 
concept of SC steeped in collectivism and egalitarianism includes communities 
that have developed customs and common values along ethnic lines. Interactions 
within most ethnic groups are thus subject to rules of behaviour that do not 
necessarily apply in dealings across ethnic lines (Pejovich, 1998). Within-family 
trust, intra-ethnic trust, or other forms of specific trust might hinder generalised 
trust (Fukuyama, 1996). This might lead to segmented markets, reducing gains 
from specialisation and perhaps from economies of scale (Greif, 1994). 
Meadowcroft and Pennington (2007) side with McCloskey and suggest that 
global expansion of markets has allowed communities that have little in common 
to connect by trade, thus leading to the development of a more inclusive 
‘bridging’ SC. 
Williamson (2011) argues that the market processes prevalent in 
individualistically oriented societies actually enhance the trust that underlies 
relational SC and the structural SC that supports the same relational SC. She 
suggests that trade provides individuals with new alternatives and opportunities. 
Therefore it increases self-autonomy and “locus of control,” increasing individual 
self-determination. The market increases the choice set facing individuals, giving 
them increased control over their lives and empowering individuals. A related 
benefit of economic exchange interactions is that integration reduces transaction 
and information costs. Such economic relationships create commonalities 
reducing the costs associated with interaction and exchange. These reduced 
transaction costs lead to increased interaction, fostering trust and respect, 
contributing to the growth of social networks and the extent of the market.  
3.2.2 Human capital conditions 
HC results from not only formal education, but also from experience and practical 
learning at the workplace. It also results from non-formal education, such as 
specific training courses. Thus, broad labour market experience, as well as 
specific career oriented experience, increases HC (Becker, 1964). I consider the 











institutions and the more explicit HC developed through formal education as a 
manifestation of formal institutions.  
HC theory suggests that knowledge contributes to cognitive abilities, enabling 
more productive and efficient activity (Becker, 1975). Therefore, potential 
entrepreneurs with more or higher quality HC should be better at perceiving 
profitable opportunities for EA. Prior knowledge and previous work experience 
are two dimensions of HC that play a significant role within the entrepreneurial 
process (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). Citizens’ idiosyncratic prior knowledge 
and work experience enable them to recognize market gaps and assess the 
economic potential of a new opportunity (Venkataraman, 1997). Often the 
education and tacit learning of the work environment are influenced by the 
socialisation processes arising from prevalent informal institutions like customs, 
moral values, religious beliefs, and other norms of behaviour that have stood the 
test of time (Mantzavinos et al., 2004). The reverse is also true. Policymakers can 
influence cultural changes through HC development over a longer term.  
HC fits in with both formal and informal institutions. Davidsson and Honig (2003) 
categorise HC as tacit and explicit. Tacit knowledge refers to expertise, the often 
non-codified components of activity. Explicit knowledge consists of the 
information normally conveyed in procedures, processes, formal written 
documents and educational institutions. Learning from peers, and in some cases 
learning from parents who are business owners, is a form of tacit knowledge 
development considered here as a manifestation of an informal institution. 
Explicit, codified knowledge in the form of school syllabi is considered here as a 
manifestation of a formal institution. 
3.2.2.1 Explicit HC 
Legislators, judges, bureaucrats, and other rule-makers enact, change and 
enforce formal education policies (North, 1990). They help entrepreneurs 
accumulate the explicit knowledge that provides skills to start a business. 
Empirical research shows that education frequently produces nonlinear effects in 
supporting the probability of becoming an entrepreneur (Davidsson, 1995; 











men are conditional on both the industry and higher levels of education. 
Education seems to be particularly important for female entrepreneurs (Honig, 
1998; Bates, 1995). 
Lucas (1978) introduced the notion of HC differences to explain enterprise size 
distribution and growth. The gap increases when individuals have information and 
skills that make them better able to exploit opportunities because these will 
increase their returns to opportunity exploitation. Education increases an 
individual’s information and skills that usefully exploit an entrepreneurial 
opportunity. Education also improves entrepreneurial judgement (Casson, 1995). 
Therefore, people that are more educated are more likely to exploit opportunities 
than less educated people are (Reynolds, 1997).  
Education and training systems contribute to high levels of venture scripts when 
they encourage individuals to be more entrepreneurial (Vesper and Gartner, 
1997). Institutions included here are the education and training system, and the 
labour market (Whitley, 1999). Empirical evidence shows that education 
influences the decision to start an enterprise (Robinson and Sexton, 1994). This 
willingness to start an enterprise arises from an increase in self-efficacy from 
possessing both specific technical and general knowledge.  
The availability of educational institutions affects rates of EA among nations 
(Bowen and De Clercq, 2008a). In the US, regions with a high density of 
educated individuals have above average rates of EA. The level of education of 
entrepreneurs associates with long prospering enterprises, especially for college 
graduates compared to those with less than a four-year degree (Doms et al., 
2010). 
3.2.2.2 Tacit HC 
Tacit knowledge can result from practical experience. It includes the norms and 
conventions, shaped by an individual’s experience (Boettke et al, 2008). This 
type of tacit HC might represent a better ’guide’ for entrepreneurs to identify 
opportunities than formal education alone. Individuals use their practical 
experience to obtain knowledge on where to find opportunities. These individuals 











ignore (Ucbasaran et al, 2008). The development of tacit HC through years of 
work experience might enhance one’s expertise and thus the confidence to take 
risks in starting a business within ones area of expertise. Thomas and Mueller 
(2000) associate risk tolerance and independence to culture. Tacit HC thus 
associates with cognitive SC. 
Entrepreneurial ability is a manifestation of a cognitive (Scott, 2001) or informal 
(North, 1990) institution. Cognitive institutions include information about market-
based competition or knowledge about how to exploit new business opportunities 
(Spencer and Gomez, 2004; Manolova et al., 2008). Since HC relates to 
awareness and knowledge, I consider it a manifestation of cognitive institutions. 
In advanced market economies there seems to be a restructuring and deepening 
of informal institutions not in the form of rules and regulations to substitute or 
complement the market and the state but in the form of tacit knowledge (Stiglitz, 
2000). From this perspective, HC conditions have the potential to be a key 
manifestation of informal institutions.  
Experience from general business (Schoonhaven and Romanelli, 2001), industry 
(Aldrich, 1999), and prior entrepreneurial initiatives (Holmes and Schmitz, 1993) 
provide the tacit knowledge to enhance EA. In addition, functional experience in 
product development, marketing, or management (Roberts, 1991) also provides 
the tacit knowledge required to start enterprises. Studies show that labour market 
experience, including management experience and previous entrepreneurial 
experience relate significantly to EA, particularly when controlling for factors such 
as industry and gender (Gimeno et al., 1997; Bates, 1995). 
Like any societal knowledge, meaning and value of entrepreneurship are also 
formed, learned, and transmitted through interaction with other societal members, 
like those at the workplace. Societies that value entrepreneurship include stories 
of successful entrepreneurs as part of collective knowledge (Hegele and Kieser, 
2001). These cultural heroes demonstrate that self-determination can combine 











3.2.3 Opportunity and incentive conditions  
In the modern theory of entrepreneurship, opportunities are real and independent 
of the entrepreneurs who perceive them. Opportunities are objective but the 
perception of opportunities is subjective (Hayek, 1937). Knight (1921) expressed 
the same idea in somewhat different language when he introduced his distinction 
between objective risks and subjective uncertainty and identified uncertainty-
bearing as the economic function of the entrepreneur. 
While Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) considered the opportunity itself to create the 
incentive, Shane and Venkataraman (2000) clarify incentives as profitmaking 
opportunities. For instance, if incentive structures distorted through high taxes, 
EA is less likely to occur (Kirzner, 1997). Since the expected profit opportunities 
accruing from entrepreneurship are the result of knowledge not commercialized 
by the incumbent firms, the magnitude of new knowledge shapes entrepreneurial 
opportunities but the commercialization capabilities of incumbent firms constrains 
them (Acs et al, 2009a). In this process of opportunity existence and the 
perception of opportunities, it seems then that the concept of incentives most 
usefully explains the perception of opportunities as sources of profit.  
Hoffmann and Gabr (2006) consider opportunity conditions being influenced by 
formal policies and regulations involving deregulation, removal of entry barriers, 
access to foreign markets, procurement regulation, national and global demand 
conditions, knowledge transfer and test facilities. The same researchers consider 
incentives arise from formal policies and regulations involving personal income 
tax, corporate taxes, fiscal incentives, social security discrimination, 
administrative burdens, labour market regulation, bankruptcy legislation, 
campaigns, and initiatives towards specific groups. Since all of these represent 
largely formal instruments under the control of governments, I thus consider both 
opportunities and incentives as a manifestation of formal institutions. Since all of 
these instruments form part of policies and/or regulations I have decided to 
consolidate opportunities and incentives into a single factor “O&Is”.  
O&I conditions and actual opportunities have different but related meanings in 











organising, new raw materials, new markets and new production processes 
(Ruef, 2002) that potential entrepreneurs could deliver as part of their business 
propositions. On the other hand, O&I conditions refer to macro-level conditions 
that influence whether individuals will exploit opportunities. These O&I conditions 
arise from both economic and political environments. Within the economic 
environment, aspects that influence the exploitation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities include wealth, economic stability, capital availability, and taxation. 
For example, higher tax rates reduce opportunity exploitation (Gentry and 
Hubbard, 2000). Within the political environment, aspects that influence the level 
of opportunity exploitation in a society include political freedom, the system of 
property rights, and the centralisation of power. Strong political freedom, property 
rights and decentralisation of power enhance opportunity exploitation (Harper, 
1997).  
O&I conditions affect EA in various ways. For example, strict labour regulations 
make it difficult for entrepreneurs to marshal the necessary human resources 
(Djankov et al., 2008b; Leung et al., 2008). They thus constrain entrepreneurs 
wishing to enter into labour-intensive industries (Klapper et al., 2007). Similarly, 
tax regulations also hinder EA (Djankov et al., 2008a). Over the longer term, 
changes in tax rates can potentially explain changes in EA rates. Changing tax 
rates and other regulatory burdens add to the uncertainty of EA and are a 
deterrent especially among less developed countries (Acs and Virgill, 2010). 
The regulatory protection of intellectual property incentivises entrepreneurs 
(Bowen and De Clercq, 2008b; McMullen et al., 2008; Sobel, 2008). It gives them 
a certain period to earn monopoly type profits. Particularly within a less 
developed country context, the ineffective legal enforcement of contracts and 
property rights frustrates potential entrepreneurs (Ahlstrom et al., 2000; Peng and 
Zhou, 2005; Naudé, 2010). On the other hand, tedious and time-consuming 
administrative formalities and bureaucracy can alter a potential entrepreneur’s 
occupational choice decision and thus decrease EA (Klapper and Rajan, 2006). 
Recently, Alvarez et al (2011) used the GEM EFC definitions to classify as formal 
institutions, conditions for entrepreneurship such as government policies, 











property rights. Markets and transactions more generally cannot function well in 
the absence of economic governance. Good governance secures the property 
rights, which incentivises individuals to save and invest. This encourages them 
not to fear that others will deprive them of the fruits of these activities. Good 
governance precedes the enforcement of contracts where potential 
entrepreneurs fear for example clients that fail to fulfil their promised role in the 
transaction, but instead act opportunistically.  
Conditions for O&Is that are related to this thesis’s modernisation perspective of 
ED (see Chapter 3) include the new technologies, the changes in consumer 
demand (Reynolds et al., 1994) due to high disposable incomes and the 
dominant economic structure. High or rising income and wealth levels enhance 
consumer demand (Jackson, 1984). Increasing income levels lead to a higher 
variety in the demand for goods and services making the introduction of new 
products less risky. Technological developments enable entrepreneurs to provide 
services in a different way and perhaps reduce the costs of production. 
Technology can raise awareness and thus influence demand (Verheul et al., 
2001). New technologies associate with the R&D capacity of a country. 
Numerous opportunities and related incentives for starting a business associate 
with technology diffusion, knowledge spillovers, imitation and the proximity of 
enterprises in a cluster. Among less developed countries, very small enterprises 
in agriculture, retailing, and craft will dominate. On the other hand, among 
developed countries, a shift from manufacturing to services creates opportunities 
since in many service industries economies of scale and other barriers to entry 
are lower than in manufacturing. In addition, the high disposable income among 
developed countries increases consumer affordability in turn giving rise to greater 
entrepreneurial opportunity (Jackson, 1984).  
Formal institutions stimulate technological developments associated with ED 
through privatization policy, competition policy and company legislation. 
Governments also stimulate technological progress through subsidizing R&D 
activities. Privatization policy can create opportunities for entrepreneurship in 











improves the accessibility of markets by reducing the market power of large 
enterprises and lowering entry barriers for new and small enterprises.  
3.2.4 Financial capital conditions 
FC may include the entrepreneur’s own savings as well as external sources of 
finance like debt, venture capital, angel financing and external shareholdings. 
Though the FC of entrepreneurs has an individual basis, GEM researchers have 
tended to explore the external sources of finance regulated by law and 
accompanied by formal contracts. The GEM finance EFC probes for equity 
funding, debt funding, government subsidies, funding available from private 
individuals (other than founders), venture capitalist funding, and funding available 
through IPOs. Recently, Alvarez et al (2011) used the GEM EFC definitions 
(Bosma and Levie, 2010) to classify FC conditions as a manifestation of formal 
institutions. Others like Welter (2005) have also considered the financial system 
of a country as a formal institution. Thus formal institutions manifest in FC 
conditions. Technology opportunities arising from modernisation require 
substantial externally-sourced funding. 
Finance is a key antecedent of EA (see Chapter 2). The returns and the 
borrowing constraints faced by potential entrepreneurs determine the 
occupational choice made at each level of wealth (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). 
An entrepreneur’s access to finance affects her or his entry decision (Berman 
and Héricourt, 2010). FC also moderates the effect of one’s entrepreneurial 
orientation on business performance (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005). Policies that 
increase access to bank finance, the creation of investment companies, low 
interest rates and credit guarantee schemes contribute significantly to the 
promotion of new enterprises (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994). 
Excessive reliance on internal funds indicates inefficient financial intermediation 
(Schwab, 2009). Public policymakers can enhance the FC available to 
entrepreneurs by influencing the efficiency of the financial market. Efficient 
financial markets reduce the reliance on internal funds and money from informal 
sources such as family and friends by connecting entrepreneurs to a broad range 











meeting short-term payments for labour and supplies as well as longer-term 
investments. The use of banks to finance investments or working capital indicates 
access to credit. Excessive loan collateral requirements are likely to constrain 
investment opportunities by entrepreneurs. 
The liquidity of financial systems influences the mix of debt and equity used by 
the entrepreneur (Whitley, 1999). A consideration of FC at a country level should 
involve the relative size of its stock market compared to its banks, the intensity of 
activity in stock markets compared to the banking sector, and the efficiency of 
stock markets compared to the banking sectors (Beck et al., 2005). Behind an 
equity-based financial system are generally large and liquid stock markets, which 
mobilize and distribute capital through market processes. Behind debt-based 
financial systems are banks and long-term credit institutions. Such institutions 
often use administrative processes targeted at certain market sectors and 
activities to allocate capital (Whitley, 1999).  
FC through debt is often a crucial determinant of EA (Evans and Leighton, 1989). 
However, high interest rates are likely to discourage potential entrepreneurs from 
EA, because of the costs and risks involved. Increases in interest rates have the 
effect of increasing the opportunity costs of EA. As interest rates increase, 
financial risk increases due to the risks of liability and redemption and because 
interest payments on debt have to be paid when due, irrespective of the 
enterprise’s profitability or liquidity levels. Often, personal finance will not meet 
the costs of EA, forcing potential entrepreneurs to use debt (Verheul et al., 2001). 
FC through venture capital sources has become important to especially 
innovative start-ups with a high-risk profile. Venture capitalists and angel 
investors use their skill to identify profitable start-ups by designing selection 
systems that meet their own risk-reward profiles (Brandl and Bullinger, 2009). 
3.3 Summary 
I have adopted North’s (1990) delineation of institutions because of its parsimony 
and the largely economic context of this research. This delineation suggests that 











can control formal institutions, informal institutions like culture lie outside the 
control of government except perhaps in the very long run. 
Formal institutions influence EA through their effects on information flows and 
transactional trust (Fogel, 2006). When governments are able to increase 
transactional trust and ease the exchange of information, entrepreneurs their 
clients and their resource providers face less uncertainty. Such contexts will tend 
to enjoy higher levels of EA. However, several researchers (Pejovich, 1998; 
Williamson, 2000; Boettke and Coyne, 2003) argue that for these new formal 
institutions to be sustainable, they should align with the prevailing informal 
institutions. Informal incentives - embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct - are more resistant to the deliberate policies and regulations of formal 
institutions. Accordingly, informal institutions will change more slowly over time 
than will formal institutions (North, 1990; Jutting et al, 2007). Formal institutional 
reforms that are supportive of EA might thus be thwarted when informal 
institutions do not support of EA. It might take considerable time before informal 
institutions adapt having observed the benefits of EA.  
I also find that the literature on entrepreneurship has not explicitly linked formal 
and informal institutions to EA. There is extensive literature on conditions for EA 
such as HC, SC, FC and O&Is. Aside from developing theoretical arguments, 
associating EA conditions to institutions will ease the location of empirical 
evidence. This is evident in the relationship between these conditions and the 
antecedents of EA such as work experience, education, social ties and networks, 
finance and the opportunities themselves.  
Manifestations of informal institutions include tacit HC and SC conditions. Tacit 
knowledge includes learning from peers, and in some cases learning from 
parents who are business owners. SC has the relational dimension (trust, 
identification and obligation), the cognitive dimension (shared ambition, vision 
and values) and, the structural dimension (strength and number of ties between 
actors). The relational SC or trust referred to in this thesis includes generalised 
trust or trust in strangers, in harmony with individual self-determination. While at 











their hierarchical nature (Tabellini, 2010) and restricted within-group associations 
actually limits trust (Olson, 1982).  
Manifestations of formal institutions include explicit HC conditions like the quality 
of formal education as well as FC and O&I conditions. Explicit, codified 
knowledge in the form of school syllabi is considered here as a manifestation of a 
formal institution. Individual and property rights, contracts, and an enforcement 
system underlie O&Is. FC includes the entrepreneur’s own savings as well as 
external sources of finance like debt, venture capital, angel financing and external 
shareholdings. Researchers have tended to explore the largely external sources 
of finance regulated by law and accompanied by formal contracts.  
O&I conditions and actual opportunities have different but related meanings in 
this research. Opportunities refer to the actual products and services, new ways 
of organising, new raw materials, new markets and new production processes 
(Ruef, 2002) that potential entrepreneurs could deliver as part of their business 
propositions. In this thesis, O&I conditions refer to macro-level conditions that 
influence whether individuals exploit opportunities. These O&I conditions arise 
from both economic and political environments. Within the economic 
environment, aspects that influence the exploitation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities include wealth, economic stability, capital availability, and taxation. 
For example, higher tax rates reduce opportunity exploitation (Gentry and 
Hubbard, 2000). Within the political environment, aspects that influence the level 
of opportunity exploitation in a society include political freedom, the system of 
property rights, and the centralisation of power. Strong political freedom, property 













4. The effect of economic development on the institutions-
entrepreneurship relationship 
These institutional constraints may seem almost trivial to the inhabitants of some 
developed economies, but they are largely lacking in many less developed 
countries and are surprisingly limited even in many otherwise developed 
economies (Fogel, 2006). While the role of EA in facilitating ED has been widely 
acknowledged, I argue here that ED is also a key condition for further EA to take 
place. I thus focus on the role of ED in influencing EA amidst the various 
institutional conditions. The importance of this reverse causality has been 
suggested by Shane (2009) and among others Reynolds et al. (1994) and Naudé 
(2011).   
4.1 ED and entrepreneurship  
“In developed economies, consumer goods industries make superior use of 
highly specialised capital goods, particularly in machinery, and enjoy access to a 
wide variety of producer services, such as equipment repair and maintenance, 
transportation and communication services, engineering and legal supports, 
accounting, advertising, and financial services and so on” (Ciccone and 
Matsuyama, 1996, p33). Herein are numerous opportunities for potential 
entrepreneurs to exploit. 
Theorists tend to use the terms growth and development synonymously. 
Brinkman (1995) explains that while ED involves a process of structural 
transformation, growth is the replication of more and more of the same structure. 
ED occurs with sustained growth from a simple, low-income economy to a 
modern, high-income economy (Myint and Krueger, 2009). Its activities should be 
geared to creating an economic base (North, 1955). This includes economic 
activity where a surplus remains after the local consumption of the product, 
service, or activity has been satisfied. Such a surplus can then contribute to trade 
with parts of the country or the world. The money from trading activities results in 











While entrepreneurs and institutions influence the structural transformation of an 
economy, the very process of structural transformation alters the entrepreneurial 
opportunities so that EA may be itself endogenous in the ED process (Reynolds 
et al., 1994; Naudé, 2011). Consequently, the links between ED and EA contain 
bi-directional causality (Naude, 2010a); EA affects ED, but ED also affects EA. 
However, Kirzner (1973) suggests that the initial conditions of ED starts off the 
relationship between ED and EA. Specifically, Banerjee and Newman (1993) 
observe that the initial distribution of wealth from ED determines the pattern of 
occupation choice of potential entrepreneurs. The structure of occupational 
choice in turn determines how much people save and what risks they bear. 
These factors then give rise to a new distribution of wealth.  
Boettke and Coyne (2003) remind us of the Austrian perspective of 
entrepreneurship as an omnipresent aspect of human action such that all 
individuals are entrepreneurs. Thus, they argue that entrepreneurship cannot be 
the cause of ED. They particularly look to Kirzner’s (1973) observation that the 
entrepreneur responds to opportunities arising from ED rather than creating them 
or as capturing profit opportunities rather than generating them. In responding to 
such unexploited profit opportunities, the entrepreneurial process improves on 
the production process, which in turn contributes to economic growth.   
There are several theories of ED to draw from (see Table 3 below). Rostow 
(1960) suggested overcoming an obstacle of traditionalism by going through five 
stages of ED: (i) the traditional society (ii) the preconditions for take-off (iii) the 
take-off (iv) the drive to maturity and (v) the age of high mass-consumption. 
Essentially, per capita growth cannot exist without turning the economy into a 
modern economy. Economies undergo a transformation from poor agrarian 
societies to modern industrial giants. Dependency models (Frank, 1967; Cardoso 
and Faletto, 1979) view less developed countries as ridden with institutional, 
political, and economic rigidities, trapped in a dependence relationship with rich 
countries. Similarly, world-system theory argues that countries are not entirely 
free, but rather are embedded in a structure of exchange relations that make up 
the world capitalist system. The political economy of relations shapes countries' 











available to those less advanced ones at the periphery of global capitalism. The 
neoclassical counterrevolution introduced market reform perspectives and called 
for freer markets, privatisation, statist planning, and government regulation of 
economic activities. Whilst neo-classical economics suggest that competition 
limits prices, classical economics suggests that supply and demand limits them. 
Table 3: Theories of ED in terms of obstacles and suggested solutions 
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Large, rent-seeking business 
groups with ties to multinationals 
and the state, state-owned 
enterprises, and subsidiaries of 
multinational enterprises (the 
‘triple alliance’). 
Business groups 
guided by state 


























































In Table 3, I find the modernisation perspective (Rostow, 1960) of ED useful to 
this thesis’s attempt to explain EA at a macro-level. Entrepreneurship and 
competitiveness researchers also support this view of ED (Porter, 1998b; Porter 
et al., 2002; Acs et al., 2008a).This perspective aligns with observations that 
potential entrepreneurs recognize opportunities from changes in technology to 
produce variants of services and inputs to large manufacturing enterprises 
(Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996). 
The role of technology is important in this modernisation perspective (Porter, 
1998b; Porter et al., 2002; Solow, 1957; Romer, 1994). Various technology 
changes take place when ED transitions from factor-driven to efficiency-driven 
and ultimately to innovation-driven economies. Factor-driven economies are 
primarily extractive in nature, while efficiency-driven economies exhibit scale-
intensity as a major driver of development. At the innovation-driven stage of ED, 
economies are characterised by their production of new and unique goods and 
services created via advanced, and often pioneering, methods. As countries 
develop economically, they tend to shift from one phase to the next. While 
Rostow (1960) focused on the age of high mass consumption, Porter’s model 
encompasses recent developments in the economics of knowledge; hence, he 
focuses on innovation. 
In the factor-driven stage, ag icultural products and small-scale manufacturing 
contribute towards the economy. Countries in this stage compete through low 
cost efficiencies in the production of commodities or low value-added products. 
Self-employment in agriculture, retailing and craft dominate (Noorderhaven et al., 
2004), with sole proprietorships being the dominant form of business registration. 
These countries neither create knowledge for innovation nor use knowledge for 
exporting. High levels of necessity type EA prevail. Almost all economies 
experience this stage, characterised by the very basic of requirements (See 
Table 4 below). 
Table 4 shows that though efficiency enhancers dominate the efficiency-driven 
stage of ED, basic requirements and innovation factors exist albeit to a lesser 
extent. Likewise, innovation and sophistication factors dominate the innovation-











present. Examples of basic requirements include health, primary education, and 
property rights. Examples of efficiency enhancers include higher education and 
training. Aspects of innovation and sophistication include the quantity and quality 
of local suppliers, well-developed production processes, business investment in 
R&D, high-quality scientific research institutions, collaboration in research 
between universities and industry, and protection of intellectual property (Lopez-
Claros et al., 2007).  
Table 4: Weightings at each stage of ED 
Weights  Basic 
requirements 
Efficiency enhancers Innovation and 
sophistication factors 
Factor-driven stage 50% 40% 10% 
Efficiency-driven stage 40% 50% 10% 
Innovation-driven stage 30% 40% 30% 
Source: Lopez-Claros et al (2007) 
In the efficiency-driven stage, a shift occurs from an agricultural towards a 
manufacturing oriented economy. Once industrialization sets in, enhanced scale 
economies arise while diminishing the scope for EA. To move into this stage, 
countries must increase their production efficiency and educate the workforce to 
be able to adapt in the subsequent technological development phase. Varying 
education levels results in varying levels of managerial ability. As an economy 
becomes wealthier, the average enterprise size should increase as better 
managers run the companies (Schultz, 1980).  
The innovation-driven stage marks an increase in knowledge-intensive activities 
(Romer 1990). In the innovation-driven stage, knowledge provides the key input. 
In this stage, the focus shifts from enterprises to individuals in possession of new 
knowledge (Acs et al 2009). The individual decides to start an enterprise based 
on expected net returns from a new product. The innovation-driven stage favours 











Innovation-driven economies move from manufacturing towards services, offering 
an increase in opportunities for small-scale production (Inman, 1989). This 
increase in EA arises from lower economies of scale and general barriers to entry 
in services compared to manufacturing. In some sectors, small businesses are 
more capable than large ones of occupying upcoming market niches (Jovanovic 
and Gilbert, 1993). Technological changes, with improvements in information 
technologies, such as telecommunications, have increased returns to EA. Mobile 
phones services, personal computers, the internet, web services, express mail 
services and photocopying services make it less expensive and less time 
consuming for geographically separate individuals to exchange information. In 
order for economies to move into the innovation-driven stage, they find it 
necessary to develop institutional conditions conducive to EA. Several countries 
have achieved this in the past decade, including Korea, Ireland, Israel and 
Taiwan to name some (Acs and Szerb, 2007). 
Recently Acs and Szerb (2009) showed that the innovation-driven economies 
break into three separate clusters. The most entrepreneurial country group, the 
‘leaders’, is followed by ‘innovation followers’. Innovation challengers’ refer to 
another group of innovation-driven countries with relative advantages in 
challenging the leaders‘. ‘Innovation followers’ and ‘innovation challengers’ still 
exhibit characteristics of the efficiency driven economies. Table 5 shows 




































































































Source: Acs and Szerb (2009) 
While the abovementioned technological changes result in an increasing number 
of opportunities for entrepreneurs to exploit, a recent theory not shown in Table 3 
- endogenous growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Romer, 1994) – also 











This theory views as endogenous the technological changes viewed by Solow 
(1957) as exogenous. Economic results primarily from endogenous and not 
external forces. It holds that investment in HC, innovation and knowledge are 
significant contributors to economic growth. It suggests that the positive 
externalities and spillover effects of a knowledge-based economy will lead to ED. 
The implications are that formal institutional incentives can have an impact on the 
long-run growth rate of an economy and thus on even more opportunities for EA. 
For instance, subsidies for R&D and education can increase the growth rate by 
increasing the incentive for innovation. 
4.2 ED and the source of entrepreneurial opportunity 
A common theme associates ED to changes in technology. Earlier, Section 2.3 
noted that changes in technology are an important source of opportunity (Shane, 
2003). Often ED introduces with it changes in technology that in turn sets off 
opportunities2 for EA. 
Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) make a particular observation on how ED results 
in opportunities. For instance, an initial investment in a modern factory that 
produces ‘final goods’ will set-off opportunities in a number of intermediate goods 
and services (Gries and Naude, 2009a). Intermediate goods include activities 
such as services, maintenance work, craft and trade, transport and logistics, 
commerce activities, and engineering.  
Potential entrepreneurs start small enterprises, which then supply intermediate 
goods to this modern factory (Gries and Naude, 2009a). Producing new 
intermediate goods induces final good producers to demand more of these. This 
demand in turn improves the incentives for other potential entrepreneurs to start-
up enterprises. With entrepreneurs spotting opportunities for providing final-
goods manufacturing enterprises in the modern sector with inputs, including 
services, the overall incidence of outsourcing in an economy increases (Gries 
and Naude, 2009b). Consequently, this raises the share of the services sector in 
                                            
2 Though I focus on opportunities related to ED, I acknowledge that the level of ED also influences 











employment and output. Changes in final consumer demand, in favour of more 
service and service-intensive goods as income rises, result in more opportunities 
in the modern sector for providing service inputs.  
From a long-run development point of view, these start-ups contribute to modern 
structural economic change by increasing the specialization of manufacturing 
enterprises by allowing them to outsource intermediate input supply (Gries and 
Naude, 2009b). Consequently, in countries that are able to adequately increase 
the entrepreneurial ability of their citizens and apply fewer constraints on start-
ups, there should be more opportunity-driven start-ups and more specialized 
manufacturing enterprises.  
4.3 ED and the spread of entrepreneurial opportunity 
An important mechanism to increase EA includes the spread of entrepreneurial 
opportunity. Entrepreneurial opportunities can spread through imitation (Schmitz, 
1989). They also spread through clustering (Porter, 1998a), entrepreneurship 
capital (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004), and the spillover of knowledge (Acs et 
al., 2009a) (see Table 6). Taking from the analyses of Baumol (1988), Schmitz 
(1989) argues that imitative type entrepreneurial processes accompany ED 
suggesting that the innovative type entrepreneurial processes proposed by a 
Schumpeterian model are not solely responsible. These processes involve 
individuals imitating the existing stock of industry knowledge and implementing 
this knowledge to produce a service or product. Entrepreneurs can augment the 
existing stock of knowledge in a learning-by-doing fashion. Technology diffuses 
















Table 6: Entrepreneurship theories linked to ED  
Theory Description Source 
Imitation Learning from the ideas of existing entrepreneurs Schmitz (1989) 
Industry clusters Enterprise formation or existing enterprise innovation through 
learning from the ideas and R&D efforts of entrepreneurs and large 











Knowledge spillovers from incumbent organisations have a positive 
effect on entrepreneurship. However, a nation’s institutions may 
impose a gap between knowledge and economic knowledge 
yielding a lower volume of spillovers. 
Acs et al (2009a) 
Source: Adapted from Acs (2010) 
Technology also diffuses when enterprises participate in a cluster (Porter, 
1998a). Clusters are geographical concentrations of interconnected companies 
and institutions like universities and trade associations in a particular field. A 
company participating in a cluster easily sources inputs, access information, 
technology and institutions and to co-ordinate with other companies. Clusters 
bring the benefits of external economies (Marshall, 1938). External economies 
depend on the general progress of the industrial environment. The growth of 
related branches in the supply chain, in the same locality, which supply highly 
specialised intermediate goods is an important source of external effects.  
 Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) use the concept of entrepreneurship capital to 
link entrepreneurship to ED. They define entrepreneurship capital as a region’s 
endowment with factors conducive to the creation of new enterprises. 
Entrepreneurship capital involves a high endowment of potential entrepreneurs 
willing to take the risk of starting a new enterprise. High entrepreneurship capital 
manifests in a high propensity for individuals to start new enterprises. It also 
implies the existence of formal and informal networks and a general social 











implies the activity of bankers and venture capitalists willing to share the risks 
and benefits involved: the concept of FC described later in Section 4.3.4.  
Acs et al (2009a) argue that EA does not involve simply the arbitrage of 
opportunities, but also the exploitation of knowledge spillovers not appropriated 
by existing enterprises. These spillovers as operate more strongly in high 
technology clusters of the type described by Porter (1998a). For example, 
individuals with knowledge and experience gained in R&D laboratories of 
previous employers start enterprises if the costs of starting the enterprises are 
sufficiently low. Associated with these knowledge spillovers then are employees 
with high levels of HC. Existing small enterprises can also start new enterprises if 
they decide to exploit the knowledge spillover from R&D activities of major 
enterprises.  
4.4 The institutional link to ED and EA 
Institutional theory helps to answer why there are cross-country variations in EA. 
Hall and Sobel (2008, p89) argue, “Entrepreneurship is the mechanism through 
which institutions are translated into economic growth.” Wennekers and Thurik 
(1999) developed a framework (see Figure 4 below) linking institutions, economic 
growth and EA. Though I am not interested in tracing the relationship from EA to 
economic growth, their delineation of macro-level elements of EA is worth noting. 
Macro-level variety, competition, selection and imitation contribute the crucial 
elements of entrepreneurship that relate to economic growth. Moreover, key 
mechanisms in which entrepreneurial opportunities diffuse through society 
include variety, competition, selection and imitation. Variety arises from the 
diversity of individuals and their entrepreneurial actions. Amidst this variety, 
competition and selection enable a country’s entrepreneurs to learn from their 
own and other’s successes and failures. These learning processes enable 
entrepreneurs to increase their skills and adapt their attitudes (Wennekers and 













Figure 4: Linking entrepreneurship to ED and institutions 
Source: Wennekers and Thurik, (1999) 
Entrepreneurship is an omnipresent aspect of human action (Boetkke and Coyne, 
2003). As such, it cannot also be the cause of ED. Rather, for ED to take place 
certain institutions must be present for EA to flourish. ED arises from the adoption 
of certain institutions, which channel and encourage EA in a direction that spurs 
economic growth. Among those countries where opportunities are left 
unexploited, one finds either a lack of institutions or an institutional structure that 
discourages opportunity-driven EA. Likewise, in those developed countries where 
individuals exploit opportunities for mutual gain, one expects an institutional 
environment that encourages opportunity-driven EA.  
The institutional approach to ED is contingent in nature. No single best path, 
process, pattern of development or social organisation exists. Rather institutional 
patterns of social organisation enable countries to take different approaches to 
ED (Rodrik, 2008). Chapter 3 I argued that the transitions from factor to efficiency 
and eventually to an innovation-driven stage of ED increases the quantity and 
diversifies the nature of opportunity-driven EA. Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) 
and Naude (2010) have suggested that the accompanying technological advance 











opportunities in services, commerce, engineering, maintenance work, craft and 
trade, and transport and logistics. However, the interplay between informal and 
informal institutions influences the actual exploitation of these opportunities 
(Boettke and Coyne, 2003). Prospering economies contain a context where the 
institutional interplay supports entrepreneurial ability and provides fewer 
constraints to exploit opportunities (Gries and Naude, 2009b).  
Formal institutions have a dynamic effect on entrepreneurs attempting to exploit 
the opportunities arising out of ED (Welter, 2011; Klapper et al., 2009). This might 
occur because formal institutions change more easily than informal institutions 
(Williamson, 2000). Changes in technology, political forces, and regulation 
influence the existence and occurrence of new opportunities (Shane, 2003). For 
example, the initial reforms in Central and Eastern European countries that 
allowed private enterprises to exist demonstrate the changes in regulations that 
can create new opportunity fields for entrepreneurs (Smallbone and Welter, 
2009). Nevertheless, the effect of formal institutions on EA will not be positive if 
informal institutions are also not supportive of EA. These informal incentives 
embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are more resistant to 
formal policies and tend to change slowly over time (North, 1990; Jutting et al, 
2007). 
Regard to informal institutions is necessary since human co-operation and 
related human co-ordination problems are central to the theory. Human co-
operation and co-ordination problems in exploiting the opportunities arising out of 
ED are likely to be traced to societal problems and related informal institutions. 
Two factors affect human cooperation viz. the completeness of the information 
received and the way that the individual processes such information (North, 
1990). For example, potential entrepreneurs formulate subjectively derived 
mental models of starting an enterprise. Human interaction relies on regular and 
expected patterns of behaviour. Institutions facilitate interaction, provide 
incentives, and reduce the coordination costs of undertaking EA by making 
actions more predictable. 
Formal institutions are rooted in longstanding informal institutions (Williamson, 











have a poor image of EA as a means of wealth creation. Sociologists (Biggart 
and Guillén, 1999) tend to regard informal institutions as the missing link in ED 
theory. They criticise market models that do not account for the conventions that 
govern social interaction in economic settings. They argue that even Schumpeter 
(1936) identified how social customs relate to ED. Schumpeter argued that 
economic activity occurs in repeating cycles and, over time, economic routines 
become custom. The entrepreneur steps outside of economic custom to establish 
new economic practices. 
Sociology based perspectives, through some alignment, can usefully support an 
explanation based on North’s (1990) formal and informal institutional framework. 
For instance, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), formal institutions drive 
the coercive isomorphism process. Informal institutions drive mimetic and 
normative isomorphism. According to Welter (2005), North’s (1990) informal 
institutions reflect normative and cultural-cognitive elements of institutions (Scott, 
1995).  
Generally, institutions operate to lower transaction costs by clarifying the rules 
and reducing uncertainty. Ideally, this occurs when formal and informal 
institutions are mutually supportive. This reduction in uncertainty leads to some 
entrepreneurs gaining more confidence to start enterprises. Others capitalise on 
the uncertainty. For example, if changes in formal rules are in harmony with the 
prevailing norms and values, the interaction of their incentives will tend to reduce 
transaction costs (Sobel and Coyne, 2011) and clear up resources for EA among 
those members of the community that are less wealthy. When new formal rules 
conflict with the prevailing cultural norms and values, the interaction of their 
incentives will tend to raise transaction costs and reduce EA within the 
community (Pejovich, 1998). However, more wealthy and less risk-averse 
members of the community might perceive this as an opportunity. 
This increase in transaction costs occurs because more resources are required to 
overcome the uncertainty from a lack of trust. Transaction costs are the costs of 
all resources required to transfer property rights from one economic agent to 
another. They include the cost of making an exchange i.e., discovering exchange 











agreements and the cost of maintaining and protecting the institutional structure 
i.e., the judiciary, police, and armed forces (Pejovich, 1998). 
Whilst North (1994) argues that adaptive institutions that are able to evolve over 
time are more likely to lead to speedier ED than institutions that are inflexible, 
Biggart and Guillén (1999) argue that high levels of ED could be still present 
among some countries that capitalise on their longstanding strengths. These tend 
to be informal in nature and result out of social organisation in collective 
understandings and cultural practice rooted in a country’s historical development. 
For example, some societies find it normal to raise finance through family ties. 
Yet, others view this as inappropriate. These other societies consider fostering 
ties to banks or to foreign investors as a more legitimate fundraising strategy. 
4.5 Summary 
Formal institutions have a dynamic effect on entrepreneurs attempting to exploit 
the opportunities arising out of ED (Welter, 2011; Klapper et al., 2009). This might 
occur because formal institutions change more easily than informal institutions 
(Williamson, 2000). Changes in technology, political forces, and regulation 
influence the existence and occurrence of new opportunities (Shane, 2003). 
While political forces and regulations represent institutions, we have noted that 
changes in technology associate with the changes in economic structure that 
underlies ED.  
While I have argued earlier that formal institutions will not affect EA positively if 
informal institutions do not support EA, this argument is in complete without a 
consideration of the role of ED. ED provides opportunities. Even when institutions 
support EA, it might not increase steeply if little opportunities exist for 
entrepreneurs to exploit. Like changes in culture, it also takes considerable time 
to alter a country’s level of ED (Acs and Szerb, 2009).  
I have found the modernisation perspective (Rostow, 1960) of ED useful to this 
thesis’s attempt to explain EA at a macro-level. The role of technology is 
important in this modernisation perspective (Porter, 1998b; Porter et al., 2002; 
Solow, 1957; Romer, 1994). Various technology changes take place when ED 











driven economies. This modernisation or technological change perspective also 
aligns with observations that potential entrepreneurs recognize opportunities from 
changes in technology to produce variants of services and inputs to large 
manufacturing enterprises (Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996). 
For instance, an initial investment in a modern factory might set-off opportunities 
in a number of intermediate goods and services including maintenance work, 
craft and trade, transport and logistics, commerce activities, and engineering 
(Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996). Potential entrepreneurs start small enterprises, 
which then supply intermediate goods to this modern factory (Gries and Naude, 
2009a). One can gauge the importance of institutions in ED if one understands 
their connection to changes in economic structure due to technological change 
(Nelson, 2008). In this light, Porter’s ED stages model becomes appropriate in 
any analysis including ED, institutions and EA. 
With such a variety and magnitude of opportunities available because of ED, it 
may appear odd that potential entrepreneurs might still not choose to exploit 
them. We gain clarity on the dynamics underlying the exploitation of opportunities 
at a country level when examining the institutional context of a country’s 
opportunity environment. Institutions or the ‘rules of the game’ tend to moderate 
the exploitation of opportunities arising out of traversing the stages of ED.  
An examination of the role of institutions has to look into not just the availability of 
opportunities themselves, but also the spread of opportunities. We have seen 
that the spread of opportunity hints at social processes, human capital, and 











5. Conceptual framework 
This Chapter builds on the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 to 4 to develop a 
framework to explain the variations in cross-country EA. I focus on explaining EA 
of an opportunity nature as opposed to those started out of necessity. 
Entrepreneurs that are motivated by an opportunity to grow their business also 
tend to register their enterprises (Levie and Autio, 2011). The framework outlined 
here relies on institutional and ED theories and uses a configurational approach 
to model the effect of contextual interdependencies on EA.  
Formal institutions adapt easily to shifts in political and economic policy. On the 
other hand, culturally-based informal institutions do not adapt easily (Li and 
Zahra, 2012). Similarly, it takes a time to progress to higher stages of ED (Acs 
and Szerb, 2009). Thus, the variations in cross-country EA can be ascribed 
largely to the different levels of formal institutional development. Further 
variations arise from the surrounding informal institutions and the nature of 
economic activity as well as their interaction with the incentives of formal 
institutions.  
Implicit here is an interaction between formal institutions, informal institutions, 
and ED, which in turn affects cross-country EA. Thus, I propose a three-way 
interaction. Consequently, this Chapter develops hypotheses on the nature of the 
three-way interactions between formal and informal institutions, and ED. The 
Chapter begins with a review of the configurational approach, which suggests 
ways to conduct a three-way interaction (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005). 
5.1 The configurational approach 
Configurational theory enables one to model those economic circumstances that 
lead to the same outcome from different initial conditions and through different 
paths (Doty et al., 1993). These paths allow for many possible ‘ideal types’ (Doty 
and Glick, 1994). Some of these ‘ideal types’ include substitutes or complements 












The nature of configurations is inherently discontinuous, making them suitable to 
examine non-linear phenomena that exhibit punctuated equilibria. As such, these 
properties accommodate the reality of the contextual differences that underlie the 
non-linearity within the S-shaped ED-EA relationship (see Chapter 3).  
Empirically, researchers represent a configuration by the simultaneous interaction 
of three variables (Baker and Cullen, 1993; Dess et al. 1997; Miller, 1988). 
Consequently, the configurational approach examines the significance and 
subsequent nature of a three-way interaction term within a multiple regression 
model. One can explain such an interaction substantively by selecting a 
theoretically meaningful focal or main explanatory variable. One then chooses a 
first-order moderator similar to the way one chooses a contingency variable for a 
two-way interaction. Extending this into a configurational approach, one goes 
further to include a second order moderator (Jaccard et al., 2003), which serves 
as contingency variable for the first-order moderator.  
Formal institutions serve as the focal explanatory variable in this conceptual 
framework. In the following discussion, I find theoretical support for informal 
institutions as a primary moderator of the formal institutions-EA relationship and 
consequently for ED to serve as a secondary moderator. However, some support 
exists for ED to serve as a primary moderator. Theorists (Kam and Franzese, 
2003) using this approach have tended to start with a main effects hypothesis 
predicting the relationship between the focal explanatory variable and the 
dependent variable, building their argument hierarchically to a two-way 
interaction hypothesis and finally to a three-way interaction hypothesis.  
Researchers implement configurational approaches through regressions. Though 
one includes the direct effect and other control terms, the research only examines 
the nature of the higher order interaction (Cohen and Cohen, 2003; Brambor et 
al., 2006). Researchers examine for the significance of the coefficient of the 
three-way interaction term. Researchers also compute the statistical significance 
of difference in fit between the model with and without the three-way interaction 
terms. Accordingly, researchers use the regression test statistic to examine for 
meaningful improvements in model fit in a hierarchical regression and not for the 











Researchers enter main effects into a multiple regression model not to test them 
but to remove them from the product term (Brambor et al., 2006). The cross 
product carries information of both the main and interaction effects (Cohen and 
Cohen, 2003). No requirement exists for the main effects estimates to be 
significant (Bedeian and Mossholder, 1994).  
5.2 Hypotheses 
“A nation’s complex tapestry of formal and informal institutions together forms the 
basis of its economic and social system  and, being very rarely the same, is one 
of the causes for differences between countries” (Salimath and Cullen, 2010, 
p.365). For instance, this institutional context influences the EA within its borders 
(De Clercq et al, 2010; Baker et al, 2005; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). They do 
this by imposing “direct and indirect effects on both the supply and demand of 
entrepreneurs” (Acs et al, 2008a, p219). Thus, while prevailing cultural values 
(Spencer and Gomez, 2004) might affect the supply of entrepreneurs, regulatory 
support (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008) might affect the demand for entrepreneurs. 
This thesis suggests that EA varies across countries because of their different 
levels of formal institutional development. Even if levels of formal institutional 
development were the same, potential entrepreneurs might respond differently to 
its incentives because of different levels of informal institutional development. In 
other words, informal institutions moderate the effect of formal institutions on EA. 
In turn, the effect of nformal institutions on the formal institution-EA relationship 
will also differ – this time depending on the ED context. In particular, the rates of 
increase in EA differ according to the different levels of ED, similar to the S-
shaped changes in EA identified by Acs and Szerb (2009). 
5.2.1 Formal institutions 
Formal institutions comprise of statutes, constitutions, common law, and other 
governmental regulations. They determine the governance structure, individual 
and property rights, contracts, and the enforcement system. Legislators, judges, 
bureaucrats, and other rule-makers enact, change and enforce them (North, 
1990). The model depicted in Figure 8, (see Section 4.3) highlights the linkages 











Economic institutions tend to be of a high level when they secure individual rights 
and promote individual actions in a market exchange process. For instance, 
North (1981) argued that higher-level institutions would simultaneously support 
private contracts and provide checks against expropriation by the government or 
other politically powerful groups. Likewise, Acemoglu et al (2001) argued that 
formal institutions of private property contribute towards a cluster of high-level 
economic institutions, including the rule of law and the enforcement of property 
rights. Those that have adopted these two institutions as well as others that stem 
from it – freedom of choice, predictable government activity, rules conducive to 
market and firm development, freedom of contract and exchange, etc. – have 
also grown at a faster rate as compared to their counterparts which have adopted 
different institutions (Boettke and Coyne, 2003). Accordingly, to facilitate an 
analysis of the effects of institutions in a cross-country setting, I frame countries 
with “higher” levels of formal institutional development as those that secure 
property rights and the rule of law. A majority of the other institutions that 
correlate with economic growth are grounded in these two institutions. Societies 
with formal institutions that facilitate and encourage factor accumulation, 
innovation and the efficient allocation of resources will prosper (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005).  
A high level of formal institutional development facilitates innovative behaviour 
through easing the surrounding uncertainty (Boettke and Coyne, 2003). As 
suggested in the preceding paragraphs, property rights and the rule of law 
comprise core formal institutions. In particular, formal institutions that manifest in 
effective regulations are required to advance market-based relationships. They 
achieve this by facilitating exchanges between otherwise weakly connected 
market participants. Of value then is the efficiency and predictability of the tax 
collection system (Estrin and Prevezer, 2010), the ability to obtain required 
permits and licenses (Djankov and Murrell, 2002) as well as the presence of 
government policies aimed at promoting EA (Reynolds et al., 2005). Depending 
on how these institutional conditions influence the distribution of profits between 
entrepreneurs and employees, potential entrepreneurs might decide to be either 











Formal institutions that manifest in inefficient government regulation deter EA 
(Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994). For example, weak legal protection hinders the 
starting of new businesses (Johnson et al., 2002). Numerous procedures, lengthy 
time and high costs of starting a business deter EA (Djankov et al., 2002). 
Arduous labour regulations also deter EA in labour-intensive industries (Klapper 
et al, 2006). An oft-cited example is how the prevalence of inadequate formal 
institutions led to low levels of EA in Russia (Aidis et al., 2008). In the popular 
literature, De Soto (2000), narrates the lack of a formal, integrated property rights 
system among less developed countries. He argues that EA suffers because 
individuals are unable to leverage their informally owned assets for credit. 
Klapper et al (2006) tested the effect of regulations on a sample of over three 
million firms in 21 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. They focused on both country and industry characteristics. 
Country characteristics include the cost of fulfilling the bureaucratic requirements 
to register a company. They also focus on whether the industry has ‘‘naturally 
high entry.’’ They find that entry regulations hamper entry, especially in industries 
that naturally should have high entry. Entrants are larger—suggesting that small 
firms are dissuaded from entering or have to grow without the protection of 
limited liability until they can afford the costs of incorporation. 
Higher levels of formal institutions often manifest in the protection of private 
property rights (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). They will tend to provide 
incentives to potential entrepreneurs and thus increase EA. For example, they 
may protect entrepreneurs against wrongful expropriation of assets by third 
parties or corrupt behaviour by government officials (Baumol, 1990; Bowen and 
De Clercq, 2008). Governments provide this protection through institutions such 
as the police, the courts, and the law. 
Where institutions increase the certainty that contracts will be honoured and 
property protected, potential entrepreneurs will be more willing to provide 
specialized products and services, invest in sunk assets, and undertake complex 











government role, levies, and taxes to cover policing expenses, and state 
monopoly over the use of force by demilitarising private armies (Bates, 2001). 
In addition, formal institutions that influence the availability of financial resources 
through policies that increase access to bank credit, the creation of investment 
companies, credit with low interest rates and credit guarantee schemes will tend 
to increase EA (van Gelderen et al., 2006). 
In the main, EA requires market-based mechanisms. Lower levels of formal 
institutions will reduce the viability of market-based relationships and have a 
negative effect on EA (Bruton et al, 2005; De Clercq et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, higher levels of formal institutions that manifest in effective regulations that 
facilitate exchanges between otherwise weakly connected market participants will 
increase EA. All in all then, I advance the following hypothesis:  
H1: The higher the level of formal institutional development, the higher the level 
of EA 
5.2.2 The interactive effect of informal institutions 
Informal institutions comprise customs, moral values, religious beliefs, and other 
norms of behaviour that have stood the test of time (North, 1990). Among others, 
Boettke et al (2008b) have made the point that formal institutional development 
works best when backed by existing informal institutions. Accordingly, higher 
levels of informal institutional development ought to support the ideals of private 
property protection and a strong rule of law. They protect the individual and his or 
her property and promote individual freedom of choice. They thus include a 
culture that tends to value the maintenance of individual liberties and cultivates 
risk-taking attitudes (Pejovich, 1998). According to Williamson and Mathers 
(2011) and Tabellini (2010), the three main informal attributes that encourage and 
support property rights and the rule of law required for market activity are trust, 
respect, and individual self-determination. Tabellini (2010) tested this through a 
factor analysis and found that trust, respect, and individual self-determination 











According to the framework depicted in Figure 8 (see Section 4.3) informal 
institutions correspond to conditions for EA, such as structural, relational, and 
cognitive SC as well as higher levels of tacit HC. While structural SC conditions 
manifest in social ties and networks (Arenius and De Clercq, 2005; Anderson et 
al, 1994), relational SC conditions manifest in trust (Knack and Keefer, 1997). On 
the other hand, cognitive SC and tacit HC conditions relate to a particular cultural 
context, for example the culture of risk taking and individualism (Thomas and 
Mueller, 2000). As suggested in Section 4.3, the development of tacit human 
capital through years of work experience might enhance one’s expertise and thus 
the confidence to take risks in starting a business related to the respective area 
of expertise.  
The various dimensions of SC are not mutually exclusive but interconnected. 
Without physical centrality or networks (structural SC), entrepreneurs would be 
less likely to develop trustful relationships3 (relational SC), subsequently 
hampering the formation of a culture of shared beliefs (cognitive SC). 
Alternatively, an entrepreneurial network with shared beliefs will more likely 
develop trusting relationships among the entrepreneurs and between the 
entrepreneurs and other stakeholders in the network (Liao and Welsch, 2003).  
5.2.2.1 Social networks 
Higher levels of social networking will tend to enhance the formal institutions-EA 
relationship. Networks sometimes contain potentially complementary but 
disparate private knowledge (Choi & Shepherd, 2004). When entrepreneurs 
participate in such networks, they are more likely to identify opportunities 
associated with such knowledge. Even the exploitation of weak ties between 
individuals who live close to each other increases opportunities for starting a 
business (Arenius and De Clercq, 2005). Moreover, entrepreneurs use their 
social networks to identify available resources when they perceive formal 
institutions as incentives. This enables them to go on to find new and better ways 
                                            
3 On the other hand, some like Woolcock (1998) argue that trust is more a consequence of SC 











to combine these resources with their own resources and knowledge (Arenius & 
De Clercq, 2005). 
Individuals use informal networking behaviour through associational activity 
within contexts where policies and regulations do not provide incentives for EA. 
These informal networks tend to substitute for such weak formal institutions to 
facilitate business transactions and economic activity (Danis et al, 2010; Luo, 
2003). In these associations, entrepreneurs establish relations with individuals 
from a variety of backgrounds and professions, both within and outside their own 
communities (De Clercq et al, 2010; Danis et al, 2010; Knack & Keefer, 1997). 
Entrepreneurs obtain financial and market information through their networks 
established within trade associations, political parties, religious groups, or 
professional associations (Acs & Stough, 2008; Davidsson & Honig, 2003). They 
increase their exposure to those who may be more knowledgeable about setting 
up a business or provide resources to facilitate the process (Putnam, 1994). 
While formal institutional reforms play a significant role in in distributing 
opportunities for EA (Lundström and Stevenson, 2005; Hoffmann, 2007), informal 
institutions are still necessary to influence perceptions of these opportunities 
(Welter and Smallbone, 2003). In an ambiguous O&I context, potential 
entrepreneurs will base their decisions on social cues with participation in social 
networks regarded as crucial (Aldrich, 1999; Kwon and Arenius, 2010). 
Consequently, a higher level of social networking will tend to result in a stronger 
positive relationship between the level of formal institutional development and the 
level of EA. 
5.2.2.2 Trust 
Though important, an entrepreneur’s social network does not guarantee the 
appropriation of the resources necessary for venture growth. For social networks 
to be effective in appropriating resources, a high degree of trust must also be 
present between the entrepreneur and his contacts (Liao and Welsch, 2005).  
While at face value one expects increasing trust to be in harmony with collectivist 
societies, their hierarchical nature (Tabellini, 2010) and close relationships 











referred to in this thesis includes generalised trust or trust in strangers. This type 
of trust harmonises with the market processes prevalent in individualistically 
oriented societies (Williamson, 2011). It enhances the trust that underlies 
relational SC and the structural SC that supports the same relational SC. 
Conceptually, this type of trust benefits a country’s economic performance. 
Formal institutions are likely to increase EA when the level of trust increases 
(Knowles, 2006; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005). High levels of trust reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding relationships among entrepreneurs and their customers 
as well as between entrepreneurs and their resource providers and thus also 
reduces the transaction costs involved in related resource exchanges (Kwon and 
Arenius, 2010;  Aidis et al., 2008; McMullen et al, 2008). Individuals are then less 
likely to fear that others will misuse their personal resources for their own 
personal benefit, which in turn increases their propensity to exploit their 
resources to create a new business. 
In countries with low levels of trust, people will transact more with close friends 
and relatives than with strangers, as in collectivist societies. Ethnic, political, 
religious, or income differences often polarise such societies. For instance, 
associations often form along ethnic lines in such societies. Though this might 
strengthen trust and corporation within an ethnic group, it weakens trust and 
cooperation between this and other groups. In those instances of a positive 
correlation, reverse causality might be at play. This occurs when high-trust 
individuals join formal associations in which the initial transactions involve 
interacting with strangers (Knack and Keefer, 1997). 
One therefore expects people’s individual resources to be more instrumental for 
EA among countries with high levels of trusts than their counterparts in low-trust 
countries (De Clercq et al, 2011b). Fukuyama (1995) classifies the U.S., Japan 
and Germany as high-trust societies, and France, Italy, China, Korea, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan as low-trust societies. Moreover, strong informal institutions that 
manifest in trust support formal institutions like property rights. They do this by 
reducing transactions costs and thus furthering market exchange (Fukuyama, 
1996; La Porta et al., 1997; Dixit 2004; Francois and Zabojnik, 2005). The more a 











versa (Kerekes and Williamson, 2008). Consequently, a higher the level of trust 
will tend to result in a stronger positive relationship between the level of formal 
institutional development and the level of EA. 
5.2.2.3 Culture 
Culture has been described in terms of uncertainty avoidance, hierarchy, 
conservatism and, individualist or collectivist orientations. In general, risk-prone, 
conservative, hierarchical or collectivist societies demonstrate lower formal EA. 
Generally, a culture that supports EA will amplify the impact on the efficacy of 
formal policies to stimulate EA (Meek, 2009). The same formal institutions that 
have a positive impact on EA often associate with a notion of freedom, a rule of 
law which is certain and equally applicable to all, freedom of choice, and the 
ability to freely contract with others (Olson, 1996). 
Cultures that support individualism and risk taking tend to increase EA (Shane, 
1992, 1993). Individualistic cultures value people for their achievements, status 
and other unique characteristics. In collectivist cultures, social groups such as the 
family, social class, and organization all take precedence over the individual. 
Such societies do not wish to put the family at risk and thus have risk-averse 
tendencies (Shane, 1995). Similarly, extant research associates risk taking and 
risk seeking behaviour to EA (Hisrich et al., 2005). In a collectivist society, the 
entrepreneurial role depends largely on social networks and personal contacts 
with key individuals who, for example might provide a loan to a start-up. In these 
societies, citizens with high needs for affiliation are more likely to develop the 
support network that will be useful to start a business. In contrast, in less 
intimate, individualist societies, following the rules and procedures of a financial 
institution, for example, may be the key to garnering support for the start-up thus 
attenuating the need for affiliation (Baum et al., 1993; Erez and Earley, 1993).  
More hierarchical cultures tend to restrain free exchanges of resources and 
therefore may offer fewer chances for people to leverage their personal resource 
base with external resources that they might be lacking (Scholtens and Dam, 
2007), lessening their chance of increasing EA. In contrast, with low levels of 











protect their privileges, which make it easier for entrepreneurs to leverage their 
personal resources in support of their new business endeavours (Mitchell et al, 
2000). 
Collectivist cultures tend to be conservative. Highly conservative cultures 
promote relatedness and communal relationships and encourage people to 
achieve “in-group” goals rather than reach out to those outside the in-group, even 
if those others could help them achieve their personal goals (Kim et al, 1996). 
Consequently, in such cultures, entrepreneurs will have reduced opportunities to 
leverage their skills and contacts with knowledgeable others (Matsumoto et al., 
2008; Mitchell et al., 2000). In contrast, in less conservative cultures, society 
admires autonomy and individual achievement than commonly shared beliefs 
with the in-group, entrepreneurs will tend to have increased opportunities to start 
businesses (Begley and Tan, 2001). 
According to the preceding discussion, higher levels of social networks, trust, and 
a culture of risk-taking and individualistic behaviour will tend to increase EA. 
Moreover, one expects such higher levels of informal institutional development to 
complement any positive impact that existing formal institutions have on EA. This 
theory suggests that informal institutional development has a positive moderating 
effect on the formal institutions-EA relationship. Therefore,  
H2: The higher the level of informal institutional development, the greater the 
positive relationship between the level of formal institutional development and the 
level of EA 
5.2.3 The interactive effect of ED 
Aside from the institutional influence on EA, a country’s economic structure also 
plays a role in influencing its particular level of EA (Acs and Szerb, 2009). This 
can be seen from the different predominant economic activities, which historically 
evolve from the primary activity of agriculture, onto industrialisation and a 
knowledge-based society (Wennekers et al. 2005). Higher formal institutional 
development is particularly important at lower levels of ED (Haggard et al, 2008). 
One thus expects the interactive effect of ED to reduce the positive impact of 











Improvements in formal institutions have a greater impact on EA at the factor-
driven and efficiency driven stages of ED (Acs and Szerb, 2009; Porter et al, 
2002). In such low ED contexts, entrepreneurial opportunities increase sharply 
since the supply chain extends from a low base of agricultural type opportunities 
to include both manufacturing and service opportunities. Manufacturers who 
focus on their core business stimulate service opportunities by outsourcing 
specialist services (Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996). An increase in transaction 
complexity accompanies these changes in economic structure accompany (Acs 
et al., 2008a; Acs and Virgill, 2010).Correspondingly higher levels of formal 
institutional development allow for such complex transactions. For instance, 
formal institutions protect the intellectual property related to the higher levels of 
innovation present here. In turn, the higher levels of formal institutions provide 
incentives to individuals to exploit the increased number of opportunities leading 
to a sharp increase in EA. Thus, as the structural changes from ED introduce 
more opportunities for EA, debottlenecking formal institutions has a significant 
impact on exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities at low ED levels. 
Rodrik et al (2004) show how reforms in formal institutions among less developed 
Eastern European economies gave rise to increased investments and increased 
opportunities for potential entrepreneurs. As a result, former less developed 
countries like Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia now enjoy higher levels 
of ED extending as far as the innovation-driven stage (Acs and Szerb, 2009). 
Importantly, recent research shows an S-shaped relationship between ED and 
EA where increases in EA are high at lower levels of ED particularly in the 
transition between the factor and efficiency-driven stage as well as in that 
between the efficiency and innovation-driven stages of ED (Acs and Szerb, 
2009). 
On the other hand, at higher levels of ED, high-quality economic, political, and 
legal institutions are prevalent (Sobel, 2008). At these high levels of ED, 
increases in levels of competition influence further increases in EA to a lesser 
extent (Barnett, 1997. For instance, competition or anti-trust policies among 
advanced economies tend to lower barriers to entry resulting initially in high 











subsequent increase in competition tends to limit further entry. Evidence for this 
argument arises from the S-shaped relationship (Acs and Szerb, 2009) that 
indicates that increases in EA start to plateau at these high levels of ED. 
The preceding discussion has shown that improvements in formal institutions 
have a greater impact on EA among countries at lower levels of ED. Among 
developed countries with already high levels of EA, those countries with 
incrementally higher levels of formal institutions will still enjoy increases in EA 
albeit to a lesser extent than less developed countries. This theory suggests that 
ED has a negative moderating effect on the formal institutions-EA relationship. 
Thus,   
H3: The higher the level of ED, the lesser the positive relationship between the 
level of formal institutional development and the level of EA 
5.2.4 The interactive effect of both informal institutions and ED  
Extant research has not gone into the effects of culture and trust on the formal 
institutions-EA relationship. However, it does suggest that social networks 
substitute for very low levels of formal institutions in influencing EA particularly 
among countries at low ED levels (Bruton et al., 2008; De Clercq et al., 2010; 
Ireland et al., 2008; Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000; Peng, 2003; Peng and 
Heath, 1996). For instance, these low levels of formal institutional development 
cannot adequately support the complex transactions around technology type 
opportunities (Acs et al., 2008a; Acs and Virgill, 2010). To achieve the productive 
benefits of technology opportunities, a society must develop an elaborate 
structure of law and its enforcement (Baumol, 2002). When such formal 
institutions are not adequately developed, transaction costs are high and the 
incentives for potential entrepreneurs are low.  
However, as less developed countries start to reform their formal institutions, 
theory suggests a positive effect of formal institutions on EA (see Hypothesis H1 
above). When a fair degree of risk-taking and individualism, high levels of trust as 
well as numerous social networks complement this context then the positive 











Though this thesis does not concern itself with the direct effect of informal 
institutions on EA, it is worth noting recent work (Pinillos and Reyes, 2011)4 
showing that ED can explain differences in the effect of informal institutions such 
as culture on EA. It is likely then that the effect of higher levels of informal 
institutions on the formal institutions-EA relationship will differ at different levels of 
ED. Indications are that an increase in ED will tend to reduce this effect of 
informal institutions on the formal institutions-EA relationship (see Hypothesis 
H3). Thus, we expect a steep relationship between formal institutions and EA at 
low ED levels becoming less steep at advanced ED levels. 
Low ED levels are marked by a shift from factor-driven to more efficiency and 
innovation-driven type economic activity (Lopez-Claros et al, 2007). Among 
efficiency-driven economies, service activities begin to increase. This results in a 
sharp increase in entrepreneurial opportunities. As discussed before (see Section 
5.2.4) the supply chain extends from a low base of agricultural type opportunities 
to include both manufacturing and service opportunities (Ciccone and 
Matsuyama, 1996). Service opportunities in particular have low start-up costs and 
will tend to increase EA significantly. These service type businesses arise from 
manufacturing businesses focusing on their core operations and relying on 
outsourced support services. In this context of low ED and increasing 
entrepreneurial opportunity, one expects reforms in formal institutions to have a 
high impact on EA. 
Acs and Szerb (2009) and Rodrik (2004) observe how former less developed 
countries - Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia - benefited from a good 
relationship with the European Union (EU) as well as their formal institutional 
reforms. Such benefits included increased investments and opportunities for 
potential entrepreneurs (Rodrik et al., 2004). In another case of low levels of ED, 
                                            
4 Pinillos and Reyes (2011) established these findings by using the GEM TEA rate that measures 
both necessity and opportunity motives to start businesses. At very low levels of ED, the TEA rate 
was still high due to the high level of necessity EA. They argued that a collectivist cultural 
orientation had an impact on this high TEA rate at low levels of ED. At high levels of ED, the TEA 
rate is again high, this time due to high levels of opportunity EA. They argued that an 











Botswana in Africa, local customs boosted the positive effects of formal 
institutional reforms on EA. Acemoglu et al (2002) show how the norms and 
values of the Tswana people supported EA and how years of British rule 
reinforced these. These cases demonstrate a complementary relationship where 
informal relations enhanced the positive formal institutions-EA relationship. 
Boettke et al (2008) compare the privatisation efforts in Poland to that of Russia. 
Poland’s transition to a market economy was facilitated by the earlier tolerance of 
a small but legitimate number of private businesses throughout the communist 
reign. Even before the collapse of communism, Poland passed the 1988 Law on 
Economic Activity, which granted every Polish citizen the right to participate in 
private business. Although these businesses were not a dominant part of 
Poland’s economy during the communist period, it became easier for both the 
populace and politicians to build on this underlying culture of private enterprise. In 
contrast, Russia did not have anything similar. There, control of state assets 
paved the way for EA among an elite few. 
At high ED levels, there tends to be more reliable tax systems, more predictable 
and consistent laws, better established legal enforcement mechanisms, and less 
administrative red tape (Manolova et al, 2008; Puffer et al., 2010). At these high 
levels of ED, there exists already an existing culture of positive attitudes towards 
EA (Pinillos and Reyes, 2011; Shane, 1992). These high levels of ED also 
correspond to higher trust societies (Williamson, 2011).  
High ED levels are marked by shifts in economic activity characteristic of 
innovation-challengers, innovation-followers and innovation-leaders (Acs and 
Szerb, 2009). High levels of HC as well as the services nature of the economy 
with related low barriers to entry associated with the low set-up costs of service 
type companies, results in higher EA among these innovation-driven economies 
than that within factor and efficiency-driven ones. Though opportunities continue 
to be high, EA will tend to increase less steeply. The high levels of HC and low 
barriers to entry that led to high levels of EA also results in increased competition 
within this advanced economic context. This increase in competition will tend to 











Among these countries, existing high levels of informal institutions render further 
formal institutional reforms less necessary (Williamson, 2011). Evidence from the 
S-shaped ED-EA relationship (Acs and Szerb, 2009) suggests that higher ED 
levels will have a negative moderating effect on the formal institutions-EA 
relationship. Initial conditions also matter (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009; Iyigun and 
Rodrik, 2004). Institutional reforms affect EA positively at low levels of EA and 
negatively at high levels of EA.  
The preceding arguments have consolidated the S-shaped finding by suggesting 
that while higher levels of informal institutions show a positive moderating effect 
on the formal institutions-EA relationship at low ED levels, they show a negative 
moderating effect at high ED levels. Thus, 
H4: At lower levels of ED, the positive moderating effect that informal institutional 
development has on the formal institutions-EA relationship increases 
H5: At higher levels of ED, the positive moderating effect that informal 
institutional development has on the formal institutions-EA relationship decreases 
5.3 Summary 
In this Chapter, I found theoretical support for the following hypotheses: 
• H1: The higher the level of formal institutional development, the higher the 
level of EA 
• H2: The higher the level of informal institutional development, the greater 
the positive relationship between the level of formal institutional 
development and the level of EA 
• H3: The higher the level of ED, the lesser the positive relationship between 
the level of formal institutional development and the level of EA 
• H4: At lower levels of ED, the positive moderating effect that informal 












• H5: At higher levels of ED, the positive moderating effect that informal 
institutional development has on the formal institutions-EA relationship 
decreases 
The hypotheses suggested above are also summarised in a conceptual 
framework (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Conceptual framework 
In general, the above conceptual framework can be specified into the following 
model with the last term (a three-way interaction) being of interest for the 
configuration approach of this research. I will test the following configuration 
model.  
EA = b0 + b1(ED) + b2 (Formal) + b3 (Informal) + b4(ED) (Informal) + b5(ED) 
(Formal) + b6 (Formal) (Informal) + b7(ED) (Formal) (Informal)  
Where: 
EA = cross-country entrepreneurial activity  











Formal = formal institution 
Informal = informal institution 
b0 = estimated constant (later I will explain how heterogeneous country effects 
are included in this term) 
b1...b7 = estimated coefficients 
ε = unobserved explanatory possibilities (error/residual) 
Though ED is an explanatory variable, it is not entirely an exogenous variable. 
Extensive research confirms the endogeneity of ED with respect to EA (Blau, 
1987; Acs et al., 1994a; Carree et al., 2002; Carree and Thurik, 2003; Wennekers 
et al., 2005; Carree et al., 2007; Acs et al., 2008a; Thurik et al., 2008). This will 















To test its hypotheses, this thesis relies on a quantitative approach with 
underlying hierarchical multiple regression analysis. The regressors included not 
only explanatory variables themselves but also multiples of explanatory variables. 
This was necessary since we test moderating or interaction effects by multiplying 
the explanatory variables that have a conditional effect on one another. 
Hierarchical multiple regression can test the significance of the variance in cross-
country EA due to the addition of two-way and three-way interaction terms. Since 
the thesis relied on eight years of secondary data from the World Bank and GEM 
database, I applied panel analysis methods to the regressions. 
First, I present the details of the population and sampling frame. Next, the 
instrumentation and data collection are detailed. This includes a discussion on 
the validity and reliability of the instrument. Thereafter this Chapter describes the 
variables. This also includes a discussion of the reliability and validity of the study 
variables. The Chapter ends with a detail discussion of the analysis. This 
includes a description of interaction analysis, model specification and estimation, 
regression assumptions, as well as violations and remedies. 
6.1 The research population 
Country units of analysis were necessary for this macro-level study. The research 
population consisted of all possible countries, including both developed and less 
developed economies. As shown earlier, developed economies tended to be 
innovation-driven whilst less developed economies tended to be either factor or 
efficiency-driven (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin, 2010). Currently there are some 196 
countries in the world (Rosenberg, 2011). 
6.2 Sample size and selection 
The secondary nature of the data dictated that sampling and sample size be 
dependent on the research designs5 of GEM and the World Bank Group 
                                            
5 I used WBGES only to gather data on the number of newly registered companies per year 











Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES). I collated data for 45 countries over the 
years 2000 to 2007. I grouped the data were grouped by country and year, 
resulting in 176 country-year observations. Table 7 below shows the sample of 
countries and their respective stage of ED at the time of sampling. The data was 
unbalanced with a minimum of one panel observation to a maximum of eight. 
This resulted because countries did not participate consistently over the eight 
years with some added to the survey sample later (for example in the GEM 
survey, lower-income countries were added later in the research).  











1 Argentina Croatia Chile Austria Australia 
2 Brazil Greece Hong Kong Belgium Canada 
3 Philippines Hungary Italy Czech 
Republic 
Denmark 
4 Serbia India Latvia France Finland 
5 Turkey Indonesia Malaysia Germany Iceland 
6  Jamaica Portugal Israel Ireland 
7  Poland Spain Japan Netherlands 
8  Romania  Singapore New Zealand 
9  Russia  Slovenia Norway 
10  South Africa   Sweden 
11  Thailand   Switzerland 
12     United Kingdom 











Source: Adapted from Aces and Szerb (2009)6 
There were 31 developed countries and 14 less developed countries (see Table 
8 below). A comparison of Tables 7 and 8 reveals that the majority of less 
developed countries are either in the factor-driven, or in the efficiency-
transformation stage of ED. Most developed countries are at the innovation-
driven stage of ED. However, within the innovation-driven stage there are 
‘leaders’, ‘innovation followers’, and ‘innovation challengers’ (Acs and Szerb, 
2009). 
Participation in the GEM project was initially reliant on the financial support for 
researchers in those countries keen to participate (Reynolds et al., 2005). Hence, 
when the GEM project started, countries included in the project reflected the 
emergence of groups of researchers that could raise the funds to participate in 
the project. As a result, the GEM sample initially represented developed countries 
- the G-7, most OECD countries and almost the entire EU - with a smaller group 
of less developed countries in Asia and Latin America.  
Table 8: Sample of countries: less developed and developed economy 
classification 
Developed Less developed 
1 Australia Argentina 
2 Austria Brazil 
3 Belgium Chile 
4 Canada India 
5 Croatia Indonesia 
6 Czech Republic Jamaica 
7 Denmark Malaysia 
8 Finland Philippines 
9 France Romania 
10 Germany Russia 
11 Greece South Africa 
12 Hong Kong Serbia 
13 Hungary Thailand 
14 Iceland Turkey 
15 Ireland 
                                            
6 There might have been some changes in GEM expert perceptions (see Section 6.3 next) since 
the gathering of this data in the period 2000 to 2007. Acs and Szerb (2009) performed their 




























Source: World Bank (2010) 
GEM first conducted research in 1999. This research analysed 10 countries: the 
G7 countries (i.e., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and 
United States) and three additional countries, Denmark, Finland and Israel 
because some researchers of these countries had relevant expertise. By 2008, 
GEM had conducted annual assessments in 66 countries, covering more than 
80% of world population and almost all nations with globally significant 
economies (Acs et al., 2009b). Fifty-three countries participated in the GEM 2010 
research.  
6.3 Instrumentation and data collection 
6.3.1 Research instrument 
The research instrument was combined from the GEM expert survey, GEM 
individual survey, WBGES, and the International Monetary Fund’s efforts in 
collecting economic data. Appendix 1 details the indicators and measures of this 
research. It also shows the item loadings and Chronbach reliability results for 
scale indicators. 
I located fourteen indicators that relate to either formal or informal institutions. 
This identification process was facilitated by determining whether the indicators 











explicit HC, FC and O&Is were categorised as formal institutions. Indicators 
linked to SC and tacit HC were categorised as informal institutions (see Section 
4.3). 
Thirteen scale indicators were sourced from the GEM expert survey, which 
probes the adequacy of EFCs within each country. One indicator, ‘Knowent’, was 
taken from the GEM individual survey. This indicator asks the potential 
entrepreneurs of each country whether they “know someone personally who 
started a business in the last two years”. Reynolds et al (2005) discusses in detail 
the methodology of both the GEM expert and individual surveys.  
The EFCs (see Table 9) measured conditions for EA such as financial support, 
entrepreneurial content of primary and higher education, business services, 
market conditions, policy and regulatory conditions, R&D conditions, general 
entrepreneurial capacity and, culture and social image. GEM measured each with 
multiple-item scales comprising three to seven questions. The standard expert 
survey contained 88 questions with responses collected on a five-point Likert 
scale. The Likert’s scale of 5 points delineates into, Completely False (1), 
Somewhat False (2), Neither True Nor False (3), Somewhat True, (4) or 
Completely True (5). I weighted the multi-item scale on the factor loadings of 
individual scale items. The next sub-section describes these. . 
Table 9: GEM EFCs used in this research 






The availability of equity and debt for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Included here are also 
grants and subsidies. 




GPR The extent to which taxes or regulations are either 






The extent to which training in creating or managing 
SMEs is incorporated within the education and 













EFC Abbreviation  Description Institution 
R&D transfer RDev The extent to which research and development leads 
to new commercial opportunities and whether or not 
these are available for new, small and growing 
enterprises.  
Formal 
Entry regulation  MOpe 
MDyn 
Contains two components: (1) Market Dynamics: the 
level of change in markets from year to year, and (2) 
Market Openness: the extent to which new 




ECul The extent to which existing social and cultural norms 
encourage, or do not discourage, individual actions 
that may lead to new ways of conducting business or 
economic activities and might in turn, lead to greater 
dispersion of personal wealth and income. 
Informal 
Entrepreneur 
social image  
ESIm The extent to which people consider that becoming 
an entrepreneur is a desirable career choice and that 





ECap The extent to which people know how to start and 
manage a business. 
Informal 
Source: Adapted from Kelly et al (2011) 
6.3.2 Reliability and validity of instrument 
The validity of an instrument indicates how well its measures represent the 
variables, while reliability refers to the consistency with which it produces results 
when one repeats the research some reason (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). 
6.3.2.1 Validity 
The literature contains limited indication of the key dimensions of a country’s 
institutional environment (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). I rely on GEM EFC 
measures to represent institutions. The GEM model accumulates individual-level 
characteristics to the structural conditions that regulate the allocation of effort into 
EA at the population level. I checked for adequate face and construct validity by 
reviewing the measures against their theoretical descriptions. GEM EFCs result 
from a survey of experts with a range of backgrounds and knowledge about their 











environment through standardised questions and validated measurement scales 
(De Clercq et al, 2011b). Levie and Autio (2008) suggest that one could view 
EFCs as defining the rules of the game for EA activity in any given context. This 
follows closely to North’s depiction of institutions as rules of the game. They also 
give a detail review of the GEM EFCs and the theoretical background starting 
with the work of Leibenstein (1968). In Table 9, I have positioned finance, 
government policy, education and training, R&D transfer and entry regulations as 
formal institutions. I position as informal institutions the cultural and social norms, 
entrepreneur social image, entrepreneurial capacity, and commercial and legal 
infrastructure. 
Institutional theorists have adequately articulated government policy and entry 
regulations as formal institutions (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). Whitley (1994) and 
Bowen and De Clercq (2008) motivate financial and educational systems as 
dimensions of formal institutions. Thus, I added finance as an indicator of formal 
institutions since most countries regulate the financial markets. For instance, 
measures of debt provision indicate financial conditions. The central bank 
regulates the cost of debt. The GEM measures of financial conditions also 
include government subsidies. I also included education and training as a formal 
institution since government education departments often control syllabi. I also 
considered the R&D transfer EFC as a formal institutional dimension since its 
measures relate to formal initiatives as the transfer of, new technology, science, 
and other knowledge from universities and public research centres to new and 
growing firms. This R&D transfer EFC also considers the adequacy of 
government subsidies for new and growing firms to acquire new technology. It 
also considers whether the country supports engineers and scientists to have 
their ideas commercialized through new and growing firms. 
Bowen and De Clercq (2008) confirm the validity of the policy EFC as a formal 
institution dimension by correlating it with the World Bank’s “regulatory burden” 
index. They obtained a value of 0.41 (p<.02) for 2002 and 0.48 (p<.01) for 2004. 
Based on Whitley’s (1994) work on national business systems, De Clercq et al 
motivated for the use of the GEM finance and education and training EFCs as 











transfer EFC as an indicator of a formal institution. This is one of the limitations in 
my study.  
Earlier, I argued that the normative and cognitive institutional framework defined 
by Scott (1995) fit within the informal institutional framework of North (1990). 
According to Peng et al (2009), the scheme of formal and informal institutions 
complements Scott’s (1995) idea of three supportive pillars: regulative, 
normative, and cognitive. Formal institutions correspond to the regulative pillar 
while informal institutions correspond to both normative and cognitive pillars. 
While the cognitive pillar corresponds specifically to the cultural aspect of 
informal institutions, the normative pillar corresponds particularly to the norms 
within informal institutions.  
Previously, De Clercq et al (2010) and Danis et al (2010) used the GEM EFC on 
entrepreneurial capacity to indicate cognitive type institutions. The same 
researchers used the GEM EFC on entrepreneur social image to indicate 
normative type institutions. The researchers validated the entrepreneurial 
capacity EFC as a cognitive type indicator by finding a positive correlation with it 
and the strength of a country’s educational system with respect to 
entrepreneurship. In turn, they validated the entrepreneur social image EFC as a 
normative type indicator by finding a positive correlation with and a question from 
the GEM adult population survey, “In your country, most people consider starting 
a new business as a desirable career choice.” Though prior research did not 
make use of the cultural and social norms EFC, I find that it correlates to the 
entrepreneur social image EFC (0.75 at the .05 significance level)7.   
I also checked the convergent validity of each EFC. Item factor loadings for all 
EFCs were above 0.5 (see Appendix 1). This suggested adequate convergent 
validity. 
External validity requires that the research findings be generalizable to the 
broader population of countries with a variety of characteristics (Leedy and 
                                            











Ormrod, 2005). This research sampled a combination of both developed and less 
developed countries at varying levels of institutional development.  
Later, I note the choice of a random effect specification. In panel data analysis, a 
random effect specification generalizes better than a fixed effect specification 
(Koop, 2008). .GEM tests the EFCs on expert views rather than the views of 
individual entrepreneurs themselves. This limits the external validity of EFCs 
(Levie and Autio, 2008). 
6.3.2.2 Reliability 
The reliability of a measure refers to the extent to which others can replicate the 
research to arrive at the same measurement outcomes. Hence, the outcome 
does not depend on the observations or subjective judgments of one or a small 
number of individuals. Researchers often increase their confidence in a 
measure’s reliability by determining the correspondence between two similar 
procedures for measuring the same event. One can also duplicate measures of 
the same event (Reynolds et al., 2005). 
To ensure reliability of the GEM expert survey procedure, country teams were 
encouraged to administer the questionnaire at the end of the interview. They then 
waited for the expert to complete this on his or her own. It was also convenient to 
have a researcher available to answer any questions (Reynolds et al., 2005).  
GEM refined some EFC items between 2000 and 2006. Though this led to better 
internal reliability of the multi-item scales, almost all scales already featured good 
reliability - Chronbach alpha of 0.7 or greater - throughout this period. The 
internal reliabilities of the multi-item scales employed in 2006 range from 0.76 to 
0.94. Validity checks with proxies from secondary sources suggested good 
external validity for the scales employed (Reynolds et al., 2005).  
The number of cases was substantial. There were over 990 cases from 21 
countries for 2001 to over 1300 cases for 31 countries for 2003. By 2003, when 
the interview schedule had been revised four times, the reliability of all 17 multi-
item scales was 0.63 or higher. Fifteen were 0.70 or higher, and seven were 0.80 











GEM achieved this despite the complex nature of the topic, the multi-country 
administration, and the complexities of ensuring cross-country harmonisation. 
These scales, and the individual questionnaire items, were utilised in the 
development of country reports as well as specialised cross-country analyses 
(Reynolds et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, I still conducted a factor analysis on all EFC items using all eight 
years of data. I first used principal components analysis to confirm the number of 
factors against the respective EFC items and to develop estimates. These 
estimates were then entered into Promax oblique rotation and Kaizer 
normalization routines to determine the factor loadings.  
This thesis’s factor analysis confirms some of the findings of Levie and Autio 
(2008) (see Appendix 2). It confirms that the Education and Training EFC (see 
Table 9 above) as well as the Entry Regulation EFC have two separate 
components. Whilst Levie and Autio (2008) also found that the Government 
Policy EFC has two separate components, I found one. Their factor analysis 
found that the GEM items separate out into two scales: a policy and a regulation 
scale. The Government Policy EFC tests the support of EA through policies and 
regulations. Reynolds et al (2005) suggest that as items are revised to improve 
reliability, these might later become one scale. 
Levie and Autio (2008) do not discuss the details of their factor analysis 
procedure. Their research and this differs by the number of years of data that 
were used. Whilst this research uses eight years of data they used seven years. 
In the early years before 2003 there were missing data for some items within the 
Government Policy EFC because additional items were introduced after 2002 
(see next section on Data collection). They do not disclose whether they left out 
the data from their factor analysis or imputed values. In this research, values 
were imputed by using the country average over the data collection period. 
I label the two components of the Education and Training EFC as “Prim” for 
primary and secondary education and “High” for post-secondary education. I 
label the two components within the Entry Regulation EFC as ‘Mope’ for market 











I drew one item “knowent” from the GEM research on potential individual 
entrepreneurs. For this reason, I will discuss some aspects of its reliability and 
validity. Reynolds et al (2005) point out that there were several cases where a 
GEM replicated the country survey for the same period. This included South 
Africa and Ireland in 2001. In 2003, it included Uganda. In South Africa and 
Ireland, GEM used different survey firms to administer the interview with similar 
sampling procedures. In Uganda, the same firm did both surveys with a different 
operational procedure. In all three examples, the levels of EA estimated for the 
same regions were not significantly different. The GEM measures were also 
theoretically verified (Reynolds et al., 1994) 
6.3.2.3 Common method bias 
Researchers using GEM data have not discussed common method bias (CMB). 
CMB arises from the measurement method rather than to the constructs that the 
measures represent (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Measurement error has a random 
and a systematic component (Le et al., 2009). Systematic measurement error 
presents a serious problem because it might explain the observed relationship 
between the measures of the different constructs independent of the one 
hypothesized (Podsakoff et al., 2003). When present, it has a confounding 
influence on empirical results yielding potentially misleading conclusions. If the 
measure of the independent variable and dependent variable share a common 
method, this method might exert a systematic effect on the correlation between 
the measures.  
Podsakoff et al (2003) advise that one avoid CMB by obtaining the measures for 
the dependent and explanatory variables from different sources. In this research, 
the dependent variable, EA, was sourced from the WBGES database whilst the 
explanatory variables were sourced from GEM and the IMF databases.  
Measurement error might occur when respondents attempt to be consistent with 
the same rater. Measures sourced from the World Bank would have had different 
respondents and raters to those of GEM. Item characteristic and context effects 
would also differed due to very different measurement instruments used between 











qualitatively different from explanatory measures like GDP, and institutional 
measures which were actually a scale of five to six individual items.  
6.4 Data collection 
Overall, the research collated 176 country year observations. The final data at a 
country level was aggregated from expert and individual survey results. The 
aggregation of the expert survey was based on the mean of the 36 expert 
responses per country.  
For the individual survey, a weighting procedure was used in addition to a 
calculation of the mean for each measure (Reynolds et al., 2005). These weights 
controlled for the proportions of different subgroups - gender and age - done to 
match the most recent official data providing descriptions of the entire population 
of the country. The basis for weighting varied somewhat among countries. While 
gender and age were always involved, other features that were used included 
geographic distribution, ethnic background, educational attainment, household 
income, or a range of other factors considered appropriate in a specific country 
(Reynolds et al., 2005). 
It was considered appropriate to use the informed judgments of country experts 
on the status of EA in their own countries. GEM selected experts based on their 
reputation and experience. Technically, these groups are samples of 
convenience. The focus of these face-face interviews was on the experts’ views 
of country strengths a d weaknesses. This indicated the context for EA and the 
policy or program changes that could enhance the level of EA in their country. 
Since there was no available list of entrepreneurial experts for any GEM country, 
representative samples were not feasible. However, GEM researchers ensured 
that the chosen experts had a substantial range of background and knowledge on 
the respective countries. Country research teams were responsible for using their 
own networks and contacts within the country to select four individuals that were 
experts for each of the main nine EFCs. The respondents in each category 
consist of at least one entrepreneur, two suppliers and one observer, such as an 











The requirements for a new set of experts in each year were relaxed for smaller 
countries (such as Iceland, Israel and Singapore) and all country teams were 
encouraged to contact experts from previous years as respondents for the self-
completed mail questionnaire. Once contacted with a detailed explanation of the 
project, virtually all country experts agreed to participate in the interview. Most 
failures to complete the interview reflected scheduling complications common to 
active professionals (Reynolds et al., 2005). Researchers conducted personal 
interviews in the office of the expert respondents. They made an effort to limit 
them to 45 minutes since these were generally very busy individuals. They 
conducted them in the language appropriate to the individual expert and the 
country.  
There were cases of missing data especially in the early years 2000 to 2002 (see 
Table 10 below). For instance in some cases a 6th measure was introduced into 
an EFC that previously had only 5 item measures. In fact, some measures were 
introduced later when certain countries were not participants in the GEM 
research. To retain all 176 observations I used the country averages to impute 
data on missing values.  
Table 10: An indication of missing values 










Start-up 6  170 170 .027 .19 
Entrepreneur social image 
- In my country, most 
people think of 
entrepreneurs as 
competent and resourceful 
individuals 
1  175 128 1.98 4.69 
Entrepreneurial culture - In 
my country, the national 
culture is highly 
supportive of individual 
success achieved through 
own personal efforts 





















Entrepreneurial culture - In 
my country, the national 
culture emphasizes self-
sufficiency, autonomy and 
personal initiative 
1  175 126 1.62 4.56 
Entrepreneurial culture - In 
my country, the national 
culture encourages 
entrepreneurial risk-taking 
1  175 131 1.35 4.54 
Entrepreneurial culture - In 




1  175 132 1.97 4.49 
Entrepreneurial culture - In 
my country, the national 
culture emphasizes the 
responsibility that the 
individual (rather than the 
collective) has in 
managing his or her own 
life 
1  175 135 1.53 4.53 
Higher education -  In my 
country, the vocational, 
professional and 
continuing education 
systems provide good and 
adequate preparation for 
starting up and growing 
new firms 
55  121 94 1.83 3.63 
Regulations -  In my 
country, coping with 
government bureaucracy, 
regulations and licensing 
requirements is not unduly 
difficult for new and 
growing firms 
55  121 106 1.26 4.17 
R&D transfer -  In my 
country, there is good 
support available for 
engineers and scientists to 
have their ideas 
commercialized through 





















new and growing firms 
6.5 Variables 
The variables and their respective indicators are summarised in Table 11 below. I 
will discuss these variables in more detail below and end with a discussion on 
their reliability and validity. 
Table 11: Variables and respective indicators (see table 9 for an expansion of 
abbreviations used here) 
Variable Type Indicators on research instrument 
EA Dependent Start-up 
ED Explanatory lgGDPcap 
Informal Explanatory ECap, Know, ECul, ESIm,  
Formal Explanatory GPR, RDev, MOpe, MDyn, Prim, High, Fin1, Fin2 
Control Control Number of existing registered companies, Country, Year 
6.5.1 EA 
This research uses the start-up rate as an indicator of EA. Virgil (2009a) used 
WBGES data dividing new company registrations by total registrations in that 
year to arrive at what she refers to as start-up rates per country. The WBGES 
start-up rates exclude informal sector initiatives (Klapper and Delgado, 2007; 
Klapper et al., 2009). This measure of EA is appropriate for policy targets of 
economic growth and the formal activity that generates tax income. Particularly, 
high-growth entrepreneurs tend to register their ventures (Levie and Autio, 2011). 
These start-up rates correlate linearly to GDP. WBGES defines the unit of 











“Any economic unit of the formal sector incorporated as a legal entity and registered in a public 
registry, which is capable, in its own right, of incurring liabilities and of engaging in economic 
activities and transactions with other entities” (Klapper and Delgado, 2007; Acs et al., 2008b). 
Researchers have tended to criticise the GEM TEA data since it does not reflect 
the assumed linear relationship between ED and EA (Acs, 2006). It also does not 
capture entrepreneurship in existing businesses, data is inconsistent and 
respondents in different countries might interpret questions differently (Hindle, 
2006; Godin et al., 2008). Since TEA accounts for both formal and informal EA, 
researchers should not use it as a simple ranking (Bosma et al., 2009).  
I tend to agree with the argument that the largely opportunity EA approximated 
here by formally registered businesses indicates EA better than necessity EA 
(Shane, 2009). In particular, opportunity EA is useful for a study that includes ED 
considerations. The GEM TEA rate includes both necessity and opportunity EA. 
GEM TEA rates are high at low-income nations due to high necessity EA. 
Necessity EA decreases as national income increases resulting in a decreasing 
relationship between ED and EA. At middle to high-income levels opportunity EA 
starts to increase and the TEA rate then picks up. The resultant U-shaped curve 
of GEM TEA data might mislead policymakers. They might incorrectly interpret 
advances in stages of ED with changes in the quantity of entrepreneurship, when 
quality is of greater import (Acs and Szerb, 2009).  
In cases where GEM data has to be used, Acs (2006) suggests that one plots the 
opportunity to necessity entrepreneurship ratio against GDP per capita. This ratio 
underlies the importance of the desirable, opportunity EA relative to the 
necessity-induced EA. The advantage of this ranking is that countries with high 
levels of necessity EA are then associated with low levels of EA. 
Instead of using GEM data, one can use instead WBGES data. Whilst GEM data 
measures the potential for EA, WBGES data measure actual EA albeit at a formal 
level (Acs et al., 2008b). Studies using WBGES and GEM data give different 
results. While GEM data does not relate to administrative barriers to EA, a 
significantly negative effect exists with WBGES data (Klapper and Delgado, 











contradictory results in the empirical entrepreneurship research to the differences 
in what the data captures.  
Desai (2009) suggests that the GEM nascent entrepreneurs do not experience 
any administrative barriers, since there is no formalization condition. Nascent 
entrepreneurs have often not yet registered businesses. However, since the 
WBGES dataset measures registered businesses, respondents would have faced 
administrative barriers. Respondents in the GEM dataset do not report on 
administrative barriers simply because they do not encounter them, not because 
they are not a problem. 
6.5.2 ED 
I measured ED by means of GDP per capita data available from the IMF website. 
This aligns with to the World Bank’s main criterion for classifying economies viz. 
gross national income (GNI) per capita. Based on its GNI per capita, the World 
Bank classifies every country as low, middle, or high-income. They sometimes 
refer to low-income and middle-income countries as less developed or 
developing economies. The use of the term is convenient. It does not imply that 
all countries in the group are experiencing similar development or that other 
countries have reached a preferred or final stage of development (World Bank, 
2010). Porter et al (2002) also used GNI per capita to arrive at their factor, 
efficiency, and innovation-driven classification of economies. Factor-driven 
economies have generally low per capita incomes whilst efficiency-driven 
economies have middle per capita incomes. Innovation-driven economies enjoy 
high per capita incomes. 
It takes some time for entrepreneurs to identify and then exploit the opportunities 
arising out of any technology changes out of a country’s efforts at ED. I lagged 
the ED variable by one year to account for the delay in ED affecting EA. Chapters 
1 and 4 acknowledged that EA affects ED. Thus, ED is endogenous. The use of 
lagged GDP also controls for endogeneity or reverse causation, in the regression 











6.5.3 Informal institutions 
6.5.3.1 Social capital 
Extant research tends to use the World Values Survey to measure SC. 
Researchers rely on measures of generalised trust and associational activity 
(Danis et al., 2010) to indicate the levels of SC within a country. However, among 
some countries, like those in transition to a market-driven economy, personal 
trust plays a more significant role than generalized trust (Puffer et al., 2010). 
Though important, measures of associational activity might not adequately 
capture the structural and relational complexity of social networks (Burt, 1992; 
Granovetter, 1992). 
Thus, this research turned to measures of SC relating to its structural, relational, 
and cognitive nature (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Structural SC (see Chapter 
4) considers the structure of the overall network of relations whilst relational SC 
considers the quality of potential entrepreneurs personal relations (Granovetter, 
1992). Cognitive SC considers the degree to which an individual shares a 
common code and systems of meaning with his or her community (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998). 
Liao and Welsch (2003) successfully located measures within PSED data to 
assess the SC of entrepreneurs. This research thus looked for corresponding 
PSED type within the GEM research design. I thus used the GEM indicators 
Know, ECul, and ESIm for SC (see Table 11 above). See Table 9 for the 
abbreviations). ‘Know’ was derived from the GEM individual measure ‘Knowent’, 
which probes if an individual has interacted with another entrepreneur over the 
last two years. I use it here to indicate structural SC. Liao and Welsch (2003) 
used PSED items, “Many of my friends have started new firms,” and “Many of my 
family and kin have started new firms.” Klyver et al. (2008) validated the GEM 
item “Knowent” as a measure of structural SC. For the purposes of arriving at a 
country level item of structural SC, I calculated the percent of ‘yes’ responses per 
country. 
The item measures for EFCs such as ECul and ESIm are shown in Appendices 1 











of SC measures used in both PSED 1 and 2 (Curtin et al., 2009) showed that the 
items for cognitive SC relate to the GEM EFCs ‘social and cultural norms’ and 
‘social image’. Thus, I link ECul and ESIm to cognitive SC conditions. ECul and 
ESIm measure the local society’s views and attitudes towards entrepreneurs.  
 
6.5.3.2 Tacit human capital 
Section 4.3.2 showed that HC comprises of both explicit and tacit knowledge 
development. Curtin et al (2009) have used PSED data on work experience as a 
more tacit or informal form of knowledge development. Within the GEM data, I 
located the entrepreneurial capacity EFC to capture tacit HC (see Appendix 1). 
This EFC looks at the practical aspects of starting enterprises such as knowing 
how to start an enterprise and having experience in starting a business as well as 
the ability to organize the resources required for a new business. 
6.5.4 Formal institutions 
6.5.4.1 Financial capital 
The GEM EFC for finance consists of items that probe the support of EA through 
financial considerations that relate to equity, debt, government subsidies, private 
funding, and venture capital funding in each country. A principal components 
analysis confirmed whether the finance EFC items formed a single factor. The 
factor loading estimates from the principal components analysis were then 
entered into Promax oblique rotation and Kaizer normalization routines to 
determine the final factor loadings. The results showed that the Finance EFC 
comprised of two scales. I labelled these ‘Fin 1’ and ‘Fin2’ (see Table 11 above). 
The results were used to indicate FC conditions and are shown in Appendix 2. 
‘Fin1’ indicates general finance relating to government funding as well as general 
debt and equity finance. Fin 2 indicates mainly private equity type funding and 
probes for the support available to entrepreneurs from venture capital, angel 











6.5.4.2 Explicit human capital 
PSED data on education represent an explicit or more formal development of 
knowledge (Curtin et al., 2009). Within the GEM data, I located the primary and 
higher education EFCs to align with the education type measures of HC 
conditions.  
Like the analysis performed by Levie and Autio (2008), the factor analysis of this 
research also resulted in the separation of the education and training EFC into 
two scales viz. (i) primary and secondary level education and training and (ii) 
post-secondary level education and training. 
6.5.4.3 Opportunity and incentives 
I have found that adapting a combination of Hoffman (2007) and Lundstrom and 
Stevenson’s (2005) categorization of entrepreneurship policy factors useful in 
developing indicators for the variable O&Is (see Table 12 below). Hoffman and 
Gabr (2006) operationalised entrepreneurial O&I conditions through several 
policy areas like entry barriers, regulations, access to foreign markets, technology 
transfer, private demand conditions and procurement regulations. On the other 
hand, Lundström and Stevenson (2005) operationalised the same factor in terms 
of the support environment for EA. This included the availability of information, 
advice, capital, contacts, technical support, and business ideas as well as the 
ease of access to these resources. Opportunity also encompasses the regulatory 
environment as well as the processes of government administration (see Section 
4.3.3).  
I simplified Hoffman’s model by combining their opportunity and motivation 
factors affecting EA into a single variable called ‘entrepreneurial opportunity and 
incentives’, in line with Lundstrom and Stevenson’s (2005) operationalization of 
entrepreneurial opportunity. Among others, Hoffmann (2007) located 
administrative burdens and labour market regulations as policy incentives for EA.  
Hoffman (2007) associated the policy area called ‘restart possibilities’ with 
entrepreneurial ability. I located this under O&I conditions since by bankruptcy 











(2007) considers lenient bankruptcy legislation as an incentive. I locate this under 
the factor entrepreneurial O&Is. Verheul et al (2001) concur by arguing that fiscal 
incentives, subsidies, labour market regulation, and bankruptcy legislation co-
determine the net rewards and the risks of the various occupational opportunities. 
Table 12: Possible indicators of the variable ‘Opportunity and incentives’ 
Opportunities and incentives 
Entry barriers / deregulation 
Access to foreign markets 
Technology transfer 
Private demand conditions 
Procurement regulation 
Personal income tax 
Business taxes and fiscal incentives 
Social security discrimination 
Administrative burdens 
Labour market regulation 
Bankruptcy legislation, restart possibilities 
From the GEM expert survey (see Table 9 above), I associated Government 
Policy, R&D Transfer and Entry Regulations to the corresponding items of O&Is 
of Table 12 above. Like Levie and Autio (2008), the factor analysis here resulted 
in the Entry Regulation EFC splitting into two scales viz. (i) market dynamics and 
(ii) market openness. 
6.6 Control variables 
In general, one should account for all possible explanatory variables associated 











variable bias (Koop, 2008). However, including irrelevant variables, ones with no 
explanatory power, lead to less precise estimates of regression coefficients and 
over-fitting. Playing off these two competing considerations is an important 
empirical exercise. 
A prevalence of existing companies influences EA in a number of ways. 
Entrepreneurs might regard existing business owners as role models. Existing 
companies also require input services and materials that start-ups can provide. 
This research acknowledged the influence of the prevalence of existing 
companies. It does this by standardising the measure of EA, dividing new 
company registrations by total registrations for that country (Virgil, 2009a; Acs et 
al., 2008). 
Most studies on cross-country EA control for ED. I account for ED more explicitly 
by considering it as a key explanatory variable. In addition, by conducting a panel 
analysis, I control for a number of country and year effects whether fixed or 
random. 
At first, as Levie and Autio (2008) did, all remaining GEM EFCs that were not part 
of the configuration term were also regressed to EA. They were often either not 
significant or not as significant as the effects of the three variables making up the 
configuration. Some of the remaining EFCs posed a multicollinearity threat since 
they correlated more than 0.7 with the main explanatory variables. Thus, for 
consistency, I developed simple models without these remaining EFCs as 
controls. The random effects, measuring for unobserved country and time 
heterogeneity, also contributed towards the control of unobserved explanatory 
possibilities (See Section 6.5).  
Olson (1996), though explaining wealth across countries and not EA, argued that 
since institutions influence the action of economic agents, one can rule out such 
considerations as population level and migration. Levie and Autio (2008) add the 
square of GDP to control for the non-linearity observed in the U-shaped curve 
using TEA data (Bosma et al., 2009). I find no need to do this since WBGES data 











6.7 Reliability and validity of research design 
External validity accounts for the ability of the research to be generalised across 
countries (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). This would require the use of a random and 
representative sample. As discussed in Section 6.2, the sample used for this 
research is convenient by nature. In the random effects approach (see Section 
6.8), findings can be generalised beyond the sample (Baltagi, 2001).  
Omitted variable bias can reduce the validity of a model. Panel analysis, in 
general, accounts for a major portion of the variation in EA due to country 
heterogeneity e.g. the demographic differences, typically accounted for by control 
variables. Panel analysis thus reduces omitted variable bias considerably. 
To increase external validity, I also replicated the research with different 
indicators of the same variable. Thus, the contingent effect of informal institutions 
was tested first by ‘entrepreneur social image’ and then by ‘entrepreneurial 
culture’ and ‘entrepreneurial capacity’. The theory supports these indicators (See 
Section 4.3).   
This replication approach, aside from enhancing validity, also enhances reliability. 
The reliability of a measure refers to the extent to which other researchers can 
replicate the measurement outcome. Correspondence between two similar 
indicators like Fin1 and Fin2 confirms reliability.  
6.8 Data analysis 
This research makes use of panel data to examine for interaction effects in a 
multiple regression analysis. There are two kinds of information in panel data. 
First, cross-sectional information reflects in the differences between countries. 
Second, time-series information reflects in the changes within countries over 
time. Panel data regressions allow one to take advantage of these different types 
of information (Wooldridge, 2002). Software used to conduct both a hierarchical 
regression and a multilevel analysis as is the case when using panel data is still 











It is not optimal to use ordinary multiple regression techniques on panel data. 
Such regression techniques might lead to incorrect estimates of coefficients since 
they are subject to omitted variable bias - a problem that arises from unknown 
variables. This type of bias also occurs when difficult-to-observe variables affect 
the dependent variable. Panel data analysis makes it possible to control for some 
types of omitted variables even without observing them. One achieves this by 
instead observing changes in the dependent variable over time. This controls for 
omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time. Panel 
data analysis also controls for omitted variables that vary over time but remain 
constant between cases (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Below I discuss the details of the interaction method, the choice of random 
effects estimation and its related assumptions. 
6.8.1 Interaction analysis 
Whilst most business researchers have tended to analyse the regression in a 
stepwise and hierarchical approach they go about analysis in different ways. This 
makes it difficult for a beginner researcher to find an exemplar on how to conduct 
interaction analysis. For instance, some go directly into interaction hypotheses 
without suggesting a direct effects hypothesis but still model the direct effects (De 
Clercq et al, 2010b). Most use control variables as a first step and others (Cox 
and Beier, 2009) go directly into analysing the main effects as a first step. In 
hierarchical regression, many researchers do not consider the coefficients of prior 
steps but only the significance of the change in the overall model as one 
completes the regression steps. Wiklund and Shepherd (2005) also look to the 
final step to test their direct effects hypothesis. Moreover, software to analyse an 
integration of hierarchical regression and panel data analysis simultaneously is 
limited (Autio and Acs, 2010). 
Researchers often refer to an interaction analysis as a moderating variable 
analysis. It involves creating an interaction term by multiplying two or more 
explanatory variables together in a regression equation. Cohen and Cohen 
(2003) advise that all lower order terms, for example the primary explanatory 











necessitates the use of an interaction analysis since it relies on modelling the 
effects of the simultaneous interaction of formal and informal institutions as well 
as ED on EA. This results in a three-way interaction term.  
While contingency analysis (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) examines the interactions 
between two explanatory variables, a configurational approach examines for 
interactions between three explanatory variables (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005). 
I thus relied on a configurational approach to model the respective interactions. I 
used hierarchical linear regression to regress the ED and respective variables of 
formal and informal institutions against EA. Preacher (2010) gives guidance on 
how to conduct a three-way interaction analysis (see quote below).  
 “Treatment of 3-way and 4-way interactions proceeds in much the same way as 
for 2-way interactions. To form the 3-way interaction term, compute the product 
of all three independent variables. In order to obtain the unique effect of a higher-
order interaction term, it is necessary to include all lower-order terms first (or 
simultaneously) so that the interaction coefficient represents a unique effect. The 
regression equation used to analyse a 3-way interaction looks like this: 
   Y = b0 + b1(X) + b2 (Z) + b3 (W) + b4 (XZ) + b5 (XW) + b6 (ZW) + b7 
(XZW) 
If the b7 coefficient is significant, then it is reasonable to explore further. Reframe 
the regression equation so that Y is a function of one of the IVs at particular 
values of the other two: 
   Y = (b1 + b4 (Z) + b5 (W) + b7 (ZW)) X + (b0 + b2 (Z) + b3 (W) + b6 
(ZW)) 
The simple slope (what Aiken and West, 1991 call a "simple regression equation") 
is now: 
 (b1 + b4 (Z) + b5 (W) + b7 (ZW)) 
The remainder of the equation now functions as a simple intercept term. 
We can represent 3-way interactions graphically in the same way as 2-way 
interactions. Pick convenient or meaningful values for Z and W, such as one 
standard deviation above and below the mean on each, and use all combinations 
of these values in the equation to plot lines at meaningful levels of X. We can 
choose any variable to use for the x-axis - it does not matter, except that it may 
be easier for interpretation to use one over another.” Preacher (2010) 
An interaction effect exists if, and only if, the three-way interaction term gives a 
significant contribution (Cohen and Cohen, 2003). The standard F or Chi-square 
tests show whether the explanatory variables in question influences the 
dependent variable in the overall model. In particular, these tests look at whether 











test for a directional hypothesis, increase or decrease, one has to look also at the 
sign of the interaction term. 
Only in a simple linear-additive regression model is the coefficient of a variable 
and the effect on the dependent variable of a unit increase in that variable are 
identical. In interactive models, this equivalence between coefficient and effect no 
longer holds. Each variable involved in the interaction terms of interactive models 
has multiple effects, depending on the levels of the other variable(s) with which it 
interacts. This represents the substantive implication of interactive hypotheses in 
the first place (Kam and Franzese, 2003). 
As can be seen from the simple slopes in the inset of Preacher (2010) above, 
those varying effects or slopes of x at particular values of z and w involve the 
coefficients on x,  xz, xw and xzw. The coefficient on x represents just one effect 
x may have, namely the effect of x at z=0. When the variables are centred, then 
the coefficient on x represents the effect of x at z = m an. Thus, single t-tests on 
individual coefficients on variables involved in interactive terms require care to 
interpret because they refer to significance at only one empirical value of the 
other variables (Kam and Franzese, 2003). 
Braumoeller (2004) supports the above-mentioned arguments. He suggests that 
because interactive relationships imply that the impact of a main explanatory 
variable on the dependent variable varies according to the level of a moderating 
explanatory variable, the idea of the impact of the main explanatory variable on 
the dependent variable in general is in fact a meaningless one. Thus, researchers 
do not focus on the significance of the regression coefficients of main explanatory 
variables. Instead, they examine the nature of the higher order interaction terms 
(Cohen and Cohen, 2003; Brambor et al., 2006). However, one should still 
include the main effect terms in the regression. The entry of main effects, into a 
multiple regression model, removes them from the interaction term (Brambor et 
al., 2006). This is necessary because the interaction term carries information on 
both the main and interaction effects (Cohen and Cohen, 2003). One thus does 












Whilst Preacher (2010), Kim et al (2001) and Jaccard et al (1990) advise to plot 
the nature of the significant interactions, Kam and Franzese (2003) suggest 
tabulating the slopes when the plots become cluttered and difficult to view and 
interpret. I take their advice.  
Interaction analysis must account for multicollinearity since the main and 
moderating explanatory variables are on their own and in the interaction terms 
within the same regression equation. Analysts have contested the issue of 
controlling for multicollinearity in interaction calculations. Whilst some advocate 
mean-centring (Preacher et al., 2006), others do not. Mean-centring involves 
calculating the mean of all observations of the explanatory variables of interest 
and subtracting this from the observed value. Others argue that if one calculates 
the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in the main explanatory variable at the 
same level of the moderating explanatory variable from the estimates of the 
centred and uncentred models, one would obtain exactly the same marginal 
effect and measure of uncertainty. Brambor et al (2006, p71) argue, “given that 
the centred and uncentred models are algebraically equivalent, we can 
unequivocally state that centring does not change the statistical certainty of the 
estimated effects and, therefore, cannot really mitigate any multicollinearity 
issues that exist.” To remove multicollinearity I choose instead to drop one of the 
collinear variables as Levie and Autio (2008) have done.  
In the traditional approach to probing significant interaction effects one chooses 
several values of the moderating explanatory variable at which to evaluate the 
significance of the simple slope for the regression (Aiken et al., 1991). The 
significance of simple intercepts is rarely of interest. In many cases, the 
regression of the dependent variable on the main explanatory variable is 
significant at values of the moderator that are less than the lower bound and 
greater than the upper bound, while the regression is non-significant at values of 
the moderator falling within the region (Preacher et al., 2006). In the absence of 
theoretically meaningful values, Cohen and Cohen (2003) recommend choosing 
values at the mean of the moderating explanatory variable and at one standard 











that a choice of two or three standard deviations away from the mean might risk 
results were coefficients are not significantly different from zero. 
Brambor et al (2006) suggest the possibility for the marginal effect of the main 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable to be significant for substantively 
relevant values of the moderating explanatory variable despite the statistical 
insignificance of the coefficient on the interaction term. This implies that one 
cannot determine whether a model should include an interaction term simply by 
looking at the significance of its coefficient. By dropping the interaction terms if 
this coefficient is insignificant, one could potentially miss important moderating 
relationships between their variables. The typical results table often conveys little 
information of interest because one is not concerned with model parameters per 
se. Instead, one is primarily interested in the marginal effect of the main 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable for substantively meaningful 
values of the moderating variable. 
6.8.2 Model specification and estimation 
The dependent variable EA corresponds to the number of registered new 
enterprises in the respective countries and standardised using the number of 
existing companies. I use heteroskedasticity-robust estimators (Wooldridge, 
2002) to ensure that one interprets a significant effect as truly significant, even for 
different residual variances. 
I use several models to test the hypotheses. Model 1 includes the informal 
institutional variable and ED. Model 3 extends Model 1 to include the formal 
institutional variable. In this way, I get to test for Hypothesis 1 by examining the 
significant difference in fit when progressing from Model 1 to Model 3. I included 
Model 2, which includes a formal institutional variable and ED, to test, relative to 
Model 3 again, if informal institutions also have a significant main effect on EA to 
confirm my choice of formal institutions as a focal explanatory variable. Models 4 
to 6 each include one of the two-way interaction terms. Models 4 and 5 in 
particular test for Hypotheses 2 and 3 respectively. The difference in fit between 











I side with Brambor et al (2006) who suggest that mean-centring does not change 
the statistical certainty of the estimated effects and, therefore, cannot really 
mitigate any multicollinearity issues that exist (see section 6.8.1). I thus form 
interaction terms directly from GEM data with any centring. In order to remove 
multicollinearity I choose to drop one of the collinear variables. It might be 
possible to mitigate against multicollinearity, by entering collinear terms in 
separate regression equations. 















ED x x x x x x x 
Informal x  x x x x x 
H1: Formal  x x x x x x 
H2: Formal x Informal    x  x x 
H3: Formal x ED     x x x 
ED x Informal      x x 
H4, H5, H6: Formal x Informal x ED       x 
The Hausman test determines the use of fixed-effects or random-effects in a 
model. This tests the significance of the correlation between the unobserved 
country-specific random-effects and the explanatory variables. If they do not 
correlate, then the random-effects model might be more powerful and 
parsimonious. If they correlate, the random-effects model results in inconsistent 
estimates and the fixed-effects model would be the model of choice. The null 











Ho = country effects uncorrelated with explanatory variables (ED, informal, formal) 
Table 14: Hausman test  




ED -0.615 -0.572 -0.043 0.065 
Informal (ESIm) -0.637 -0.598 -0.039 0.067 
Formal (GPR) -0.943 -0.898 -0.045 0.128 
ED#Informal 0.163 0.155 0.008 0.017 
ED#ED 0.238 0.227 0.010 0.030 
Informal#Formal 0.239 0.233 0.006 0.032 
Formal#Informal#ED -0.060 -0.058 -0.001 0.008 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from panel regression 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from panel regression 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(7) =  = 3.53………………………Probability>chi2 = 0.8321 
I chose a random-effect specification for all models. I show an output (see Table 
14) for a Hausman test of the model that includes the three-way interaction 
between ED, entrepreneur social image and government policies and regulations. 
The probability value of 0.8321 indicates that the null should not be rejected i.e. 











this instance. Note though that the Hausman statistic, 3.53, is relatively small and 
the coefficients are not entirely different.  
Substantively, fixed-effects models examine the causes of changes within a 
country (Kohler and Kreuter, 2009). For example, fixed-effects will not work well 
with data with slow changing variables over time like that of the typical informal 
institutional variable like entrepreneurial attitudes. Nevertheless, I am interested 
in examining the variations across countries. Nielsen and Alderson (1997), 
suggest that fixed effects throws out cross-sectional variation in the dependent 
and independent variables present in the data. Halaby (2004) however argues 
that fixed effects merely buy protection against biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates.  
In random effects, the unobserved heterogeneity is mean independent of the 
main explanatory variables. In particular, the generalised least square (GLS) 
random effects model lets the variances differ across countries and controls for 
any unobservable country effects. This model also allows inclusion of time-
invariant variables in the estimation, such as the slowly evolving informal 
institutions. The model also generalises to the entire population of countries. 
Substantively then random effects suits this research. Below, I show a general 
version of the random effects specification used here. 
EA = bo + b1(ED) + b2(Formal) + b3(Informal) + b4(ED)(Informal) + b5(ED)(Formal) + 
b6(Formal)(Informal) + b7(ED)(Formal)(Informal) + αi + εi,t 
Where: 
EA = cross-country entrepreneurial activity 
ED = economic development 
Formal = formal institution 
Informal = informal institution 
b0 = estimated constant  











αi , εi,t = error terms 
The two “error” terms, αi and ε i,t behave somewhat differently. There is a 
different ε for each country at each time. On the other hand, αonly varies across 
countries, not over time. One regards α as representing the combined effect on 
EA of all unobserved variables that are constant over time. On the other hand, ε 
represents purely random variation at each point in time. I am interested in the 
three-way interaction term, b7(ED) (Formal) (Informal). 
6.8.3 Regression assumptions, violations and remedies 
In similar panel research on EA, Levie and Autio (2008) considered 
multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation violations. This thesis 
also considers endogeneity since extant research confirms that EA influences 
ED. 
6.8.3.1 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity exists if two explanatory variables are highly correlated with one 
another. Such variables will then contain roughly the same information. Present 
multicollinearity then the regression model will not adequately isolate those 
explanatory variables that have a significant influence on the dependent variable. 
In addition, the resultant coefficient gives imprecise estimates. The most common 
solution to multicollinearity drops one of the highly correlated explanatory 
variables (Koop, 2008). 
Advice differs on the approach to treat multicollinearity in models with interaction 
terms. Whilst mean-centring has been a common approach (Preacher et al., 
2006; Preacher, 2010), it does little to solve the underlying problem of collinearity 
except for where a variable is interacted with itself to model non-linearity 
(Echambadi and Hess, 2007; Shieh, 2010). I choose to drop explanatory 
variables with bivariate correlations greater than 0.7, as Levie and Autio (2008) 
have done. 
This thesis examines only interactions between formal and informal institutional 











problems since mainly indicators within the same institution correlate by more 
than 0.7. For instance, note from Table 15 below that ECul and ECap both 
indicators of informal institutions correlate by 0.739. Since these indicators are 
never in the same model, multicollinearity is not a problem in similar cases.    





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*= 5% significance  
6.8.3.2 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelations occurs when the errors in time-series data correlate with one 
another. Serial correlation occurs when the errors in cross-sectional data 
correlate with one another. Serially independent errors occur in the absence of 
these problems. In any analysis of panel data, it is important to examine for 
autocorrelation (Koop, 2008). 
A popular test of autocorrelation uses the Durbin-Watson statistic. It relies on 
measuring the differences of errors between consecutive measures. This statistic 
generally lies between zero and four (Koop, 2008). If the error at time t correlates 
positively with that at t-1, then this statistic will be near zero. On the other hand, if 
they correlate negatively, then the difference will be large and close to a statistic 
of four. No autocorrelation is associated with intermediate values, around two. 
Field (2009) suggest a Durbin Watson statistic in the range of 1.5 to 2.  
Stata calculates a modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson statistic. A test 
statistic of 1.084 resulted for the regression model containing the three-way 
interaction between lgGDPcap, ESIm and GPR. This violated the ‘no 
autocorrelation’ assumption. 
Levie and Autio (2008) argue for the use of the Baltagi-Wu test (Baltagi and Wu, 











unbalanced panels. In the panel data used for this research, there are 
observations missing for some countries especially during the earlier years of 
GEM. The Durbin-Watson test is sensitive to an unbalanced panel structure. 
Though the literature does not suggest specific critical values for the Baltagi-Wu 
test, values that are ‘much smaller than 2’ are suggestive of the need to correct 
for serial autocorrelation (Kögel, 2004). The Baltagi-Wu values did not conflict 
with this threshold in any of the regressions. I therefore ran these regressions 
without controlling for autocorrelation in error terms. To illustrate, the regression 
model containing the three-way interaction between ED, entrepreneur social 
image and government policy and regulation resulted in a Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic 
of 1.71, a value not ‘much smaller than 2’.  
6.8.3.3 Endogeneity 
A central regression assumption is that the explanatory variables are 
independent or exogenous. Endogeneity occurs when an explanatory variable is 
not entirely exogenous but depends on some unmodelled causes that also drive 
other variables in the model. These causes might include an omitted variable, 
unobserved heterogeneity or self-selection, and simultaneity (Woolridge, 2002). 
The error term in a regression model captures the effects of these causes. Thus, 
researchers detect endogeneity when the explanatory variable correlates with the 
error term. In this research, it is likely that prior EA (the dependent variable) 
influences ED (the explanatory variable) a year later and beyond (Wennekers 
and Thurik, 1999). If we leave out this effect, we run the risk of ED being 
endogenous.  
The regression equations that use time series data often contain lagged 
variables. The lag function creates variables with lags of various lengths. 
Econometrists (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998) in the area of entrepreneurship 
have considered two ways to treat endogeneity. One may either use a set of 
instrumental variables associated with the endogenous explanatory variable or 
use a lag, in which case one uses values of the explanatory variable measured 
some time before the dependent variable. One typically searches the literature for 
instrumental variables associated only with the problem variable and not the 











Stata’s GMM procedure) to choose lagged instrumental variables, especially in 
the case where one uses lagged dependent variables as explanatory variables.  
Following Danis et al (2010) among others, I chose a distributed lag model. This 
model includes current and lagged values of the explanatory variables as 
regressors. Another option available to me was to use an autoregressive model, 
which contains a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable. This 
would mean that past EA helps to spur on further EA in the future. I chose 
instead to lag only one explanatory variable, ED, by one year. This removes 
endogeneity since EA does not have a counter-effect on past ED. 
Two other ways to reduce endogeneity also require discussion. One can also 
mitigate against omitted variable bias by controlling for other explanatory sources 
of EA. As stated earlier, I did not use any controls beyond ED (see Section 6.6). 
Errors also occur from common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). For 
instance, the same respondent evaluates characteristics related to the 
independent and dependent variables. In the GEM research, experts evaluated 
the level of EFCs while other individuals responded to questions on actual 
entrepreneurial efforts. To avoid common method bias, I went on to use the 
World Bank data on new registered companies.   
Bruderl (2005) recommends the fixed effects model to mitigate against 
endogeneity. This works especially when the sources of endogeneity are due to 
time invariant effects. One could use a Hausman specification test to determine 
the bias in the RE-estimator. This test (see Section 6.8.2) suggests that the 
random effects model has no bias. 
6.8.3.4 Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity exists when the variance of the error term differs across 
observations. For instance, there is a good chance of heteroskedasticity if the 
error variance for less developed countries differs from that of more developed 
countries.  
Software packages like Stata are able to compute for heteroskedasticity-robust 











do with outliers and non-normal distributions (Field, 2009). For any econometric 
analysis, Stock and Watson (2007) recommend the use of heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. In their analysis of panel data containing EFCs, Levie and 
Autio (2008) also controlled for potential heteroskedasticity in error terms, arising 
from grouping by country, by specifying robust standard errors when running their 
models. Thus, I chose to run the option on Stata that controls for 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
I used the regression model containing three-way interaction between lgGDPcap, 
ESIm and GPR to test for heteroskedasticity using a simple plot of the model 
predictions versus the resultant residual or errors. Figure 10 below does seem to 
show a slight broadening of the residual as the linear prediction increases, 
characteristic of heteroskedasticity. For consistency, I ran all the models to 
control for heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
 













7. Regression results 
This thesis set out to explain the variation in cross-country EA by taking both an 
IE and ED perspective. In particular, it set out to answer: How and why ED 
moderates informal institutions, which in turn moderates the formal institutions-
EA relationship? It was therefore necessary to examine the simultaneous 
interaction between all three explanatory variables viz. formal institutions, 
informal institutions and ED. I thus chose a configurational approach based on a 
multiple regression model that includes a three-way interaction term. 
I conducted an analysis of secondary panel data from the GEM expert survey as 
well as the WBGES and IMF databases. GEM EFCs were associated with 
institutional conditions. GDP per capita values from the IMF database were 
associated with ED. I used a measure of EA located in the formal economy, 
extracted from the WBGES database on new business registrations across the 
world. 
The results of a Hausman test supported the use of a random effects 
specification for the multiple regression models. This specification enables the 
control of other heterogeneous country effects over and above the thesis’s 
primary ED and institutional explanations of EA. Interaction analysts (Kam and 
Franzese, 2003; Braumoeller, 2004) advise that one focuses only on the three-
way interaction term. They add that an analysis of the lower order terms will lead 
to misleading conclusions. Nevertheless, researchers test for the significance of 
change in model fit as one adds interaction terms to the model. I continue this 
practice here. The term of interest in this thesis after controlling for random 
effects is ‘b7(ED) (Formal) (Informal’)’. 
7.1 Descriptive results 
Table 15 (see Section 6.8.3.1 on Multicollinearity) shows modest correlations 
among formal and informal institution indicators. As expected, correlations are 
stronger between indicators of the same type of institution, be it formal or 
informal. These strong correlations do not influence the analysis since the 
interaction terms comprise variables representing the two different institutions viz. 











Table 16 summarises the descriptive results of the data. Appendix A describes 
the variables and their respective abbreviations.  
Table 16: Descriptive results (see Table 9 for abbreviations) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
start-up 176 0.100134 0.036842 0.027322 0.189918 
lgGDPcap 176 4.231952 0.43699 2.666008 4.857781 
Knowent 176 0.394793 0.107604 0.13 0.881 
ESIm 176 3.35092 0.394509 2.474467 4.640915 
ECul 176 2.807879 0.49069 1.738738 4.567466 
Fin1 176 2.909364 0.467911 1.498694 4.015133 
Fin2 176 2.634814 0.551445 1.40784 3.97807 
Prim 176 2.098542 0.342691 1.27667 3.10359 
High 176 2.81353 0.333391 1.909856 3.795492 
ECap 176 2.587582 0.387949 1.684657 3.93681 
GPR 176 2.507101 0.537365 1.348676 3.781669 
RDev 176 2.524726 0.371698 1.72546 3.438227 
MDyn 176 2.801485 0.451239 1.829775 3.945647 
Mope 176 2.741934 0.338911 1.850045 3.753239 
7.2 A test of the operational model 
Earlier, I sought an answer to, how institutions link to conditions for EA. Informal 
institutions manifest as conditions for EA like SC and tacit HC (practical 
experience). Formal institutions manifest as conditions for EA like O&Is, FC and 
explicit HC (formal education). Section 4.3 shows that the definitions of formal 
and informal institutions have clear associations with these conditions for EA. 
Theoretical support thus exists. I however, use the GEM EFC data to test these 
empirically as conditions for EA.  
I examined their direct correlation with EA (Table 15) as well as their usefulness 
as contingent variables by looking at whether they appear within statistically 
significant configurations. Some of the GEM EFCs did not lend empirical support 
to conditions for EA. Others lent support to each of SC, tacit HC, FC and O&I as 
conditions for EA (see Table 17). For instance among the explicit HC indicators of 
education, while Prim correlated significantly to EA, High did not. Neither Prim 
nor High interacted significantly with any of the indicators of informal institutions 











interacted significantly with indicators of formal institutions and ED. I dropped 
indicators not featuring in any statistically significant configurations from the 
following tests of the hypotheses. 
Table 17: Useful indicators of institutions from GEM (see Table 9 for 
abbreviations) 
 Formal Informal 
Indicators featuring in configurations at 1%, 







ECap (Tacit HC) 
Know (SC) 
Indicators in configurations above 10% 
significance level 
High (explicit HC) 




One indicator of FC featured in a statistically significant configuration viz. Fin2. 
This represents private equity type funding. However, Fin2 did not did not add 
any variance to EA above the informal institution indicator and ED (See Appendix 
4). I thus do not discuss it below. Thus, I test formal institutions using O&Is and 
not FC.  
While, a formal institutional indicator like R&D transfer (RDev) forms part of a 
significant three-way interaction term with Know and ED, it did not demonstrate 
any significant effect on EA directly and neither did it add any variance to EA 
above the other explanatory variables viz. informal institutions and ED (see 
Appendix 4). Since ‘knowing another entrepreneur” (Know) formed part of the 
same interaction term as RDev, I do not discuss it below. With the structural SC 
(Know) measures not being significant, I test the effects of informal institutions 
through cognitive SC, which associates with attitudes towards an entrepreneurial 











Overall, I find that formal institutions associate with conditions for EA like O&Is. 
O&Is include theory-driven measures of formal institutions like the adequacy of 
government policy and regulations and market openness that relate significantly 
to EA directly and as contingent variables (see Section 4.3.3). However, the R&D 
measures that I also proposed earlier (see Section 6.3) do not. Similarly, the 
findings do not support an association between formal institutions and FC. I find 
that FC measures are either not significantly correlated to EA or do not appear in 
any significant configurations. The findings do not support an association 
between formal institutions and formal education measures like primary and 
higher education. As suggested earlier, I find support for an association between 
informal institutions and tacit HC as well as cognitive SC but not with structural 
and relational SC.  
7.3 Hypothesis testing 
Having reviewed the adequacy of some of the GEM measures, I now assess the 
conceptual model. I used hierarchical regression8  starting with a direct effects 
model, then proceeding to a model including two-way interactions and eventually 
to that including a three-way interaction. I added the two-way interactions 
separately at first to test if each interaction adds significant variance to the direct 
effects model. I added all two-way interactions simultaneously to test if the 
subsequent addition of a three-way interaction term results in any significantly 
difference variance in EA.   
Bearing in mind the prior hypotheses on the nature of the three-way interaction 
(Hypotheses 4 and 5), the significance of the three-way interaction terms was 
important only as far as signalling that it was important to examine the particular 
interaction further. For the two-way interaction hypotheses (Hypotheses H2 and 
H3), it was only necessary to examine the sign of the interaction term. A negative 
sign meant that the formal institutions-EA relation decreases as either informal 
                                            
8 These Tables contain an additional chi-square difference test to establish if the informal 
institutional variable adds any significant variance to EA over and above the formal institution and 
ED variables. Though this was not a hypothesis, I have performed this to test my underlying 











institutions or ED levels increases. A simple slope analysis was necessary to 
examine the formal institutions-EA relationship based on contingent effects 
arising from country variations in informal institutions and ED levels.  
I first review the results including the interaction between ‘entrepreneur social 
image’ (ESIm), ‘government policy and regulations’ (GPR) and ED. ESIm, 
associates with cognitive SC or culture, indicators of informal institutions. GPR 
indicates formal institutions. In the measurement model, this three-way 
interaction was significant at the 1% level. I then use other indicators to discuss 
the robustness of the above findings. The log of GDP per capita indicated ED. 
Stata uses a Wald chi-square statistic to test the model fit of a random effects 
specification. The use of a lagged ED variable to control for endogeneity results 
in the number of observations dropping from 176 to 116 for all tests9. There were 
33 groups per test. Observations per group were at an average of 3.5 varying 
from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 7.  
7.3.1 Entrepreneur social image, government policy and regulations and ED   
configuration 
Model 1 (see Table 18) contains only the direct effects of informal institutions and 
ED. In order to test Hypothesis H1 - the higher the level of formal institutional 
development, the higher the level of EA - Model 3 adds the effect of formal 
institutions. The addition of formal institutions, consistent with the starting point of 
the thesis’s exposition, results in a positive effect of formal institutions on EA (β = 
.018, p < .05). The formal institution variable also explains additional variance (chi 
square difference = 5.29, p < .05). Notice that though the informal institutional 
variable has a significant effect on EA (β = .014, p < .05) it does not explain any 
additional variance (chi square difference = 2.49, p > .10) above the direct effects 
of formal institutions and ED (Model 2). This supports the thesis’s stance that 
formal institutions constitute the main or focal explanatory variable.  
                                            
9 Another reason for this drop in the observations is that Stata’s panel analysis does not recognise 
a single observation. For instance, Jamaica and Israel had only one observation – only in 2006 











Hypothesis H2 predicts a greater positive relationship between formal institutional 
development and EA when informal institutions are at a high level. On the other 
hand, Hypothesis H3 predicts a lesser positive relationship between formal 
institutional development and EA for high levels of ED. To test these hypotheses, 













Table 18: Random-effects GLS estimation of entrepreneurial activity against entrepreneur social image, government policy and 
regulations and ED 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Β S.E. Β S.E. Β S.E. β S.E. Β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
ED 0.219* 0.012 0.018 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.016 0.013 -0.042 0.039 -0.095 0.073 -0.572*** 0.153 
Informal 0.019*** 0.007   0.014** 0.007 0.04 0.034 0.013* 0.007 -0.035 0.075 -0.598*** 0.162 
H1: Formal   0.021*** 0.008 0.018** 0.008 0.054 0.041 -0.084 0.057 0.001 0.1 -0.898*** 0.272 
H2: Formal # Informal       -0.01 0.012   -0.016 0.015 0.232*** 0.069 
H3: Formal #ED         0.024 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.227*** 0.066 
Informal #ED           0.021 0.021 0.155*** 0.044 
H4, H5,: Formal # Informal # ED             -0.058*** 0.017 
Constant -0.055 0.065 -0.029 0.055 -0.066 0.063 -0.151 0.135 0.189 0.155 0.277 0.285 2.294*** 0.581 
               
R square within 0.0696  0.136  0.159  0.161  0.213  0.23  0.289  
R square between 0.2499  0.193  0.246  0.265  0.215  0.219  0.222  
R square overall 0.1926  0.182  0.218  0.225  0.212  0.213  0.218  
Wald chi-square (df) 7.53** (2)  10.33*** 
(2) 









Chi-square difference (df)      5.29** (1) 
formal 
  2.43 (1)   0.2 (1)   11.49*** 
(3) 
  4.98** (1)  
Chi-square difference (df)      2.49 (1) 
informal 











The two-way interaction models (4 and 5) do not significantly increase the 
amount of explained variance (p >.10) above the direct effects Model 3. In 
addition, none of the two-way interaction terms are statistically significant (p 
>.10). Thus, the findings do not support Hypothesis H2 or Hypothesis H3. 
However, the inclusion of the three-way interaction term in Model 7, significantly 
increases explained variance over all the two-way interactions included in Model 
6 (chi square difference = 4.98, p < .05). The effect of the configuration or three-
way interaction was also significant (β = -.058, p < .01). This suggests a 
configuration of formal and informal institutions and ED. 
Hypotheses H4 and H5 predict the nature of the configuration or three-way 
interaction. To determine the nature of an interaction one must consider jointly 
the main effects and the interaction terms (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). For higher-
order interactions, one must consider all lower-order interactions and main effects 
(Aiken and West, 1991). Based on the regression coefficients of Model 7 in Table 
18, I conduct a simple slope analysis (Aiken and West, 1991). Appendix 3 
illustrates the calculation of the slopes that represent the effect of formal 
institutions on EA (Hypothesis H1). Table 19 below10 shows the slopes. 
Table 19: Simple slope analysis for configuration of entrepreneur social image, 
government policy and regulations, and ED    
 Informal institutional development 
Low High 
ED Low -0.002 (.09)* 0.007 (.11) 
High 0.046 (.13) 0.015(.14) 
* EA values are shown in brackets 
Hypothesis H4  predicts an increase in the positive moderating effect of informal 
institutional development on the formal institutions-EA relationship at low levels of 
                                            
10 One can also choose to plot the slopes but the plots are somewhat cluttered and difficult to 











ED. Particularly relevant to test H4 are the two cells where low ED intersects with 
weak informal institutions (slope = -.002)11 and strong informal institutions (slope 
= .007). Observing the two cells, one can confirm that for low levels of ED, the 
positive of formal institutions on EA increases as the level of informal institutional 
development increases. This result supports Hypothesis H4. 
Hypothesis H5 predicts a decrease in the positive moderating effect of informal 
institutional development on the formal institutions-EA relationship at high levels 
of ED. High levels of EA exists at these higher levels of ED, despite a decrease in 
simple slopes. Particularly relevant to test H5 are the two cells where high ED 
intersects with low informal institutional development (slope = .046) and high 
informal institutional development (slope = .015). Observing the two cells, one 
can confirm that for high levels of ED, the effect of formal institutions on EA 
decreases as informal institutional development increases. This result supports 
Hypothesis H5. 
7.3.2  Examining the robustness of the results 
7.3.2.1 Entrepreneur social image, market openness and ED configuration 
I now repeat the analysis with a series of other measures that are also valid 
indicators of formal and informal institutions. I now indicate formal institutional 
development by means of ‘market openness’ abbreviated as Mope. This 
represents the extent to which the new enterprises are free to enter existing 
markets. As in the previous interaction, examined in Section 7.3.1, I retain the 
indicator of informal institutional development as ESIm.   
Table 20 shows the regression results for similar models to the prior analysis. 
The addition of formal institutions to Model 1 to give Model 3, results in a positive 
effect of formal institutions on EA (β  = .023, p < .01). The formal institution 
variable also explains additional variance (chi square difference = 4.63, p < .05). 
Again, these results lend support to Hypothesis H1. Notice, here too, that the 
effect of informal institutions has a significant effect on EA but it does not explain 
                                            
11 The slope is marginally non-positive. It shows that there is no relationship between formal 











any additional variance above the direct effects of formal institutions and ED 
(Model 2). Again, this supports the thesis’s stance that formal institutions 
constitute the main or focal explanatory variable.  
Hypothesis H2, predicts a positive moderating effect of the informal institution 
variable on the formal institutions-EA relationship. I tested it by adding an 
interaction term to Model 3 to give Model 4. The results, like before do not 
support H2.  
Hypothesis H3, predicts a negative moderating effect of the ED variable on the 
formal institutions-EA relationship. I tested it by adding an interaction term to 
Model 3 to give Model 5. A positive interaction between formal institutions and 
ED exists (β = .023, p < .10). However, the interactions does not add any 
variance (chi square difference = 1.3, p > .10). I conclude that these results do 
not lend support to H3. 
Again, like the previous result that examined the entrepreneur social image, 
government policy and regulations and ED   configuration, the inclusion of the 
three-way interaction term, in Model 7, significantly increases the explained 
variance over Model 6 (chi square difference = 4.55, p < .05). The effect of the 














Table 20: Random-effects GLS estimation of EA against entrepreneur social image, market openness and ED 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model7 
 Β S.E. Β S.E. β S.E. Β S.E. Β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
ED 0.022* 0.012 0.017 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.016 0.013 -0.047 0.044 -0.113 0.087 -0.696*** 0.207 
Informal 0.019*** 0.007   0.016** 0.006 0.038 0.047 0.015** 0.006 -0.022 0.074 -0.751*** 0.223 
H1: Formal   0.025*** 0.009 0.023*** 0.009 0.05 0.054 -0.076 0.053 0.018 0.07 -0.938*** 0.308 
H2: Formal # 
Informal 
      -0.008 0.016   -0.022 0.016 0.256*** 0.083 
H3: Formal # ED         0.023* 0.014 0.019 0.013 0.242*** 0.075 
Informal # ED           0.023 0.02 0.194*** 0.057 
H4, H5: Formal # 
Informal # ED 
            -0.065*** 0.02 
Constant -0.055 0.065 -0.04 0.058 -0.081 0.0666 -0.156 0.186 0.187 0.173 0.261 0.333 2.749*** 0.815 
               
R square within 0.07  0.125  0.151  0.15  0.185  0.205  0.234  
R square 
between 
0.25  0.149  0.231  0.242  0.199  0.191  0.194  
R square overall 0.192  0.146  0.206  0.211  0.189  0.185  0.187  
               
Wald chi-square 
(df) 















    4.63** 
formal 
 0.07  1.3  6.27*  4.55**  
Chi-square 
difference (df) 
     1.86 
informal 











I use the slopes shown in Table 21 below, test Hypotheses H4 and H5. 
Table 21: Simple slope analysis for configuration of entrepreneur social image, 
market openness, and ED   
 Informal institutional development 
Low High 
ED Low 0.012  (.10) 0.021 (.12) 
High 0.057 (.13) 0.021 (.14) 
The two cells where low ED intersects with low informal institutional development 
(slope = .012) and high informal institutional development (slope = .021) confirm, 
an increase in the positive moderating effect of informal institutional development 
on the formal institutions-EA relationship at low levels of ED. This result supports 
Hypothesis H4. 
The two cells where high ED intersects with low informal institutional 
development (slope = .057) and high informal institutional development (slope = 
.021) confirm, a decrease in the positive moderating effect of informal institutional 
development on the formal institutions-EA relationship at high levels of ED. This 
result supports Hypothesis H5. 
7.3.3 Entrepreneurial culture, government policy and regulations and ED 
configuration 
I now take the interaction examined in Section 7.2.1, and indicate the informal 
institution variable by means of ‘cultural and social norms’ abbreviated as ECul. 
This measures the extent to which existing social and cultural norms encourage 
EA.  
Table 22 shows the regression results for similar models to the prior analyses. 
The addition of formal institutions to Model 1 to give Model 3, results in a positive 
effect of formal institutions on EA (β  = .018, p < .05). The formal institution 
variable also explains additional variance (chi square difference = 3.6, p < .10). 











considered as indicators, informal institutions has little effect on EA (β = .009, p > 
.10) but it explains additional variance (chi square difference = 2.94, p < .10).   
The findings do not support H2. The effect size is not significant but the additional 
explained variance is, albeit at a 10% level. In addition, the findings do not 
support H3. The effect of interaction between formal institutions and ED is 
positive (β = .024, p < .10). However, no additional variance (chi square 
difference = -.27, p > .10) is added. Again, the inclusion of the three-way 
interaction term, in Model 7, significantly increases the explained variance over 
Model 6 (chi square difference = 11.52, p < .01). The effect of the configuration or 













Table 22: Random-effects GLS estimation of EA against entrepreneurial culture, government policy and regulations and ED 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Β S.E. Β S.E. Β S.E. Β S.E. β S.E. Β S.E. β S.E. 
ED 0.02 0.013 0.018 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.013 -0.043 0.037 0.041 0.051 -0.176* 0.096 
Informal 0.014** 0.006   0.009 0.006 0.025 0.023 0.008 0.006 0.24*** 0.093 -0.079 0.113 
H1: Formal   0.021*** 0.008 0.018** 0.008 0.036 0.028 -0.086 0.057 -0.198** 0.088 -0.613** 0.249 
H2: Formal # 
Informal 
      -0.006 0.009   -0.0001 0.011 0.138** 0.065 
H3: Formal # 
ED 
        0.024* 0.014 0.05*** 0.018 0.146*** 0.056 
Informal # ED           -0.053*** 0.025 0.02 0.028 
H4, H5: 
Formal # 
Informal # ED 
            -0.032** 0.014 
Constant -0.022 0.054 -0.029 0.055 -0.038 0.055 -0.085 0.092 0.219 0.148 -0.148 0.187 0.792* 0.404 
               
R square 
within 
0.073  0.136  0.151  0.153  0.207  0.264  0.292  
R square 
between 
0.208  0.193  0.221  0.23  0.187  0.23  0.224  
R square 
overall 




















     3.6* (1) 
formal 
  3.51* (1)   -0.27 (1)   4.65 (3)   11.52 *** (1) 
Chi-square 
difference (df) 
    2.94* (1) 
informal 











Table 23 below indicates the slopes used to test for H4 and H5. 
Table 23: Simple slope analysis for entrepreneurial culture, government policy 
and regulations and ED configuration 
 Informal institutional development 
Low High 
ED Low -0.0203 (.05) -0.003 (.11) 
High 0.0426 (.13) 0.0328 (.12) 
The two cells where low ED intersects with low informal institutional development 
(slope = -.0203) and high informal institutional development (slope = -.003) 
confirm, an increase in the moderating effect of informal institutional development 
on the formal institutions-EA relationship at low levels of ED. However, the 
negative slopes here do not support an overall positive effect of formal institutions 
on EA. This result, using the GEM indicator ECul for informal institutions, does 
not convince one to support Hypothesis H4. 
The two cells where high ED intersects with low informal institutional 
development (slope = .0426) and high informal institutional development (slope = 
.0328) confirm, a decrease in the positive moderating effect of informal 
institutional development on the formal institutions-EA relationship at high levels 
of ED. This result supports Hypothesis H5.   
7.3.4 Entrepreneurial capacity, government policy and regulations and ED 
configuration 
I now take the interaction examined in Section 7.2.1 and replace the informal 
institutional variable, ‘entrepreneur social image’ by means of ‘entrepreneurial 
capacity’. This measures the extent to which people know how to start and 
manage a business. 
Table 24 shows the regression results for similar models to the prior analyses. 
The addition of formal institutions to Model 1 to give Model 3, results in a positive 











variable also explains additional variance (chi square difference = 2.8, p < .10). 
Again, these results lend support to Hypothesis H1. Upon using entrepreneurial 
capacity as an indicator, informal institutions effect EA positively (β = .016, p < 
.05) but explains no additional variance (chi square difference = 2.41, p > .10).   
These results do not lend support to H2The results show an effect size that is not 
significant and no additional explained variance. In addition, the results do not 
support H3. Here too, the results show an effect size that is not significant and no 
additional explained variance. The inclusion of the three-way interaction term, in 
Model 7, significantly increases the explained variance over Model 6 (chi square 
difference = 6.69, p < .01). The effect of the configuration or three-way interaction 















Table 24: Random-effects GLS estimation of EA against entrepreneurial capacity, government policy and regulations and ED 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 β S.E. Β S.E. Β S.E. Β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
ED 0.015 0.012 0.018 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012 -0.033 0.034 -0.025 0.084 -0.28* 0.146 
Informal 0.023*** 0.009   0.017** 0.007 0.028 0.031 0.014** 0.007 0.059 0.116 -0.353 0.217 
H1: Formal   0.021*** 0.008 0.016** 0.007 0.026 0.027 -0.065 0.049 -0.064 0.077 -0.557* 0.327 
H2: Formal # 
Informal 
      -0.004 0.011   -0.007 0.017 0.176 0.112 
H3: Formal # 
ED 
        0.019 0.012 0.023* 0.013 0.135* 0.071 
Informal # ED           -0.006 0.034 0.088* 0.051 
H4, H5: Formal 
# Informal # ED 
            -0.041* 0.024 
Constant -0.021 0.052 -0.029 0.055 -0.038 0.052 -0.068 0.101 0.165 0.135 0.082 0.281 1.194* 0.62 
               
R square within 0.153  0.136  0.201  0.201  0.234  0.238  0.263  
R square 
between 
0.139  0.193  0.196  0.201  0.172  0.179  0.187  
R square 
overall 
0.1  0.182  0.175  0.178  0.171  0.18  0.193  
Wald chi-
square (df) 
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formal 
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I use the she slopes shown in Table 25 below to test Hypotheses H4 and H5. 
Table 25: Simple slope analysis for   configuration of entrepreneurial capacity, 
government policy and regulations and ED 
 Informal institutional development 
Low High 
ED Low -0.001 (.08) 0.014 (.10) 
High 0.037 (.13) 0.025 (.14) 
The two cells where low ED intersects with low informal institutional development 
(slope = -.001) and high informal institutional development (slope = .014) confirm, 
an increase in the positive moderating effect of informal institutional development 
on the formal institutions-EA relationship at low levels of ED. This result supports 
Hypothesis H4. 
The two cells where high ED intersects with low informal institutional 
development (slope = .037) and high informal institutional development (slope = 
.025) confirm, a decrease in the positive moderating effect of informal institutional 
development on the formal institutions-EA relationship at high levels of ED. This 

















8. Discussion and conclusions 
There is yet more to understand about the underlying causes of the cross-country 
variance in EA (Levie and Autio, 2011). Plans to increase EA have become an 
important element of country strategies for economic restructuring. However, 
transaction problems prevail because of uncertainty and information asymmetry 
(Li and Zahra, 2011; De Clercq et al, 2011b; Welter, 2011). Policymakers seeking 
to encourage EA must devise ways to help entrepreneurs overcome such 
uncertainty and information asymmetry. Both formal and informal institutions 
provide the proper incentives to help reduce such problems. Consequently, the 
thesis roots its theoretical perspective of institutions in institutional economics 
(North, 1990). 
This thesis suggests that a country's formal institutions affect its EA. The more 
developed these institutions, the more they reduce information asymmetry and 
uncertainty to incentivise EA. Further, it proposes that informal incentives 
moderate the formal institutions-EA relationship. In turn, the differences in the 
availability of opportunities through differences in ED levels moderate the effect 
of culture. Informal constraints considered included the local society’s attitudes 
towards an entrepreneurial profession as well as their orientation towards risk 
taking and individualism. A collectivist attitude restricts the development of formal 
institutions and limits EA to those with social ties from an existing network. As a 
result, other potential entrepreneurs excluded from joining the network might not 
get an opportunity to start an enterprise. In particular, I develop and test the 
following hypotheses: 
• H1: The higher the level of formal institutional development, the higher the 
level of EA 
• H2: The higher the level of informal institutional development, the greater 
the positive relationship between the level of formal institutional 
development and the level of EA 
• H3: The higher the level of ED, the lesser the positive relationship between 











• H4: At lower levels of ED, the positive moderating effect that informal 
institutional development has on the formal institutions-EA relationship 
increases 
• H5: At higher levels of ED, the positive moderating effect that informal 
institutional development has on the formal institutions-EA relationship 
decreases 
I construct a panel dataset based on the GEM and World Bank Group 
Entrepreneurship Surveys and the IMF database for up to 45 countries over the 
2000–2007 periods. I test the hypotheses by means of a random effects 
generalised least squares model in a hierarchical multiple regression procedure. 
This procedure tests the significance in the variance of cross-country EA when 
adding two-way and three-way interaction terms. While contingency approach 
refers to the examination of two-way interaction, a configurational approach 
refers to the examination of three-way interactions (Wiklund and Shepard, 2005). 
The regressors included not only explanatory variables themselves but also 
multiples of explanatory variables. One commonly tests moderating or interaction 
effects, by multiplying the explanatory variables with a conditional effect on one 
another.  
In the process of developing the theoretical framework, I also sought to develop 
an operational framework that links institutions to the conditions for EA. This 
operational framework suggests that formal institutions associate with O&Is, FC 
and explicit HC or education. In addition, informal institutions associate with SC 
and tacit HC like practical experience. A number of indicators in the GEM expert 
survey confirm the adequacy of this framework (see Section 7.2).  
8.1 Discussion of results  
While the GEM EFC on policies and regulations featured as a useful indicator of 
O&Is, the GEM EFC on the social image of the entrepreneur served as an 
indicator of cognitive SC. While formal institutions tend to influence O&Is, 
informal institutions tend to influence cognitive SC (See Section 4.3). Cognitive 
SC has a stronger association with EA than structural or relational SC. Relational 











cognitive SC relates to a particular cultural context, for example the culture of risk 
taking and individualism (Thomas and Mueller, 2000). I measured cognitive SC 
using GEM EFCs such as societal attitudes towards entrepreneurship and 
cultural norms and values such as individualism and risk-taking. Except for De 
Clercq et al (2011) and Pinillos and Reyes’ (2011) work on culture and EA, extant 
research predominantly relies on social network arguments of informal influences 
on country level EA. Such SC measures only depict the structure of social 
relations (Arenius and De Clercq, 2005; Anderson et al, 1994).  
Though the cognitive dimension has not been discussed in the mainstream 
literature on SC (Liao and Welsch, 2003), it has the potential to encapsulate all 
dimensions of SC. Thus, one might be able to extend arguments based on 
observations of cognitive SC to arguments around structural and relational SC. 
Without physical centrality or networks (structural SC), entrepreneurs would be 
less likely to develop trustful relationships (relational SC), subsequently 
hampering the formation of a culture of shared beliefs (cognitive SC). 
Alternatively, an entrepreneurial network with shared beliefs will more likely 
develop trusting relationships among the entrepreneurs and between the 
entrepreneurs and other actors in the network (Liao and Welsch, 2003). 
The use of policies and regulations and culture to represent formal and informal 
institutions respectively resulted in empirical support for all of the hypotheses 
except H2 and H3. Hypotheses H2 and H3 predict the explanatory potential of EA 
through two-way interactions between formal institutions and informal institutions 
as well as between formal institutions and ED. Countries with higher levels of 
formal institutional development contain higher levels of EA (H1). Positive 
attitudes towards an entrepreneurial profession as well as a high orientation 
towards risk taking and individualism increases the effect of formal institutions 
such as policies and regulations on EA. This increase in the effect of formal 
institutions predominates among less developed countries (H4) than developed 
countries (H5). The results show that both formal and informal institutions 
contribute to EA, and suggest that the same formal institutions used in different 











While a contingency approach (two-way interactions) does not provide additional 
information over and above a main-effects-only model, a configuration (three-way 
interaction) of formal and informal institutions and ED does. The added role of an 
informal institution such as culture appears insignificant (H2). In line with findings 
by Pinillos and Reyes (2011), the effect of culture only becomes significant when 
considering it in the light of a country’s level of ED. Even the added effect of ED 
on the formal institutions-EA relations is not significant (H3) without considering 
the effect of culture. Implications are that insights into EA does not reach 
consistently high levels across all countries despite their efforts at formal 
institutional reforms can be gained through the concomitant study of the effects of 
informal institutions and ED. 
When formal institutions help reduce transaction costs they incentivise EA. Thus, 
the debottlenecking of political, economic and contractual constraints is important 
because transaction costs influence economic exchange in a significant way 
(North, 1990). For instance, the allocation of cash flow and control rights depend 
on the institutions that underpin the adequacy of property rights in incentivising 
entrepreneurs to start businesses (Alvarez et al, 2008). Another circumstance, 
information asymmetry hinders EA (Cohen and Winn, 2007), since it leads to 
incomplete information and an increase in search costs. Such circumstances 
make it costly to evaluate opportunities. They also make it costly to monitor and 
enforce contracts and to protect the property rights of the entrepreneurs involved.  
While formal institutions structure economic exchange under conditions of high 
costs and incomplete information, longstanding attitudes and cultural orientations 
provide continuity and reduce uncertainty (Li and Zahra, 2011; North, 1990). 
While formal institutions can undergo deliberate reform, culturally-based informal 
constraints tend to resist reforms. This thesis’s findings imply that formal 
institutional reforms will not succeed in adequately incentivising individuals to 
start businesses while prevailing informal institutions continue to contribute 
towards uncertainty. 
An individualistic cultural orientation that motivates personal achievement helps 











orientation enables more contract-based, arms-length market transactions 
(Tiessen, 1997).  
On the other hand, this thesis suggests that high levels of collectivism (low-levels 
of individualism) will tend to reduce the effect of formal institutional reforms on 
EA. High levels of collectivism tend to rely more on informal connections to help 
with transactions (Gould, 1993). Contract-based, arms-length market transactions 
in collectivist societies might signal lack of trust and even conflict (Steensma et 
al., 2000a). Those who wish to avoid such conflict will tend not to start 
businesses even though they have the desire and the skills to do so. In addition, 
transactions influenced by informal relationships can be difficult to maintain in a 
cost effective manner, hindering further transactions (Peng, 2003).  
This thesis’s results lend support to the preceding arguments only under an 
additional condition of ED. They suggest that a culture of individualism and risk 
taking enhances the effect of policy and regulatory reforms on EA more sharply 
among less developed than developed countries. The effects of societal attitudes 
and cultural orientations tend to depend on the nature of opportunities that arise 
from ED considerations such as the predominant economic structure whether 
agriculturally, manufacturing or services based. 
These results support argument  that formal institutional development affects EA 
particularly among less developed countries (Haggard et al, 2008). Thus, 
improvements in formal institutions have a greater impact on EA at the factor-
driven and efficiency driven stages of ED. Low opportunity EA exists among less 
developed countries. Baliamoune-Lutz (2007) showed that the initial conditions 
matter such that institutional reform affects EA positively at low levels of EA and 
negatively at high levels. Further support for the enhanced effect of policy and 
regulatory reforms on EA among less-developed countries arises from the non-
linear S-shaped trend across the entire spectrum of ED levels (Acs and Szerb, 
2009. EA rises steeply among less developed countries and plateaus among 
more advanced countries.  
Generally, the regulatory context protects large incumbents’ market shares in 











favours large established corporations. Högfeldt (2004) describes in detail how 
Sweden’s social democratic governments forged de facto partnerships with large 
established corporate groups, essentially offering protection from competitors in 
return for cooperation in implementing new social policies. They argue that 
politicians quite understandably find dealing with the controlling owners of a few 
large corporate groups simpler and more predictable than dealing with the 
managers of many smaller independent firms. 
The low ED levels characteristic of less developed countries are marked by a 
shift from factor-driven to more efficiency and innovation-driven type economic 
activity (Lopez-Claros et al, 2007). Among efficiency-driven economies, service 
activities begin to increase. This results in a sharp increase in entrepreneurial 
opportunities. As discussed before (see Section 5.2.4) the supply chain extends 
from a low base of agricultural type opportunities to include both manufacturing 
and service opportunities (Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996). Service opportunities 
in particular have low start-up costs and will tend to increase EA significantly. 
These service type businesses arise from manufacturing businesses focusing on 
their core operations and relying on outsourced support services. In this context 
of low ED and increasing entrepreneurial opportunity, formal institutional reforms 
have a high impact on EA on condition that the societal attitudes towards EA are 
positive. 
Rodrik et al (2004) show how reforms in formal institutions among less developed 
Eastern European economies gave rise to increased investments and increased 
opportunities for potential entrepreneurs. In another case of low levels of ED, 
Botswana in Africa, local customs boosted the positive effects of formal 
institutional reforms on EA. Acemoglu et al (2002) show how the norms and 
values of the Tswana people supported EA and how years of British rule 
reinforced these. 
Boettke et al (2008) compare the privatisation efforts in Poland to that of Russia. 
The tolerance of a small but legitimate number of private businesses during 
Poland’s communist reign helped facilitate its transition to a market-economy. 
Before the collapse of communism, Poland also passed the 1988 Law on 











private business. Although these private firms were not a dominant part of 
Poland’s economy during the communist period, it became easier for both the 
populace and politicians to build on this underlying culture of private enterprise. 
There was nothing, however, comparable in the Soviet Union. There, an elite 
became wealthy by taking over control of state assets. 
Among countries at a higher level of ED, high-quality economic, political, and 
legal institutions are prevalent (Sobel, 2008). There tends to be more reliable tax 
systems, more predictable and consistent laws, better established legal 
enforcement mechanisms, and less administrative red tape (Manolova et al, 
2008; Puffer et al., 2010). At these high levels of ED, there exists already an 
existing culture of positive attitudes towards EA (Pinillos and Reyes, 2011; 
Shane, 1992). These high levels of ED also correspond to higher trust societies 
(Williamson, 2011).  
High ED levels are marked by shifts in economic activity characteristic of 
innovation-challengers, innovation-followers and innovation-leaders (Acs and 
Szerb, 2009). High levels of HC as well as the services nature of the economy 
with related low barriers to entry associated with the low set-up costs of service 
type companies, results in higher EA among these innovation-driven economies 
than that within factor and efficiency-driven ones. Though opportunities continue 
to be high, EA increases less steeply. Increased competition exists among the 
many enterprises. This high competition slows down the entry of further 
enterprises into the market. 
8.2 Theoretical contribution  
Nuanced explanations of differences in cross-country EA are still forthcoming 
(Levie and Autio, 2010). The current explanations of cross-country EA (Klapper et 
al, 2006; Djankov et al, 2002,Aidis et al, 2012; De Clercq et al, 2011b; Levie and 
Autio, 2010; Lim et al, 2010; Kreiser et al, 2010; Acs and Szerb, 2009) have 
tended to omit either one of formal institutions, informal institutions, or ED in their 
models. In other words, they have not fully explained country level differences in 
EA based on all three variables: formal institutions, informal institutions, and ED. 











informal institutions under different ED contexts remains underdeveloped in the 
literature. Klapper et al (2006) and Djankov et al (2002) recognise the simple 
causal effect of formal institutions on EA. I go on to extend their work to include 
explanations of how this effect varies among different societal and ED settings. 
More broadly, I contribute to efforts at integrating the fields of economics and 
management to explain EA. Naudé (2010) notes that one should explain EA 
based on institutions to further such efforts. 
A configurational approach enabled me to put forth more nuanced explanations 
of cross-country EA. Instead of explaining how some institutions are better at 
explaining EA than others are, I could show how they combine to affect EA. Thus, 
rather than explain EA through singular causation and linear relationships, I could 
now assume complex causality and nonlinear relationships allowing for possible 
explanations where institutions complement one another in one context and 
compensate one another in another. When I introduce ED into the model, I find 
both compensating and complementary effects within similar contexts.  
For instance, support for this thesis’s configurational hypotheses suggests that 
for low ED contexts, formal institutional reforms have a greater effect on EA when 
informal institutions develop. This effect decreases for high ED contexts. This 
suggests that informal institutional development complements formal institutional 
reforms at low levels of ED. At higher levels of ED, informal institutions 
compensate for formal institutions. In a sense, stronger formal institutions have a 
maximum threshold when informal institutions and the economy are developed. 
One need not develop formal institutions beyond this threshold for high levels of 
both informal institutions and ED. 
In order to explain these trends one has to consider the underlying incentives and 
opportunities, as the individual perceives them. Earlier I argued that institutions 
influence the incentives while ED influences the opportunities. I based this on 
assumptions that opportunities are independent of the individual’s incentives 
(Shane and Venkatraman, 2000). The need for institutions to complement one 
another at lower levels of ED suggests that these aligned incentives are 
compensating for the low levels of opportunities. Institutions need not align when 











countries can compensate for state-driven incentives. One should not interpret 
this to mean that countries can get by with weak state-driven incentives but rather 
that they do not require strengthening beyond a certain threshold once informal 
institutions develop. In any case, developed countries are unlikely to contain 
weak formal institutions (Acemoglu et al, 2004/5).  
At lower levels of ED, it seems that opportunities relate to individual incentives. 
Individual incentives compensate for lower levels of opportunities within such 
contexts. It might be that individuals perceive incentives as opportunities. This 
lends support to theories that opportunities are not waiting to be found (Ardichvili 
et al. 2003) and like incentives, they arise within an individual. Opportunities are 
“enacted” based on the entrepreneur’s perception, interpretation, and 
understanding of environmental forces rather than simply discovered (Dutta and 
Crossan, 2005; Gartner 1985). Moreover, this thesis indicates that the creation 
perspective of opportunities (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006) can explain increases in EA at 
lower levels of ED where independent discovery type opportunities (Shane, 2003) 
are scarce. The discovery perspective of opportunities adopts the assumption 
that opportunities form through exogenous shocks to pre-existing industries, to be 
exploited by unusually alert individuals or firms (Kirzner, 1989; Shane, 2003). The 
creation perspective of opportunities adopts the assumption that entrepreneurs 
themselves through an enactment process (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006) form 
opportunities endogenously. 
Because of the complex interdependencies between EA, ED and institutions, 
current literature has not articulated the direction of these effects. This thesis 
proposes one possible explanation of the direction of the effects of institutions 
and ED on EA. Unlike extant literature, I consider ED as a key explanatory 
variable of EA rather than an outcome. Boettke and Coyne (2003) support this by 
suggesting that ED gives rise to EA, proposing like Baumol (1990) that the 
adoption and development of institutions encourage EA. Overall, I acknowledge 
further nuances that require investigation because of such complex 
interdependencies between these variables.  
Related to the issue of directionality, I also question whether opportunities or 











possibility of incentives coming first. The individual entrepreneur initiates the 
exploitation of an opportunity. I therefore place incentives before opportunities. 
Since the expected profit opportunities accruing from entrepreneurship are the 
result of knowledge not commercialised by the incumbent firms, the magnitude of 
new knowledge shapes opportunities but the commercialisation capabilities of 
incumbent firms constrains them (Acs et al, 2009). In this process of opportunity 
existence and the perception of opportunities, it seems then that one can rely on 
the concept of incentives to explain the perception of opportunities as sources of 
profit.  
The above argument assumes that opportunities are real and independent of the 
entrepreneurs that perceive them (Shane, 2003). Opportunities are objective but 
the perception of opportunities is subjective (Hayek, 1937). Knight (1921) 
expressed the same idea in somewhat different language when he introduced his 
distinction between objective risk and subjective uncertainty and identified 
uncertainty-bearing as the economic function of the entrepreneur. However, my 
discussion on the creation perspective of opportunities explains how EA still 
increases in low opportunity contexts also indicates that this directionality issue 
requires further probing. The instituti nal approach views economics as a theory 
of choice subject to constraints. In addition to modifying the rationality postulate 
of neoclassical economics, it adds institutions as a critical constraint and 
analyses the role of transaction costs as the connection between institutions and 
costs of production. It extends economic theory by incorporating ideas and 
ideologies into the analysis, modelling the political process as a critical factor in 
the performance of economies, as the source of the diverse performance of 
economies, and as the explanation for inefficient markets. While neoclassical 
economics takes for granted the existence of enterprises, and focuses on how 
they interact in markets, it does not adequately explain the creation of these 
enterprises. The neoclassical result of efficient markets only obtains when it is 
costless to transact. Institutions, however, matter when it is costly to transact 
(North, 1990). 
Economic theories based on mature and highly developed economies prove 











institutional constraints. Which institutional factors most significantly affect 
entrepreneurship depend on an economy’s stages of ED. For example, state-of-
the-art accounting disclosure rules are of little use in an economy with a majority 
illiterate population and corrupt judges. EA in developing countries often entails 
an individual setting up a small business to earn a living. At this stage, the state 
can promote EA by offering entrepreneurs secure ownership of their businesses, 
legal enforcement of business contracts they enter, basic communication and 
transportation infrastructure and transportation infrastructure, and an educated 
population from which to hire. This can stimulate economic growth, as small 
business owners and employees develop business skills and the broader society 
comes to appreciate their achievements. Individuals who succeed in these 
endeavours save from their earnings and invest further in the human capital of 
their children, in their own businesses or more broadly. This creates opportunities 
for developing a financial system, which extends entrepreneurial career 
opportunities to people lacking personal or family wealth. This sows the seed for 
the next stage of ED and for more intense EA. Accounting disclosure standards, 
bank regulation, and corporate governance now take prominence as 
entrepreneurs’ needs for large-scale capital grow (Fogel et al, 2006).  
Moreover, arguments on the effects of formal institutional reforms on EA cannot 
apply universally without the concomitant consideration of both informal 
institutions and ED. Staw (1995) suggests that a strong theoretical argument 
should demonstrate when effects intensify or weaken. One can then place much 
greater confidence in the theory. He goes on to observe that too often, 
moderating variables are isolated in an atheoretical manner, providing empirical 
limits to a finding rather than offering any insight on the theoretical mechanism 
itself. 
Though acknowledged in part within the theoretical literature, often by simple 
two-way interactions or contingency effects, little empirical research has 
documented the simultaneous interaction of all of the three variables in formal 
and informal institutions and ED. This thesis consolidates several arguments 
based two-way interactions (Pinillos and Reyes, 2011; Danis et al, 2010; 











the effect of informal institutions on EA depends on the level of ED (Pinillos and 
Reyes, 2011). It also extends arguments that formal institutions influence EA 
more among less developed than developed countries (Haggard et al, 2008). 
Further, it supports research (Acs and Szerb, 2009) suggesting that cross-
country opportunity EA follows a non-linear S-shaped trend across the entire 
spectrum of ED levels - EA is increasing but non-linear. Overall, a configurational 
approach leads to a theory that can generalise to a wider range of institutional 
and economic contexts. 
The thesis also contributes methodologically. It demonstrates the usefulness of 
the configurational approach in extending an understanding of why there are 
differences in the effects of formal institutional reforms on country level EA. This 
approach can account for the simultaneous effects of cultural and economic 
contexts on policy and regulatory reforms. In addition, the thesis’s suggests a 
framework to relate institutions to conditions for EA. This framework has the 
promise of contributing to future theoretical development around the nexus of 
institutions, ED and EA. I suggest that formal institutions associate with 
conditions for EA such as O&Is, FC and explicit HC or education. In addition, 
informal institutions associate with SC and tacit HC like practical experience. I 
also locate a number of indicators in the GEM expert survey to test emerging 
arguments. 
This thesis also demonstrates the usefulness of going beyond structural SC 
measures like social ties and networks to use instead measures of cognitive SC 
like the local society’s attitude towards the entrepreneur as well as their cultural 
and social norms. Liao and Welsch (2003) found a strong association between 
cognitive SC and technology-based entrepreneurs while structural SC was 
associated more strongly to non-technology-based entrepreneurs. Informal 
institutions indicated by cognitive SC ought to increase the validity of findings 
since technology contributes significantly to ED. 
The thesis confirms prior research that individual freedom and EA go hand-in-
hand. It thus supports the use of generalised trust or trust in strangers as a 
means to measure informal institutions. This type of trust harmonises with the 











2011). Conceptually, this type of trust should be beneficial to a country’s 
economic performance. While at face value one expects increasing trust to be in 
harmony with collectivist societies, their hierarchical nature (Tabellini, 2010) and 
close relationships restricted to within-group associations actually limits trust 
(Olson, 1982). In countries with low levels of trust, people will transact more with 
close friends and relatives, as in collectivist societies, than with strangers.  
8.3 Practical contribution  
Those countries pursuing high EA levels need to devise ways to reduce the 
transaction problems associated with uncertainty and information asymmetry. 
Implications are that policy and regulatory reforms to reduce the transaction 
problems associated with EA cannot apply universally without the concomitant 
consideration of both informal institutions and economic structure. Policymakers 
wishing to craft formal incentives for EA based on successes among exemplar 
countries need to design for differences in the cultural and economic contexts in 
the respective countries. They can only expect high increases in EA when they 
make simultaneous efforts at influencing the populace’s cultural values and 
norms that favour free enterprise. Moreover, policymakers and politicians among 
less developed countries must have some affinity for the norms and values 
sympathetic to free enterprise.  
Though the malleability of informal institutions such as cultural values and norms 
are in dispute, targeting change might begin with educational investments (Autio, 
2009) and practical experience (Boettke et al, 2008)12. Until these are in place, 
reformers must realise that efforts to impose institutions, whether internally or 
externally-driven, will fail. Reformers could start with designing the educational 
system to infuse students with entrepreneurial attitudes, and to provide 
encouraging role models. Those with tertiary education general face the 
magnitude of opportunity costs that motivate one to target high growth EA. Thus, 
policymakers should prioritise the teaching of entrepreneurial attitudes in higher 
                                            
12 Niall Fergusen (2011) suggests that the spread of religion is also able to influence informal 
institutions such as culture. He describes the impact of the protestant work ethic on the economic 











educational institutions. Autio (2009) also suggest secondment schemes to 
enable managers and academics to take a temporary leave of absence to pursue 
an entrepreneurial idea. Policymakers could also encourage informal institutional 
mechanisms that promote experience sharing between successful high‐growth 
entrepreneurs and aspiring ones. Such efforts ought to bear fruits over the long 
term. Consequently, in the short term, there exists a modest influence of 
government policies on EA. In the long term, policies may have a greater impact.  
Alternatively, policymakers need to identify particular indigenous traditions that 
are in synergy with property rights, trade, and individual liberty (Boettke et al, 
2008)13 that their policies can piggyback. Institutions indigenously introduced but 
exogenous to the local culture are more successful than those that are 
exogenous through its source and its culture. For example, reforms imposed by 
organisations like the World Bank that are also not in tune with local culture will 
not work unless either the local government or the local populace share some 
values that underpin such reforms.  
In yet another perspective, Pinillos and Reyes (2011) suggest that in very low ED 
contexts where the collective spirit prevails, policy measures should rather take 
cognisance of this need for affiliation by promoting EA through cooperatives. For 
more developed countries, the emphasis should continue to be on the 
satisfaction of other needs such as self-realisation and personal achievement. 
Policymakers ought to formulate realistic policies that consider their country’s 
economic structure (Wennekers et al, 2005). They must assess whether their 
economic structure is mainly factor, efficiency, or innovation driven (Acs et al, 
2008a). Often factor-driven countries have high unemployment levels 
accompanied by a large skills deficit. Policymakers should therefore have a 
staggered approach to influencing their economic structure and the 
                                            
13 In South Africa, we observe the effects of civil servant’s poor attitudes towards business and 
entrepreneurs in the late payments to entrepreneurs for services rendered. Many small 
businesses in South Africa fail because they are not paid within the promised 15 to 30 day 












accompanying entrepreneurial opportunities. Therefore, in the case of factor-
driven economies it might be wise to target labour intensive manufacturing 
enterprises somewhat characteristic of an efficiency-driven economic structure. 
Though targeting innovation-driven activities will bring economic benefits it 
absorbs a limited number of highly skilled entrepreneurs. Policymakers ought to 
be wary of ambitious targeting of innovation–driven activities at the expense of 
relatively less skilled efficiency-driven activities. Overall, policymakers’ efforts 
must consider their local context. 
Factor-driven economies with reasonable institutions and reasonable policies 
might easily achieve high growth up to semi-industrialisation (Rodrik, 2002). 
However, the institutional requirements of reigniting growth in an efficiency-driven 
economy can be significantly more demanding. Policymakers within low-income 
countries that have a relatively strong base of cultural norms and values in 
support of EA will do well to reform their policies and regulations. On the other 
hand, policymakers will have trouble in low-income countries with a history of 
negative attitudes or unsupportive norms and values towards entrepreneurship. 
Policymakers within efficiency-driven economies might do well to strengthen their 
institutions further through entrepreneurship promotion, education programmes 
and other such efforts (see for example Lundström and Stevenson (2005) and 
Hoffmann (2007)).  
Considerations of formal policies that directly incentivise entrepreneurs together 
with other policies to do with say education means that a singular government 
department cannot influence EA in an isolated manner. The framework used in 
this thesis confirms the multidisciplinary nature of entrepreneurship even at a 
macro level. The multidisciplinary nature of entrepreneurship calls for the 
requisite multidisciplinary policy approach. Thus, the design of government 
operations should prioritise the alignment of diverse government departments to 
the national goal of entrepreneurship development.  
8.4 Limitations and future research  
One cannot adequately cover all of the nuances of vast topics such as EA, 











insights into their contingent effects, which the majority of researchers have 
steered clear off until recently. 
The small number of less developed country observations limits this thesis. This 
might be cause for explicit HC (education) and FC conditions of EA not featuring 
in any statistically significant configurations. Higher variance makes it easier to 
detect relationships. For example, a higher variance in education level occurs 
among less developed countries than developed countries. Thus, the relationship 
between education and EA increases among less developed than in developed 
countries (Unger et al, 2011).  
While the quantitative approach used in this thesis has value in confirming the 
expected trends in the interactions between institutions and ED, a qualitative 
approach will delve deeper and explore more fully, why these trends occur. A 
multiple case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) ought to provide more insights 
into the nuances of the interactions emerging from this study. Future research 
should thus consider case studies of country groupings that correspond to some 
of the thesis’s findings. 
Researchers have not exhausted models of the interplay between institutions, ED 
and EA. For example, entrepreneurs do influence institutional change. Progress 
into higher levels ED also introduce new challenges, which if managed requires 
further institutional changes (Chang, 2010). Substitution effects also exist within 
either of formal or informal institutions. This requires careful modelling. However, 
one should balance this against the need for a parsimonious model. Future 
research could apply structural equation modelling to analyse for a more 
comprehensive range of interplay and endogeneity. 
 This thesis assumes that legally registered enterprises associate more closely 
with opportunity than necessity-driven EA. Levie and Autio (2011) suggest that 
entrepreneurs aspiring towards high-growth operations will register their 
businesses. Necessity or survival does not drive such entrepreneurs. 
Consequently, I used annual WBGES data on new and formally registered 
enterprises. Whilst GEM measures the potential for EA, the World Bank 











might well be that a portion of formal enterprises, albeit going through the efforts 
of a registration process, have origins steeped in survival or necessity. For 
example, professional people nowadays go through retrenchments. Recent 
experiences in the banking sector bear this out. Future research could replicate 
this research using specific GEM opportunity-driven EA data. 
Examinations of interactions also involve establishing regions of significance. In 
some cases, the dependent variable regresses significantly on the main 
explanatory variable at values of the moderator less than the lower bound and 
greater than the upper bound, while it regresses non-significantly at values of the 
moderator falling within the region (Preacher et al., 2006). In the absence of 
theoretically meaningful values, Cohen and Cohen (2003) recommend choosing 
values at the mean of the moderating explanatory variable and at one standard 
deviation above and below the mean. I chose to apply this approach. Future 
researchers should consider establishing the regions of significance using more 
advanced calculation procedures. 
This research has not considered a number of control variables arguing that the 
random effects estimator has accounted for these and that the most commonly 
used control for cross-country studies, GDP, is an explanatory variable in this 
thesis. Other controls might be appropriate. For example, as potential 
entrepreneurs age they become risk averse and the rate of EA might decrease. 
Future research might consider controlling for average age to account for the 
aging population among advanced economies (Acs and Szerb, 2009). Future 
research might explore other examples of controls such as unemployment, 
female entrepreneurship participation, an in-depth sector distribution, population 
growth, land size, economic cycles, period in democracy and wealth disparity. 
Finally, this thesis has not used the GEM EFC measure on intellectual property 
rights. This EFC would have made a useful indicator of formal institutions. Future 
researchers might consider using this GEM EFC. 
This thesis has not operationalized arguments on the increasing role of 
intrapreneurship in the context of ED and institutions. I suspect that increasing 
intrapreneurship among advanced economies contributes to the observed decline 











a variable indicating innovation and entrepreneurship within existing businesses 
as Bosma et al (2010) have recently done. Since two dependent variables will 
come into play - entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship - this might involve a type 
of Manova technique or perhaps a SEM approach.  
Lastly, the analysis has been restricted to country-level data. Even though the 
process proposed by the model appears to work at the population level, different 
patterns might occur when using longitudinal individual-level data. The GEM EFC 
data are based on impressions of experts, rather than ‘‘hard’’ data (Levie and 
Autio, 2008). For example, experts might have an ideal of entrepreneurs based 
on several values and attitudes, but those values may not be determinants of EA 
in some regions (Alvarez et al., 2011). For this reason, it might be that though 
some of the GEM EFCs did not lend empirical support to conditions for EA, 
others like the World Bank’s Doing Business data might do. Researchers should 
replicate this work with other datasets. Alternatively, future research might 
consider multilevel methods that analyse for both individual and country level 
responses. Recent work by De Clercq et al (2011b) and Acs and Autio (2010) 
provide exemplars of multilevel methods applied to entrepreneurship research.  
8.5 Conclusions 
The effectiveness of higher levels of formal institutions on EA depends on their 
surrounding cultural and economic context. Countries with higher levels of formal 
institutions tend to have higher levels of EA within contexts of increasing cultural 
orientation towards risk taking and individual freedom within the local society. 
Formal institutions affect EA more among less developed than developed 
countries.  
Policymakers wishing to adopt formal institutions that have successfully provided 
incentives to entrepreneurs in an exemplar country have to also design for any 
differences in the cultural and economic contexts of the respective countries. In 
other words, a country’s entrepreneurs respond differently to the incentives 
provided by formal institutions depending on societal incentives and the nature of 
opportunities due to the predominant economic structure whether agriculturally, 











variations in EA due to both an institutional and ED context. As a result, it 
provides a theory that generalises to a wider range of institutional and economic 
contexts.  
The effect of formal institutions on EA does not depend on informal institutions 
alone. As a result, the interaction effects between formal and informal institutions 
do not apply universally. For institutions to provide a universal explanation of EA, 
their concomitant interaction with ED becomes important. Previously, Pinillos and 
Reyes (2011) suggested that the contingent effect of culture on the formal 
institutions-EA relationship only becomes significant when considering it in the 
light of a country’s level of ED. In particular, I find that at lower levels of ED, the 
positive moderating effect of higher levels of informal institutional development on 
the formal institutions-EA relationship increases. At higher levels of ED, the 
positive moderating effect of higher informal institutional development on the 
formal institutions-EA relationship decreases. 
By introducing the nuances due to differences in ED levels, these findings enrich 
arguments that formal institutions are more effective within contexts where the 
local society supports the values and norms associated with free enterprise 
(Boettke et al, 2008; Biggart and Guillen, 1999; North, 1990). They also lend 
empirical support to arguments that formal institutional reforms have a greater 
impact on EA among less developed than developed countries (Haggard et al, 
2008; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009; Iyigun and Rodrik, 2004). Thus, formal institutional 
reform particularly affects the factor and efficiency-driven stages of ED, where the 
structural changes introduce sharp increases in opportunities.  
These results support research showing that institutions and ED have an 
increasing but non-linear effect on EA (Acs and Szerb, 2009). The effects of 
institutions and economic structure cause EA to increase more steeply among 
less developed than developed countries. Among developed countries, higher 
levels of institutions and associated low barriers to entry have been around for 
longer. The high levels of competition that exist among the resultant large 












Lastly, in the process of developing the theoretical framework, this thesis sought 
to develop a framework that links institutions to the conditions for EA. This 
framework suggests that formal institutions associate with O&Is, FC and explicit 
HC or education. In addition, informal institutions associate with to SC and tacit 
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Appendix 1: Research instrument 








Formal Finance EFC Fin1 0.8249  A01  In my country, there is sufficient 
equity funding available for new 
and growing firms 
0.8121 
Finance EFC  A02  In my country, there is sufficient 
debt funding available for new 
and growing firms 
0.9797 
Finance EFC  A03 In my country, there are sufficient 
government subsidies available 
for new and growing firms 
0.68 
       
Formal Finance EFC Fin2 0.843 A04 In my country, there is sufficient 
funding available from private 
individuals (other than founders) 
for new and growing firms 
0.8308 
Finance EFC  A05 In my country, there is sufficient 
venture capitalist funding 
available for new and growing 
firms 
0.8317 
Finance EFC  A06 In my country, there is sufficient 
funding available through initial 
public offerings (IPOs) for new 
and growing firms 
0.8915 
       
Formal Policy EFC GPR 0.9112 B01 In my country, government 
policies (e.g., public 
procurement) consistently favour 
new firms 
0.7666 
Policy EFC B02 In my country, the support for 
new and growing firms is a high 
priority for policy at the national 
government level 
0.7623 
Policy EFC B03 In my country, the support for 
new and growing firms is a high 





B04  In my country, new firms can get 
most of the required permits and 




B05 In my country, the amount of 
taxes is NOT a burden for new 




B06 In my country, taxes and other 
government regulations are 
applied to new and growing firms 





B07 In my country, coping with 
government bureaucracy, 
regulations and licensing 
requirements is not unduly 
difficult for new and growing firms 
0.8958 
       
Formal Primary 
education EFC 
Prim 0.9012 D01 In my country, teaching in 
primary and secondary education 
encourages creativity, self-





















education EFC  
D02 In my country, teaching in 
primary and secondary education 
provides adequate instruction in 
market economic principles 
0.8913 
Primary 
education EFC  
D03 In my country, teaching in 
primary and secondary education 
provides adequate attention to 
entrepreneurship and new firm 
creation 
0.9067 
       
Formal Higher 
education EFC 
High 0.7703 D04  In my country, colleges and 
universities provide good and 
adequate preparation for starting 




D05 In my country, the level of 
business and management 
education provides good and 
adequate preparation for starting 




D06  In my country, the vocational, 
professional and continuing 
education systems provide good 
and adequate preparation for 
starting up and growing new firms 
0.8322 
       
Formal R&D transfer 
EFC 
RDev 0.8668 E01  In my country, new technology, 
science, and other knowledge are 
efficiently transferred from 
universities and public research 




E02  In my country, new and growing 
firms have just as much access 
to new research and technology 




E03 In my country, new and growing 





E04 In my country, there are 
adequate government subsidies 
for new and growing firms to 




E05  In my country, the science and 
technology base efficiently 
supports the creation of world-
class new technology-based 




E06 In my country, there is good 
support available for engineers 
and scientists to have their ideas 
commercialized through new and 
growing firms 
0.875 




MDyn 0.9672 G01 In my country, the markets for 
consumer goods and services 






G02 In my country, the markets for 
business-to-business goods and 
services change dramatically 
from year to year 
0.9809 




















openness EFC  
Mope 0.8455 G03 In my country, new and growing 





G04  In my country, the new and 
growing firms can afford the cost 
of market entry 
0.9382 
Market 
openness EFC  
G05 In my country, new and growing 
firms can enter markets without 





G06 In my country, the anti-trust 
legislation is effective and well 
enforced 
0.4958 
       
Informal Entrep culture 
EFC  
ECul 0.8861 I01 In my country, the national 
culture is highly supportive of 
individual success achieved 




I02  In my country, the national 
culture emphasizes self-











I04 In my country, the national 





I05  In my country, the national 
culture emphasizes the 
responsibility that the individual 
(rather than the collective) has in 
managing his or her own life 
0.8196 
       
Informal Entrep 
Capacity EFC 
ECap 0.8569 L01 In my country, many people know 





L02 In my country, many people know 





L03 In my country, many people have 





L04 In my country, many people can 
react quickly to good 




L05  In my country, many people 
have the ability to organize the 
resources required for a new 
business 
0.9077 
        
Informal Entrep social 
image EFC  
ESIm 0.843 M01 In my country, the creation of 
new ventures is considered an 
appropriate way to become rich 
0.8293 
Entrep social 
image EFC  
M02  In my country, most people 
consider becoming an 




image EFC  
M03 In my country, successful 
entrepreneurs have a high level 





















image EFC  
M04 In my country, you will often see 




image EFC  
M05 In my country, most people think 
of entrepreneurs as competent 
and resourceful individuals 
0.6955 
       
 Knowent Know NA Q1G You know someone personally 
who started a business in the 
past 2 years. 
NA 
       
 Entrepreneuria
l Activity 
EA NA  New company registrations 
divided by total registrations per 
year (WBGES data) 
NA 
       
 logGDPcap ED NA  GDP per capita data available 
from the IMF website 
NA 
       
 Country Country NA  Country name. Fixed effects 
based on dummy variables (or 
mean-centred differences) 
NA 
 Year Year NA  Year of measurement. Fixed 
effects based on dummy 













Appendix 2: Factor analysis 
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Factor 3 and 4: Finance1 (a01, a02, a03) (reliability = 0.8249), Finance 2 (a04, 
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Factor 5 and 6: Primary education (d01, d02, d03) (reliability = 0.9012), Higher 
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Factor 10 and 11: Market dynamism (g01, g02) (reliability =0.9672), Market 
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Appendix 3: Illustration of simple slope computation 
The simple slope was computed using the coefficients in the Table below. The 
equation that was used to compute the slopes is as follows: 
   (b1 + b4 (z) + b5 (w) + b7 (zw)) 
Table A4.1 Configuration lgGDPcap x GPR x ESIm 
  mean std dev Weak Strong   
x GPR 2.507 .537 1.970 3.044   
z ESIm 3.351 .395 2.956 3.745   
w lgGDP 4.232 .437 3.795 4.669   
        
        
bo bx bz bw bxz bxw bzw bxzw 
2.294 -0.898 -0.598 -0.572 0.233 0.227 0.155 -0.058 












 slope -0.002   slope 0.046  









intercept 0.087  














Appendix 4: Results not used for hypothesis testing 
Table A4-1: Random-effects GLS estimation of EA against Know, RDev and ED indicators 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
ED 0.024* 0.013 0.018 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.018 0.013 -0.132* 0.074 -0.146* 0.077 -0.488** 0.205 
Informal -0.0002 0.017   -0.002 0.017 -0.226 0.148 -0.01 0.02 -0.329 0.245 -4.036** 1.822 
H1: Formal   0.019* 0.011 0.018 0.011 -0.014 0.028 -0.239* 0.124 -0.259** 0.117 -0.866** 0.347 
H2: Formal#Informal       0.09 0.058   0.057 0.068 1.572** 0.725 
H3: Formal#ED         0.061** 0.03 0.061** 0.029 0.201** 0.084 
Informal#ED           0.042 0.061 0.9** 0.439 
H4, H5, H6: Formal#Informal#ED             -0.349** 0.173 
Constant 0.0003 0.056 -0.022 0.062 -0.021 0.062 0.064 0.091 0.608** 0.306 0.723** 0.3001 2.197*** 0.843 
               
R square within 0.032  0.102  0.101  0.117  0.207  0.226  0.247  
R square between 0.113  0.073  0.075  0.078  0.062  0.055  0.068  
R square overall 0.094  0.086  0.087  0.082  0.065  0.064  0.068  
Wald chi-square (df) 3.25 (2)  4.66* (2)  4.86 (3)  11.06** (4)  9.34** (4)  12.73** (6)  17.84*** (7)  














Table A4-2: Random-effects GLS estimation of EA against ESIm, Fin2 and ED indicators 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
ED 0.022* 0.013 0.024 0.014* 0.022* 0.013 0.022* 0.013 -0.033 0.032 -0.062 0.078 -0.495*** 0.184 
Informal 0.019*** 0.007   0.02** 0.008 0.023 0.025 0.02** 0.008 -0.011 0.099 -0.549*** 0.201 
H1: Formal   0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.032 -0.095* 0.054 -0.066 0.066 -0.854** 0.372 
H2: Formal#Informal       -0.001 0.009   -0.005 0.009 0.222** 0.095 
H3: Formal#ED         0.022* 0.012 0.019 0.015 0.201** 0.085 
Informal#ED           0.01 0.023 0.136*** 0.048 
H4, H5, H6: Formal#Informal#ED             -0.052** 0.022 
Constant -0.055 0.065 -0.004 0.056 -0.054 0.065 -0.065 0.107 0.179 0.137 0.255 0.305 2.113*** 0.768 
               
R square within 0.07  0.031  0.07  0.071  0.11  0.118  0.159  
R square between 0.25  0.124  0.25  0.252  0.221  0.212  0.214  
R square overall 0.192  0.111  0.19  0.19  0.171  0.166  0.166  
Wald chi-square (df) 7.53** (2)  3.75 (2)  7.97** (3)  8.42* (4)  10.87** (4)  13.26** (6)  16.44** (7)  
Chi-square difference (df)      0.44 (1)   0.45 (1)   2.9* (1)   5.29  (3)   3.18* (1)  
Chi-square difference (df)     4.22** (1)             
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